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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis makes the Ahmadiyya a case for examining how colonial law in India 
defined Muslims, from the late nineteenth century through the 1930s. Contrary to the 
mainstream discourse on Muslim in India, which examines sectarian Muslim identity 
but discounts social stratification among Muslims, this thesis shows that there was a 
material basis for how the law differentiated Muslims that contributed to the creation 
of sectarian difference. First, it examines structures of landownership and social 
relations in personal law in colonial India. In the Punjab, customary law created a 
legal distinction between urban and rural Muslims, while blurring the legal distinction 
between rural Hindus and Muslims. Second, it examines the emergence of the 
Ahmadiyya among Muslim landowners in central Punjab within this legal context. 
Third, it looks at the Ahmadiyya's inclusion within Punjab’s structure of political 
representation, which maintained the rural and urban distinction, privileged rural 
Muslims, and marginalized urban Muslims. Fourth, it looks at an all-India structure of 
political representation, which subverted the legal distinction among urban and rural 
Muslims in the Punjab and delegitimized the Ahmadiyya as representative of Muslims. 
Finally, it examines all-India legislation introduced in the 1930s by Indian Muslims. 
These legislative reforms would have restructured Muslim personal law into a distinct 
legal system but were impeded by structures maintained through Punjab customary 
law. Ahmadis gave primacy to freedom of belief in Islam, including to conversion, 
which depended upon porous social boundaries between Hindu and Muslim personal 
law, as well as between caste communities. It concludes that the Ahmadiyya’s 
‘sectarian’ interpretation of Islamic law, contrary to Muslims who claimed ‘orthodox’ 
authority, was incompatible with the notion of a Muslim legal system that entailed the 
construction of impermeable social boundaries between communities in India. This 
thesis has implications for the discourse on human rights and Islamic law.  
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Introduction: The ‘Ahmadi Problem’ 
 
In 1935, Muhammad Iqbal raised the ‘Ahmadi problem’. In an open letter to 
the British people, Iqbal claimed that the integrity of Muslim society was held 
together by the ‘idea of the finality of prophethood alone’.1 He argued that the 
Ahmadiyya, as a community that arose from Islam and claimed a new prophet as its 
basis, was a danger to that integrity. The problem for Iqbal was that the British 
government in India, as a liberal state, allowed the ‘rebellious group’ to propagate 
their beliefs without concern for the integrity of the Muslim community. It demanded 
tolerance from the Muslim community in the face of its own disintegration. As a 
foreign government, it could not grasp the intensity of feelings felt by Indian Muslims 
against the Ahmadiyya, which arose from an ‘instinct for self-preservation’. Other 
Muslims, who preached tolerance to their Muslim brothers, were deprived of this 
instinct through ‘imperceptible westernization’. 
The ‘Ahmadiyya problem’ had an important afterlife in Pakistan, where the 
Ahmadiyya’s religious status became central to debates around how the Muslim state 
and political membership are constituted under Islamic law. Abul Ala Mawdudi was 
prominent among other Pakistani Islamist leaders who demanded that Pakistan’s 
government declare the Ahmadiyya to be non-Muslim.2 Like Iqbal, he argued that the 
                                                
1 Muhammad Iqbal, ‘Qadianis and Orthodox Muslims’, The Statesman, 14 May 1935. 
2 For analysis of the Jaamat-i-Islami and Mawdudi’s political theories, see: Seyyed Vali Reza, 
Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Roy 
Jackson, Mawlana Mawdudi and Political Islam: Authority and the Islamic State (London: Routledge, 
2008). 
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Ahmadiyya’s belief in continuous prophecy threatened the integrity of the Muslim 
community.3  During its first decades, Pakistan’s government treated such demands as 
subversive to the principles upon which it was founded. According to the 
government’s view, Muhammad Ali Jinnah (d. 1948) envisioned Pakistan to be a state 
that would protect the secular and religious rights of its citizens regardless of their 
religion. Islamists who demanded that Ahmadis be declared non-Muslim assumed 
Pakistan to be an Islamic state in which citizens’ rights would be determined by their 
religious status.4 Ahmadis’ right to propagate their beliefs was protected under 
Pakistan’s 1956 constitution, which included a fundamental rights chapter that 
guaranteed the right to religious freedom for all Pakistani citizens.5 This fundamental 
rights chapter aligned Pakistan’s domestic law with international human rights norms 
embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), while Pakistan’s 
government promoted a ‘modernist’ interpretation of Islamic law that accorded with 
these rights.6 
In 1974, however, the Ahmadiyya’s religious status changed when Pakistan’s 
National Assembly amended its constitution to define the Ahmadiyya as non-Muslim. 
President Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan’s first democratically elected leader, described 
the amendment as an act of national self-determination, expressing the democratic 
                                                
3 Abul Ala Maududi, The Qadiani Problem, (Lahore: Islamic Publications Limited, n.d. [1953]), 12; 
The Jamaat-i-Islami in Pakistan was an organization for the establishment of an Islamic state and laws 
through political and constitutional means.  
4 Muhammad Munir, Punjab Disturbances of 1953: Report of the Court of Inquiry, (Lahore: 
Government Printing, 1954), 149-202; For an analysis of the Munir Report, see Asad Ahmed, 
‘Advocating a Secular Pakistan: The Munir Report of 1954’ in Islam in South Asia in Practice, ed. by 
Barbara Metcalf (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 424-437. 
5 Martin Lau, Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law, 3 (1996), 382.  
6 On Pakistan’s ‘modernist’ interpretation of Islamic law see N.J. Coulson, ‘Reform of Family Law in 
Pakistan’ in Studia islamica 7 (1957), 135-155; N.J. Coulson, ‘The State and the Individual in Islamic 
Law’ in The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 6, 1 (1957), 49-60. 
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will of Pakistanis hitherto thwarted by an authoritarian state.7 The 1974 amendment 
legitimized a conception of ‘Islamic law’ as laws enacted by the state in defense of 
Islam, which brought it into conflict with the ‘modernist’ interpretation of Islamic law 
that Pakistan’s government had promoted in the past.8 Since then, anti-Ahmadi laws 
that make it a criminal offense for Ahmadis to ‘pose’ as Muslims have been enacted 
as ‘Islamic law’.9 These laws contribute to the violent persecution of Ahmadis in 
Pakistan and have been used to support the contention that Islamic law and the 
cultural values it embodies conflict with the international human rights norms 
embodied in the UDHR.10  
While recent scholarship has examined the Ahmadiyya’s exclusion from Islam 
under Pakistani law, this thesis examines how colonial law defined the Ahmadiyya’s 
inclusion and political membership within the Indian ‘Muslim community’ in the first 
                                                
7 Dawn, 7 September 1974. 
8 Pakistan played a prominent role promoting Article 18 (rights related to religious liberty) during the 
drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). In the 1990s, however, Pakistan led a 
bloc of Muslim states in forming the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), which has 
produced the ‘Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam’ that does not recognize religious liberty, 
conversion, and missionary work as individual rights. See, Susan Eileen Waltz, ‘Universal Human 
Rights: The Contribution of Muslim States’ in Human Rights Quarterly 26, 4 (2004), 817; Ann L. 
Mayer, Islam and Human Rights: Tradition and Politics (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2012), 
chapter 7.    
9 For an analysis of these laws, introduced in 1984 by President Zia al-Haq, see: Martin Lau, ‘The 
Legal Mechanism of Islamization: The New Islamic Criminal Law of Pakistan’ in Journal of Law and 
Society, 11, 1992, 43-58. On the disproportionate targeting of Christian and Ahmadi minorities through 
anti-blasphemy laws, see: Paula Schriefer, ‘Remarks by Paula Schriefer’ in Proceedings of the Annual 
Meeting (American Society of International Law) 106 (2012), 352. A database of newspaper reports of 
violent attacks on Ahmadis in Pakistan is maintained on the Ahmadiyya website: 
www.thepersecution.org.  The judgment that the treatment of Ahmadis in Pakistan amounts to 
persecution by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is found in: MN and 
Others (Ahmadis – country conditions – risk) Pakistan CG [2012] UKUT 389 (IAAC) (14 November 
2012). 
10 Mawdudi is taken to be an authority on Islamic law and human rights for his writings on the subject 
in Tibi, ‘Islamic Law/Shari'a, Human Rights’; and as ‘harmonizing’ human rights and Islamic law in 
Charles J. Adams, ‘Mawdudi and the Islamic State’ in Voices of Resurgent Islam, ed. John L. Esposito, 
99-133 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983). For Mawdudi’s writings on human rights and non-
Muslim minorities under Islamic law, see: Abul Ala Mawdudi, Human Rights in Islam, trans. Khurshid 
Ahmad and Ahmed Said Khan (Leicester: Islamic Foundation, 1976), and Rights of Non-Muslims in 
Islamic State, trans. Khurshid Ahmad (Lahore, Dacca: Islamic Publications, 1967).  
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place.11 This requires examining the legal system under which the Ahmadiyya 
emerged, and its classification of Indians along religious lines. It requires examining 
how it determined who was and was not Muslim and, inherent in this process, 
determined legitimate interpretation of Islamic law and doctrine. In this thesis, the 
Ahmadiyya become a ‘prism’ through which to examine colonial law in India from 
the late nineteenth century through the 1930s—from the time when the Ahmadiyya 
emerged to when Muhammad Iqbal raised the ‘Ahmadi problem’.12    
The changing legitimacy of the Ahmadiyya’s political membership within the 
Indian Muslim community reflected political developments in colonial India during 
this period. These political developments provide an overarching narrative for this 
thesis and the context in which the Ahmadiyya’s contested religious status is 
examined. The Ahmadiyya emerged in a political environment in which a colonial 
administration was concerned with maintaining economic and social stability within 
the Punjab’s agrarian society. This concern was reflected in policies focused on class 
relations in the Punjab, especially with protecting landowning classes and a mostly 
Muslim ‘peasantry’ from land dispossession by restricting a free market in land. 
These policies continued through the First World War, when the British 
administration relied heavily on rural Punjabis for recruitment into the Indian army, 
and the 1920s. After the expansion of representative institutions in India in 1919, they 
contributed to the creation of the Punjab Unionist Party, a class-based, pro-
agriculturalist party that included Ahmadis as Muslim representatives.  
                                                
11 On the Ahmadiyya’s exclusion from Islam in Pakistan see Sadia Saeed, ‘Pakistani Nationalism and 
the State Marginalisation of the Ahmadiyya Community in Pakistan’ in Studies in Ethnicity and 
Nationalism 7, 3 (2007): 132-152; Ali Usman Qasmi, The Ahmadis and the Politics of Religious 
Exclusion in Pakistan (London, New York: Anthem Press, 2014); Asad Ahmed, ‘Advocating a Secular 
Pakistan: The Munir Report of 1954’ in Islam in South Asia in Practice, ed. Barbara Metcalf 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 424-437. 
12 The term ‘prism’ was used by David Washbrook in his examination report of this thesis.  
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Muhammad Iqbal’s argument that the Ahmadiyya be excluded from the 
Muslim community reflected a changed political environment, in which the colonial 
administration was focused on the constitutional demands of all-India political parties. 
During the 1930s, Muslim politicians were concerned with political unity among 
Muslims in India divided by class interests. Iqbal’s argument for the exclusion of the 
Ahmadiyya, which conformed to a conception of the Muslim community as being 
united in terms of belief, related in fundamental ways to legal debates that were taking 
place during this time, including debates over the legitimacy of customary law over 
Muslims (which vested Punjabi ‘agriculturalist’ Muslims with ancient land rights and 
protection from land dispossession, but also defined them as belonging to pre-Islamic 
village communities),13 different conceptions of sovereignty among Muslims 
(whether Muslims formed a political community or belonged to diverse political 
communities),14 and the legitimacy of international law (whether a higher command 
over Islamic law was legitimate for Muslims). In the Punjab, this argument appealed 
to urban politicians and ulama who had been politically marginalized by the colonial 
administration.  
This thesis takes an approach to examining the law that focuses on the 
operation of personal law in civil suits brought before colonial courts in the Punjab, 
                                                
13 For these debates see Nelson, The Shadow of Shari’ah; David Gilmartin, ‘Customary Law and 
Sharî'at in British Punjab’ in Sharî'at and Ambiguities in South Asian Islam, ed. Katherine P. Ewing 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 43-62. 
14 Ayesha Jalal, Self and Sovereignty: Individual and Community in South Asian Islam Since 1850 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Chitralekha Zutshi, Languages of Belonging: Islam, Regional 
Identity, and the Making of Kashmir (London: Hurst and Company, 2004); Mridu Rai. Hindu Rulers, 
Muslim Subjects: Islam, Rights, and the History of Kashmir (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2004); David Gilmartin, Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan (London: I.B. Tauris & 
Co Ltd., 1988); Ian Talbot, Punjab and the Raj, 1849-1947 (Manohar: New Delhi, 1988); David. Page, 
Prelude to Partition: the Indian Muslims and the Imperial System of Control, 1920-1932 (Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 1982). 
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the province where the Ahmadiyya emerged.15 A system of personal law in India 
defined an individual’s civil rights, including property rights, according to the caste 
and religious community into which he or she was born. Many of the cases examined 
in this thesis involve conversion between religions, which gave rise to civil or 
property disputes. They illustrate how judges interpreted the boundaries between 
religious communities, and the economic and social implications inherent in their 
construction.  In the Punjab, judges had a large amount of discretionary power, 
especially in deciding whether a litigant followed custom or religious law.16 At the 
same time, an entire group’s caste or religious identity might be called into question 
when making this determination.  
Examining these civil suits brings Islamic law from the realm of abstraction 
down to the material level. They show what brought Punjabis to court, the kinds of 
claims that they made over property or their relations with other Indians, and what 
was at stake if they won or lost their cases. For example, in a few cases examined in 
this thesis, professing Muslims argued in court that they followed customary law and 
not Muslim personal law. In these cases, their being determined as following 
customary law would have prevented the alienation of their agricultural lands by 
leading to their recognition as having protected land rights.  In other cases, the 
‘punishment’ for apostasy from Islam under Islamic law, which operated in colonial 
India to automatically dissolve the marriage of an apostate, was used by Muslim 
women as a strategy to obtain divorce.  
                                                
15 For this approach see: David Washbrook, ‘Law, State, and Agrarian Society in Colonial India’ in 
Modern Asian Studies 15, 3 (1981), 649-721. For recent studies that adopt this approach see: Eleanor 
Newbigin, Leigh Denault and Rohit De, ‘Introduction: Personal Law, Identity Politics and Civil 
Society in colonial South Asia’ in Indian Economic Social History Review 46, 1 (2009), 1-4.    
16 Matthew Nelson, The Shadow of Shari’ah: Islam, Islamic Law, and Democracy in Pakistan (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2011). 
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This approach also allows us to examine the legal arguments of Punjabi 
Muslim lawyers who would become prominent politicians in India during the 1920s 
and 1930s (including the Ahmadi lawyer Zafrullah Khan who would become the 
Muslim member of the Viceroy’s council and Pakistan’s first foreign minister). It 
allows for a multidimensional examination of colonial law: on one level, the thesis 
considers colonial law as a law that was articulated by a British administration over an 
Indian subject population and aligned with its administrative concerns; on another 
level, it considers colonial law as a law that was practiced by men who were also 
colonial subjects (and recognized as legitimate by Indians who used colonial courts to 
settle their disputes).17 The judgments and arguments in these cases, furthermore, 
direct us to the sources of law and ‘fact’ that Punjab courts relied upon in reaching 
their judgments, including digests on Islamic law and ethnographic descriptions of 
Muslims in the Punjab.  
Implicit in these judgments, arguments, and sources were also prevailing 
theories of law. These theories, important in this thesis’s analysis of the law, 
concerned questions of how the law functioned in society and to what purpose. 
Evolutionary legal theories that were influential among the Punjab administration in 
the late nineteenth century, contributed to a sociological view of the law as aiming to 
bring about a gradual advancement of society. They were based on a historical and 
comparative approach to the law that considered its economic and social functions.18 
                                                
17 Lauren Benton, ‘Historical Perspectives on Legal Pluralism’ in eds. Brian Z. Tamanaha, Caroline 
Sage, Michael Woolcock, Legal Pluralism and Development: Scholars and Practitioners in Dialogue 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 28-29. This view of the law is from: E. P. Thompson, 
Whigs and Hunters: the Origin of the Black Act (London: Allen Lane, 1975). 
18 Clive Dewey, ‘The influence of Sir Henry Maine on agrarian policy in India.’ In The Victorian 
Achievement of Sir Henry Maine: A Centennial Reappraisal, ed. Alan Diamond (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 353-375; Karuna Mantena, Alibis of Empire: Henry Maine and the 
Ends of Liberal Imperialism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); Karuna Mantena, Law and 
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Muhammad Iqbal’s conception of Islamic law reflected a more Geertzian 
interpretation of the law as a manifestation of a society’s cultural values.19   
Colonial law in India defined the Ahmadiyya’s inclusion within the Muslim 
community, and also their liability to suffer exclusion from it. In terms of personal 
law, the Ahmadiyya’s classification as a ‘Muslim sect’ by the colonial administration 
was legally significant because it signified conscience and belief and was treated by 
colonial courts as a private matter. An argument that Ahmadis were non-Muslim 
because of their beliefs arose in civil suits in which the loss of their religious status 
would have resulted in the loss of their civil or property rights. On a theoretical level, 
the Ahmadiyya’s contested religious status reflected countervailing sets of legal 
principles in colonial law, which supported different conceptions of how Islamic law 
constituted the ‘Muslim community’ and defined political membership. While 
principles derived from evolutionary legal theories contributed to an interpretation of 
Islamic law that was more inclusive towards the Ahmadiyya, legal principles that 
recognized the sovereign right of Indian communities to define their laws and 
membership suggested the potential for their exclusion from Islam at the command of 
the Muslim community. Muhammad Iqbal’s argument that the Ahmadiyya must be 
excluded from the Muslim community reflected this second set of principles.     
 
Chapter Outline and Argument   
 
                                                                                                                                       
“Tradition”’: Henry Maine and the Theoretical Origins of Indirect Rule’, in Law and History, eds. 
Andrew Lewis and Michael Lobban (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 159-188.   
19 For this view of the law see: Sally Engle Merry, ‘Legal Pluralism and Legal Culture: Mapping the 
Terrain’, in Legal Pluralism and Development: Scholars and Practitioners in Dialogue, eds. Brian Z. 
Tamanaha, Caroline Sage, Michael Woolcock, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) pp. 70-
71; Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology (New York: Basic 
Books, 1983), pp. 182-183. 
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This thesis is divided into five chapters. The first two chapters deal with 
personal law, providing an overview of personal law in India and then examining the 
Ahmadiyya’s position in relation to personal law. The third and fourth chapters relate 
personal law to questions of how Islamic law defined political membership among 
Muslims—juxtaposing Muhammad Iqbal’s argument for the exclusion of the 
Ahmadiyya against the Ahmadiyya’s inclusion within Muslim politics in the Punjab. 
The final chapter bridges personal law with ideas of political membership by 
examining the debates surrounding apostasy and conversion in Islam. Only the 
universal principle of freedom of conscience and belief removed the Ahmadiyya’s 
liability to be excluded from the Muslim community (which included the potential 
loss of property and life). However, this principle conflicted with the notion of 
sovereignty as community right over internal laws and membership expressed by 
Muslims and Hindus in legislative debates during the 1930s. 
Chapter 1, ‘Community Boundaries in Personal Law’, introduces the 
framework through which personal law is understood within this thesis. It first maps 
out personal law in colonial India across caste and religious categories, and then the 
legal order created by personal law in the Punjab. Personal law is understood as 
having a social and economic function: directing the devolution of wealth within 
communities and fixing religious and caste boundaries. In the Punjab, evolutionary 
legal theories underpinned a fundamental legal distinction between ‘urban’ Punjabis 
and ‘rural’ Punjabis, and guided the Punjab administration in its codification of 
customary law over Hindu, Sikh, and Muslim ‘agriculturalist’ tribes. These same 
theories underpinned interpretations of Islamic law that were amenable to progressive 
reform. In contrast to caste and religious categories recognized in personal law, the 
 15 
religious identity of ‘Muslim sects’ signified conscience and belief, rather than a 
category of social belonging, and was treated as a private matter.  
Chapter 2, ‘The Ahmadiyya: a Muslim Sect’, examines how the Ahmadiyya 
fit within this legal order, providing the legal context for early arguments that 
Ahmadis were apostates from Islam as they appeared in civil suits. The Ahmadiyya’s 
founder Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was a landowning Muslim in a similar but different 
position than Sufi religious authorities in the Punjab. He articulated the Ahmadiyya’s 
doctrines in opposition to the ‘orthodox’ Islamic doctrines enunciated by Christian 
missionaries and the Arya Samaj. In civil suits in which it was argued that Ahmadis 
were non-Muslim by virtue of their doctrines, their loss of religious status would have 
carried with it the loss of civil and property rights had not a court determined that 
Ahmadi doctrines were derived from legitimate interpretations of Islamic sources. 
This determination was based on ‘evolutionary’ rather than ‘orthodox’ legal principles.  
Chapter 3, ‘Divisible Sovereignty: Customary Law and Islamic Law’, 
examines how Punjab customary law and Muslim personal law were associated with 
different ideas of political membership by the Punjab administration. While ‘rural’ 
Muslims (defined by customary law) were associated with obedience to British laws, 
‘urban Muslims (defined by Muslim personal law) were associated with obedience to 
Islamic law and political power. In the 1920s, Ahmadi politicians were incorporated 
into a structure of political representation in the Punjab that privileged ‘rural’ classes 
by linking political rights with land rights. During the Non-Cooperation movement, 
these classes maintained their political privilege by demonstrating their loyalty to 
colonial rule. With the expansion of Ahmadi missions abroad, the Ahmadiyya 
interpreted their loyalty to the British as implying the protection of their lives and 
right to freedom of conscience and belief under an emerging international law.  
 16 
Chapter 4, ‘Muhammad Iqbal’s Concept of the Muslim Community and 
Exclusion of the Ahmadiyya’, examines Iqbal’s 1935 argument for the exclusion of 
the Ahmadiyya from the Muslim community within its historical context. This 
argument functioned as a legal construct that opposed the principles upon which the 
structure of political representation in the Punjab was based. It appealed to urban 
Muslim politicians and ulama whose political, social, and economic interests had 
been marginalized in the Punjab. It asserted the authority of the ulama to determine 
membership within the Muslim community over the principle of religious tolerance 
that the British government professed to uphold. 
Chapter 5, ‘Conversion and Apostasy’, traces the legal debates surrounding 
apostasy and religious conversion, examining first a series of civil suits in the Punjab 
and then 1930s debates in the Indian legislative assembly around legislation to reform 
personal law over Indian Muslims. During these debates, the Ahmadi official 
Zafrullah Khan argued that there was no punishment for apostasy in Islamic law. This 
argument had clear implications for the Ahmadiyya, in light of Muhammad Iqbal’s 
argument that they be excluded from the Muslim community. However, the 
universality of the principle of freedom of conscience and belief also had broader 
implications in altering social relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in India.  
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Chapter 1: Community Boundaries in Personal Law 
Introduction 
This thesis is concerned with how personal law in colonial India determined 
the boundaries that defined the ‘Muslim community’ and, inherent in this process, 
how it determined the legitimacy of contested interpretations of Islamic law. This 
chapter examines the guiding principles by which personal law defined community 
boundaries across categories of caste and religion. It examines late nineteenth-century 
evolutionary legal theories that underpinned the codification of customary law in the 
Punjab, differentiating rural and urban Punjabi Muslims along caste lines, and also 
legitimizing interpretations of Islamic law that were amenable to progressive reform. 
It also examines the ‘Muslim sect’ as a category that did not conform to the logic of 
personal law, but was rather conceptualized as formed of Muslim dissenters who 
expressed liberty of conscience and belief. Unlike minority Muslim communities, 
including rural Punjabi Muslims, who were conceptualized under personal law as 
retaining their pre-Islamic customs, Muslim sects were not recognized as having their 
own personal law.  
 The first section of this chapter sets out the logic by which the law in colonial 
India defined community boundaries through personal law. It examines how personal 
law circumscribed caste and religious communities and fixed their position within 
India’s economy in two ways: by determining the permeability of community 
boundaries through marriage restrictions and by directing the devolution of wealth 
within communities through defining inheritance and property rights.20 According to 
the logic of personal law, Muslim minority communities in India were indigenous 
Indian communities who had converted to Islam before the advent of colonial rule in 
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India, but retained their caste customs and identity. The second section of this chapter 
examines how the logic of personal law operated in the Punjab to create what became 
known as the ‘urban and rural distinction’, which was schematic for a complex set of 
legal classifications meant to differentiate land rights among Punjabis.21 According to 
this schema, ‘urban’ Punjabis followed Hindu or Muslim personal law while ‘rural’ 
Punjabis followed ancient customary law. Thus rural Punjabi Muslims were 
conceptualized in a similar manner as Muslim minority communities elsewhere in 
India: as tribal groups who had converted from Hinduism but retained their tribal 
customs and identity. The ‘urban and rural distinction’ had important economic 
implications: it was the basis for legal interventions aimed at maintaining the 
economic position of rural landowners in general and Muslims landowners in 
particular. Like the ‘urban and rural distinction’, these interventions were underpinned 
by evolutionary legal theories, which provided a rationale for conserving traditional 
institutions against the operation of a free market in land.22  
These same evolutionary legal theories also supported a progressive 
interpretation of Islamic law among colonial officials in the late nineteenth-century, 
which will be examined in the third section of this chapter. According to this 
interpretation, Islamic law developed from a rational and socially adaptive set of legal 
principles into a rigid code of law that restricted social progress. Its progressive 
potential lay in returning it to its original principles. For these officials, codified 
Islamic law was implicated in the economic backwardness of Muslims and deemed 
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particularly unsuited to agrarian society. However, despite their retaining customs in 
common with rural Sikhs and Hindus, colonial ethnography also described rural 
Punjabi Muslims as being more prone to economic backwardness than other religious 
groups as a consequence of cultural attitudes that they acquired after converting to 
Islam.  
The last section of this chapter examines the category of ‘Muslim sect’ in 
colonial ethnography and an important legal judgment at this time. ‘Muslim sects’ 
were conceptualized differently than Muslim minority communities and rural Punjabi 
Muslims in personal law. Rather than having a religious identity that reflected the 
material and historical conditions from which they emerged, the religious identity of 
members of Muslims sects was interpreted according to a liberal conception of 
religion as individual, private, and based on conscience and belief. 23  Their 
identification within colonial ethnography as Muslim dissenters from the traditional 
authorities of Islamic law suggested their potential for reforming Islamic law. 
By examining the contested status of the Ahmadiyya as a Muslim sect, 
subsequent chapters will show how the mapping of community boundaries through 
the logic of personal law, existing alongside an alternative conceptualization of 
Muslim sects that transcended this logic, defined inclusion within the Muslim 
community according to alternative criteria. The legal identity of Muslims in the 
Punjab was alternatively defined by the material and historical conditions of the group 
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that one was born into, and a core set of beliefs and cultural attitudes that one held in 
common with other Muslims.  
Personal Law 
 
Colonial law in India conceptualized Hindus and Muslims as being two 
distinct normative communities over whom two separate bodies of ‘personal law’ 
operated. Hindu and Muslim personal law operated in civil suits ‘regarding 
inheritance, marriage, caste and other religious usages and institutions.’ In such 
matters, courts adhered to scriptural law: ‘the laws of the Koran with respect to the 
Mahomedans and those of the Shaster with respect to the [Hindu] Gentoos.’24 
Additionally, religious law modified by custom defined normative communities based 
on caste. Colonial courts applied a similar logic as used to define caste communities 
to interpret the personal law of minority religious communities that were not Hindu or 
Muslim. Jains, Buddhists, and Sikhs were conceptualized as arising from Hinduism 
and following Hindu personal law modified by custom.  
As David Washbrook has argued, personal law produced spheres of ‘moral 
and community obligations to which the individual was subject’ that cut against legal 
principles based on individualism, utility and equity, which were embodied in 
statutory law in India.25 Personal law had material implications: it differentiated 
individual property rights according to the community to which an individual was 
born into and it regulated the devolution of wealth within communities through rules 
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of property inheritance and succession. This opposed economic principles that were 
embodied in the 1793 Permanent Settlement, which established the foundation of real 
property law in the Bengal.26  This property law reflected European economic theories 
in which private ownership and a free market in land were to be the basis for 
economic prosperity in India.27 Hindu personal law operated against these principles 
by recognizing property rights to be shared among members of the ‘Hindu joint 
family.’28 Interpreted as a sacred institution under Hindu personal law, the Hindu joint 
family functioned to create something like a trust in property that impeded the 
individual’s absolute right over property.29   
Muslim personal law had different economic implications than Hindu law 
because it recognized individuals’ absolute ownership rights and distributed them 
widely among heirs.30 Raymond West, a Bombay judge and eminent authority on 
Hindu law, wrote in 1900 that this distribution of wealth arrested economic and 
political development within Islamic societies: ‘the centrifugal dispersive character of 
the Mohammedan laws of family, and of inheritance, afford[ed] another striking 
instance of the powerful effect of a religious system on the social and political 
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organization, and on the economic condition of a community.31 ‘Dispersive’ elements 
within Islamic law included laws allowing up to four wives, legitimizing the offspring 
of concubines, and placing sons on equal legal standing. Instead of channeling wealth 
through one line of descent ‘amongst the great men of a lower grade’, Islamic law 
contributed to the impoverishment of Muslim countries and prevented the rise of ‘a 
territorial aristocracy which might serve as a bulwark against the sovereign’s 
tyranny.’ 32  Islamic law opposed the law of primogeniture upon which English 
economic theories on the wealth of nations were based. According to these theories, 
succession of property through patrilineal descent promoted security in land by 
keeping large estates intact.33   
Although Muslims living under Islamic rulers in the Middle East and South 
Asia had long kept their estates intact by creating endowments called waqfs, colonial 
law did not recognize these endowments as valid until 1913.34 For centuries, waqfs 
had allowed their creators to place their estates under the management of a designated 
heir, bypassing Muslim rules of inheritance. Colonial law interpreted Islamic 
institutions in a manner that fundamentally altered how waqfs functioned in India by 
making a novel distinction between ‘private’ waqfs and ‘public’ waqfs. Only ‘public’ 
waqfs in which income was designated for charitable and public use were recognized 
as valid. ‘Private’ waqfs, endowments made for the benefit of family members, were 
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understood as invalid because they violated the Islamic law of inheritance.35  This 
distinction also allowed colonial courts to interpret Islamic law in a manner that 
accorded with British law: private waqfs were also understood to violate British laws 
against perpetuities.36 Private waqfs became valid after 1913 with the passage of 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s Mussalman Wakf Validation Act.37  
 British Indian law recognized caste difference among Indians, which cut 
across religious difference and further differentiated property rights.38 Hindu Pandits 
in Bengal and British interpreters of Hindu scripture derived an interpretation of caste 
in India from varna, a term found in Vedic sources that designated some form of 
social differentiation in ancient India.39 They understood Indian society to be ordered 
hierarchically into four castes. The ‘twice born’ Brahmins, Kshatriyas and Vaisyas 
were organized on top and Sudras below them in what was conceptualized as being a 
more or less holistic caste system. Dalits (those who were described in colonial 
sources as ‘Untouchables’ or ‘depressed classes’), pastoralists, and forest dwellers, 
fell outside of this system.  
From the mid-eighteenth century, colonial officials based their understanding 
of caste in India on racial theories.40 This racial understanding of caste was based on 
the notion that higher caste Hindus were of superior Aryan stock, the product of 
ancient migration into the subcontinent, while Sudras and Untouchables were 
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indigenous people of ‘Dravidian’ stock. This racial dichotomy developed similarly to 
theories that produced the concept of an Aryan-Semitic dichotomy in the European 
context. Caste ideologies were understood as a mechanism for maintaining racial 
purity by creating exclusionary conventions, such as restrictions on marriage and food 
handling, which distanced racially superior people from racial outsiders.41 As late as 
1901, H.H. Risley’s census described Indian society through the prism of this racially 
constructed caste system.42  
Colonial courts relied on legal commentaries to provide guiding principles in 
the application of personal law, including commentaries that interpreted inter-caste 
relations in terms of race. In his 1906 commentary on Hindu law, for example, 
Jogendra Chandra Ghose interpreted the treatment of Sudras under Hindu law in such 
terms: ‘The rules about Sudras, as found in the Smritis [Hindu scripture], are a relic of 
the barbarism of ancient nations who considered slavery right and lawful. The 
contempt of the white races for the black ones, which we find in the Vedas was, 
however, not more intense than what is now to be found in South Africa and other 
countries.43 Ghose’s earlier commentary on Rammohun Roy, the founder of the 
Brahmo Samaj (f. 1828), suggests that he interpreted caste relations in Hindu law with 
an impulse towards legal reform. Ghose wrote that Roy’s mission was to liberate the 
Sudra from the ‘thraldom that had enchained them body and soul’ and restore the 
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‘life-giving’ religion of the Upanishads.44 However, regardless of the intention behind 
Ghose’s commentary of Hindu law, colonial courts relied upon legal digests to 
provide guiding principles for their application of Hindu and Muslim personal law 
while reform was left to legislation that could be shown to reflect the will of the 
community.45  
Racially constructed caste ideologies influenced how courts interpreted Hindu 
personal law as separating caste ‘communities’ by imposing impermeable social 
boundaries.46 The colonial administration defined Hinduism broadly as the native 
religion of India. In the 1881 census, any Indian who was unable to define his creed or 
described his creed by a name not recognized by tabulators was classified as Hindu.47 
This classification encompassed caste Hindus and ‘Untouchables’ However, the 
mixture of Hindu personal law based on scripture and legally sanctioned caste custom 
stratified the ‘Hindu community’ socially. British Indian courts maintained a social 
order separating caste communities by invalidating marriages and adoptions between 
castes and recognizing caste communities to be regulated by separate rules of 
succession, adoption, and marriage.48 These courts applied Hindu personal law in its 
purest sense to Brahmin Hindus and the other twice-born castes while interpreting 
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caste customs to modify and relax social restrictions amongst Sudras.49  Severe 
restrictions on commensality between castes, based on conceptions of purity and 
pollution, were validated in both criminal and civil court cases.50  
The legal distinctions that formalized a separation of caste communities also 
carried with them the threat of economic sanctions should they be transgressed. 
According to William Rattigan’s authoritative digest on custom in the Punjab, inter-
caste marriage resulted in the loss of caste status for twice-born Hindus and thus 
separation from the Hindu joint family.51 The Caste Disabilities Removal Act (XXI of 
1850) legislated that Hindu or Muslim law could not cause the loss of property or 
inheritance rights due to apostasy or loss of creed.52 Conflicting court rulings in the 
Punjab interpreted the 1850 enactment differently, sometimes but not always 
interpreting it as protecting property against loss of caste status. As a consequence, 
the law was unclear about whether separation from the Hindu joint family led to the 
forfeiture of property held within the Hindu joint family.53 
The colonial administration denied property ownership rights to individuals 
designated as belonging to one of the depressed classes. The Punjab administration’s 
policy of not settling Sansi people with property ownership rights in canal colonies, 
but rather interning them as labourers on reformation colonies, was justified on the 
basis of their status outside the caste system.54 These semi-nomadic people occupied 
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lands that the administration defined as ‘waste lands’ and belonging to the colonial 
state. They were denied property ownership rights after these lands were transformed 
into agrarian land through canal colonization.55  
Although caste was understood as a Hindu institution, colonial law saw caste 
extending beyond religious boundaries and understood Muslims to have been socially 
defined by the caste system. By the late nineteenth century, British ethnography had 
come to interpret the majority of Muslims in India as descended from Hindu 
converts.56  Many of these converts did not come from the gentry classes who had 
served under Mughal rule, and many Muslims living under rural conditions 
experienced the same structural conditions as lower-caste and depressed class 
Hindus.57  The law interpreted Muslim ‘converts’ (Muslims of indigenous descent) as 
carrying their caste status with them after conversion.  
In the Punjab, the colonial administration classified Muslims belonging to 
indigenous agriculturalist tribes as Sudra along with Hindus and Sikhs who belonged 
to agriculturalist tribes.58 This had implications for how the rules that governed 
intermarriage and inheritance were applied. For instance, in the civil suit Dalip Kaur v. 
Mussamat Fathi (1911), the Lahore High Court first determined that a Sikh 
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landowner and his Muslim tenant were Sudra before ruling that the their marriage was 
valid under Hindu law.59   According to the ruling, Sikhs were governed by Hindu law 
modified by custom, which removed the caste barriers to conversion to Sikhism of the 
Muslim tenant. Had the Sikh landowner been governed purely by Hindu personal law, 
as was argued during the suit, the marriage would have been invalidated. 
There were also barriers within Muslim personal law to inter-religious 
marriage. In the above-mentioned case, for example, the court also needed to 
determine that the Muslim woman’s conversion to Sikhism was valid in order to 
determine the validity of her marriage. Under Muslim law, a Muslim woman was only 
permitted to marry a Muslim man. A Muslim man, however, was permitted to marry 
women ‘of the book,’ which was interpreted within standard textbooks on Islamic law 
to mean Christian and Jewish women.60 According to this interpretation of Muslim 
law, inter-marriage between Muslims and Hindus was forbidden. Ameer Ali’s digest 
on Muslim law did permit intermarriage between Muslims and Hindus by recognizing 
the Brahmo Samaj to be ‘of the Book.’ However, colonial courts did not validate this 
interpretation. 
A civil marriage allowed couples to transgress these caste and religious 
restrictions. However, it required that both parties formally renounce their religions 
before marrying.61 The civil marriage law (Act III of 1872) allowed a state-appointed 
registrar to solemnise the marriage rather than a ‘clergyman.’ Until 1923, couples 
were required to sign a declaration stating: ‘I do not profess the Christian, Jewish, 
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Hindu, Muhamedan, Parsi, Buddhist, Sikh, or Jaina religion.’62 This declaration was 
to placate Hindu and Muslim opponents of civil marriages, who feared that civil 
marriage would allow inter-religious marriage, seduction, elopement, and marriage to 
immoral women.63  
Within a ‘Muslim community’ governed by Muslim personal law, British 
Indian law recognized Khojas and Kutchi Memons to be minority Muslim 
communities that followed customs that were at variance with Muslim personal law.64 
Ersking Perry’s 1847 Bombay Supreme Court ruling found that both communities 
diverged from Quranic injunctions and followed rules of succession ‘nearly analogous 
to the Hindu rule of succession.’65 In this case, that meant that property once held by a 
deceased Khoja man succeeded in its entirety to his brother’s widow according to 
custom, excluding his daughter from her share of inheritance required under Muslim 
personal law.  
The status of the Khoja and Memon ‘communities’ under personal law was 
understood according to an occupational interpretation of caste, which existed 
alongside racial interpretations. An occupational interpretation of caste emphasized 
local conditions, ‘diversity and historicity in the making of caste.’66 Perry’s ruling 
interpreted both the Khojas and Memons as having been originally Hindus who 
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converted to Islam but retained their customs. 67  These customs reflected their 
economic position within Indian society before and after conversion. Both 
communities were associated with trade, the Khojas ‘for the most part confined to 
subordinate departments of trade’68 and the Memons ‘originally Loannas, a Hindu 
commercial caste in Kutch’.69 For both communities, conversion to Islam took place 
before British rule. Khojas were recorded in the case commentary as settled amongst 
Hindu communities in Bombay, Kutch, and Kathiawar and as tracing their conversion 
to Islam to 200 to 300 years ago.70 Memons were recorded as seated in Kutch, with 
communities in Malabar and Bengal, and their conversion dated hundreds of years in 
the past.71  
A historical understanding of Khoja and Memon as converts from Hinduism 
persisted into the 1930s. By 1882, Justice Scott at the Bombay High Court remarked 
about Memon custom that it was ‘a well-known principle of law in India’ that when a 
Hindu converted to Christianity or Islam, the conversion did not necessarily change 
his or her rights and powers over property. 72  In 1935, a Bombay magistrate 
recognized Memons to be converts to Islam rather than ‘the original Moslem invaders’ 
of India.73 They remained distinct, he explained, because they retained Hindu customs 
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that prevented intermarriage or intermixing with other Muslims. Legal principles 
conceptualized the boundaries between Hindus and Muslims to have been once 
porous, with custom among Indians Muslims being evidence of their movement 
between them. However, this principle did not infer that an individual who converted 
from Hinduism to Islam could continue to follow Hindu personal law while 
professing to be Muslim. 74  Colonial courts applied this legal principle to a 
community’s status rather than that of an individual. As will be shown in chapter five, 
there was no unified principle that governed how conversion altered the personal law 
of an individual religious convert. The effect of conversion varied depending upon 
such factors as his caste, gender, religion, and the religion to which he was converting 
into.  
 
The Rural and Urban Divide in the Punjab 
 
In the Punjab, the concept of the ancient ‘village communities’ provided the 
basis for the codification of customary law in the province. 75   The Punjab 
administration gave primacy to the custom of ancient ‘village communities’ over 
Hindu and Muslim personal law. It designated certain tribes as ‘agriculturalist’ and 
recognized these tribes as following customary law. In doing so, it differentiated the 
property rights of Punjabis who belonged to designated ‘agriculturalist’ tribes from 
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non-agriculturalists, who continued to be governed by Hindu and Muslim personal 
law. In addition to protecting the economic status of agriculturalists, Punjab land laws 
were underpinned by evolutionary legal theories that inferred that agriculturalists had 
greater potential for progressive social development than non-agriculturalists. 
According to these theories, colonial officials interpreted Punjabi agriculturalists to 
exist at an earlier stage of development along the same evolutionary continuum upon 
which European society had progressed. These legal theories inferred that Punjab 
agrarian society was a starting point in the development of progressive laws and that 
the linking of law and religion had arrested progressive development in urban areas.   
Prior to the annexation of the Punjab by the British in 1849, the territory had 
been held first under Islamic and then under Sikh rule.76 Islamic rule in the Punjab 
began in the early thirteenth century under the Delhi Sultanate, a series of Muslim 
dynasties that ruled northern India until the rise of the Mughal Empire in 1526. The 
Punjab, which was only loosely controlled under the Delhi Sultanate, was brought 
under tighter control during the reign of Mughal emperor Akbar (r. 1556 to 1605) and 
his successor Jahangir (r. 1605 to 1627). Under the Mughals, Jats and other local 
groups like Rajputs, were slowly converted from warrior tribes to quasi-officials. 
Mughal control in the region waned thereafter, and in its place emerged independent 
Sikh chiefdoms in central Punjab. The majority of Jats came to identify themselves as 
Sikhs.77 Sikh chiefdoms held power through confederation until the end of the 
eighteenth century. In 1799, the Sikh ruler Ranjit Singh (d. 1839) consolidated power 
away from them and established a kingdom from Lahore. He appropriated lands taken 
by usurping Sikhs during Mughal times and he built his kingdom around an army of 
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small deras (platoons) led by deradars (local heads) recruited from separate villages. 
He also reestablished the Mughal policy of building a religiously composite army, 
which continued under the British administration.  
After its annexation in 1849, the British began to incorporate Punjabis into the 
Indian army.78  In 1857, Punjabis made up a quarter of the Indian army and supported 
the British in putting down the Indian mutiny and related uprisings. Thereafter, the 
British began to shift army recruitment away from high caste Bengali Brahmins 
towards favouring the recruitment of rural Punjabi peasants. By 1904, Punjabis, less 
than 10% of the population of British India, contributed to over half of the Indian 
army.79 Racial theories identified agriculturalist tribes from the Punjab such as Jats 
and Rajputs, as well as Afghans and Gurkhas, as belonging to ‘martial races’ that 
were more suited to combat than other kinship or caste groups in India—a designation 
for Jats that is found in pre-colonial, vernacular sources as well. 80 Punjab land laws 
were grounded in a policy that rural contentedness was prerequisite to peace and order 
in the province.81 Heavy army recruitment from the rural Punjab also meant that this 
contentedness was prerequisite for stability within British India and the Empire. 
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From the 1870s, Henry Maine’s theories shaped the Punjab’s agrarian policies 
and land laws.82 Maine was the legal member for the Council in India following the 
mutiny, from 1862 to 1867. After his appointment, he returned to England and 
lectured at Oxford, Cambridge, and the Inns of Court in London to future civil 
servants and policy makers of India. Denzil Ibbetson, S. S. Thorburn, Lewis Tupper 
and William Rattigan were among the most influential administrators of the Punjab 
and frequently cited Maine to support their policy recommendations. Maine’s 
principles provided the Punjab administration an evolutionary schema of legal 
development by which to redraw community boundaries erected in personal law.83  
Maine based his legal theories on a comparative and historical approach to 
understanding the law.84 He looked at Roman law to understand various legal systems 
existing within the British Empire, and by doing so he found what he interpreted to 
have been vestiges of ancient law co-existing beside a modern legal system. This led 
him to adopt an evolutionary understanding of legal development. He theorized that 
the legal diversity he found in the Roman and British empires reflected different 
stages of development. He summed up this development in terms of private law: the 
legal development of progressive societies was the movement of the individual from a 
position of status to that of contract in private law. Private law encompassed rules of 
inheritance, marriage, divorce, and the like, as did its equivalent personal law in 
British India. Private law in traditional societies, according to Maine’s view, was 
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defined by the individual’s relationship to a patriarchal head. At the other end of the 
developmental spectrum, private law in modern societies was defined by contract.85  
Maine’s theories conceptualised the movement towards ‘contract’ as not 
necessarily progressive, cautioning the application of Utilitarian legal principles.86 He 
understood society to be made up of institutions in interaction with one another and 
individual mentalities. If any of these institutions were modernized ahead of others, or 
before individual mentalities were ready, they would malfunction.87  Maine’s theories 
also did not suppose that the laws of traditional societies were necessarily static. 
According to Maine, modern legal systems evolved from ancient laws based on time-
honoured customs. Whereas modern law evolved through legislation to meet the 
changing needs of society, ancient law also evolved but through different 
mechanisms.88  In traditional societies, ancient laws evolved through ‘legal fictions’ 
that preserved the illusion of continuity with the past. So long as impediments were 
removed, the evolutionary potential of custom existed. The role of a progressive 
government in a traditional society was to guide the law in its natural course, to bring 
about a controlled evolution of the law rather than radical social reform through the 
introduction of a modern legal system based on abstract and absolute principles.  
According to Maine, unlinking religion from the law was a necessary 
precondition for social advancement. India had not progressed beyond the stage in 
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European history when the ‘rule of law’ was separated from the ‘rule of religion.’89 
For Punjab colonial officials, Islamic law in particular presented an impediment to 
social progress. William Rattigan understood religious and political authority to be 
inseparable in the Muslim world, where it was united first in the person of 
Muhammad and then in that of the khalifs who succeeded him. The Quran was ‘not 
only a compendium of religious dogma, but a code of rules regulating civil, criminal, 
political, administrative, and economic matters; covering the whole domain of the 
private and public life of the citizen’.90 Denzil Ibbetson attributed the economic 
backwardness of Punjabi Muslims in part to Islamic law being inelastic and rigid 
compared to Hindu law and described Hinduism as being more dynamic owing to its 
being ‘essentially a cosmology rather than a code of ethics’.91 Ibbetson pointed to the 
Islamic law of inheritance as a prime example of the inelasticity of Islamic law: it was 
suited for seventh century Arabia where wealth was measured in livestock and 
movable property but unsuited to nineteenth-century agrarian Punjab where wealth 
was measured in immovable property.92  
Maine theorized that social development varied depending upon the 
penetration of state structures, which accounted for the absence of Islamic law in 
agrarian society in India. Punjab civil officer Lewis Tupper found—and Maine cited 
him to support his theories—that Hindu (meaning native Indian) institutions in the 
Punjab were in the state that they had existed in before Brahmanical influence. It was 
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not that the Punjabi villager ‘negligently violates his Hindu sacerdotal law, but that 
neither he nor his forefathers ever knew anything like its integrity.’ 93 Lahore Chief 
Justice William Rattigan concurred: in the habits and customs of the rural population 
‘neither the shara [Islamic law] nor the shastras [Hindu law] really exercised any 
direct influence among them’.94 Religion did not bind rural society together, the 
village community did. It united Muslim and Hindu Punjabis together ‘by the same 
common rules regulating the devolution and disposal of property’.95 While this 
schema understood customary law in villages to be more primitive than religious law, 
the absence of religious sanction inferred that it was more conducive to reform.   
For the majority of ‘agriculturalists’ who were Muslim, Maine’s evolutionary 
legal theories supported inheritance customs that conflicted with Muslim personal 
law.96 As communities bound together by their contiguity to the land, William 
Rattigan understood the customs of ‘village communities’ to be aimed at keeping land 
intact.97  This was often interpreted by Punjab officials to mean that custom favoured 
agnatic theories of land succession, according to which agricultural land passed 
through a line of male descendants. Lahore High Court judge Meredith Plowden 
found that there was an affinity between the Hindu joint family and agnatic theories, 
which confirmed to him that agriculturalist tribes were bound to agnatic theories of 
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land succession through their ancient adherence to Hindu law.98 These theories 
influenced how Punjab civil servants determined ‘authentic’ customs within village 
communities and may have strengthened claims to inheritance based on agnatic 
theories.99 But Punjab ‘custom’ also came to reflect interests that emerged over time 
within the village coparcenary and challenged the initial objectives of the British 
administration to strengthen cultivator rights over kinship rights. They were shaped by 
rising land prices and agrarian debt.100 
Late nineteenth century legal reforms in the Punjab were based on the notion 
that the British administration had mistakenly introduced Hindu and Muslim personal 
law into the countryside.101  From 1854 until 1872, the Punjab Civil Code had 
assumed the existence of Hindu or Muslim personal law in the Punjab unless it could 
be proven that custom persisted from time immemorial. The Punjab Laws Act of 1872 
replaced this assumption with one that custom existed everywhere in agrarian society 
unless proven otherwise. The majority of Muslims in the Punjab, recognized as 
belonging to ‘agriculturalist’ tribes like Jats and Arain, were now assumed to follow 
custom. So too were their Sikh and Hindu tribesmen. These reforms dissolved a 
differentiation over agricultural land rights based on religious law, and instead 
differentiated land rights between ‘urban’ (non-agriculturalist) and ‘rural’ 
(agriculturalist) Punjabis.  
The 1872 Act recognized a right of pre-emption over village lands, which 
meant that specified people belonging to ‘village communities’ had the right to 
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acquire property within the village in preference to other people.102 Court decisions 
over the right of pre-emption gave legal precision to how ‘village communities’ and 
‘towns’ were defined. A ‘village community’ consisted not simply of members of one 
family or clan holding village lands in common, but a body of people bound together 
by residence. It was not confined to landowners, but ranked below them were lower-
caste and depressed class occupancy tenants.103 Determining where the law of pre-
emption operated meant distinguishing between ‘villages’ and ‘towns’ and 
differentiating rural from urban populations. The law defined a ‘village’ as having an 
economy based on agriculture, whereas the economy of a ‘town’ was based on 
trade.104   
The Punjab Land Alienation Act of 1900 reified this differentiation by 
restricting the transfer of land from ‘agriculturalist’ tribes to non-agriculturalists.105 
An agrarian society in the Punjab defined by the concept of ‘ancient village 
communities’ was threatened by high rates of peasant indebtedness and land transfers 
that resulted from mortgages and sales. By 1876, most of the mortgages of 
agricultural lands were held by urban moneylenders. In 1888, 1,300,000 acres of land 
were transferred to new owners. Most land transfers were between ‘agriculturalists’, 
but 500,000 acres were transferred to urban traders.106 Policy makers in the Punjab 
interpreted the Land Alienation Act as preserving traditional society according to 
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Mainian principles, and the problem of peasant land dispossession as stemming from 
British recognition of proprietary rights over agricultural lands.107 Increased political 
stability and low revenue demands contributed to greater profitability of land 
cultivation and raised the value of agricultural property. A peasantry, unaccustomed 
to systematic revenue collection and putting away profit from one season to meet a 
shortfall in the next, were compelled to borrow from moneylenders to make ends meet 
or finance weddings and funerals. As land became more valuable, moneylenders 
began to demand it as collateral and convert mortgages to sale when landowners were 
unable to meet the terms of their debt. Traditionally, village headman and panchayats 
(village councils) might have prevented agricultural lands from being transferred to 
village outsiders. However, the British had introduced a system of courts and lawyers 
who were detached from village customs that would have kept village communities 
intact. 
The debate among government officials over high rates of land alienation 
drew upon two competing principles of administration, that of paternalism and laissez 
faire.108 According to principles of laissez faire, the dynamics of ‘political economy’ 
should have been allowed to operate without the government intervening on behalf of 
the cultivating class. Paternalists, on the other hand, insisted on the duty of the 
government to protect rural peasants. Maine’s evolutionary principles made a strong 
case against laissez faire by cautioning against too rapid a development through free 
market principles. The free market in land had the potential to stir political discontent 
by both dispossessing the peasantry, upon whom the Indian army was increasingly 
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reliant, and introducing into the countryside urban classes.109 In the late nineteenth 
century, these urban classes—particularly Khatri, Arora, and Bania Hindu commercial 
castes—were also associated with anti-British, Indian nationalism.110  
The Punjab Land Alienation Act also protected ‘landed gentry’, a category 
that included landowners with aristocratic land tenures and Muslim families whose 
land rights were connected to Sufi shrines.111 The western region of the Punjab was 
crisscrossed with dense networks of these shrines, to which agricultural lands were 
held as religious endowments. Their custodians (sajjada nashin) and the descendants 
of the shrines’ founding saints (pirs) inherited their religious offices and rights over 
agricultural lands endowed to the shrine.  
Colonial judges had a large amount of discretionary power in their application 
of the act. The privileges brought to families protected under the act were liable to be 
taken away by the judiciary. This is illustrated in a land dispute involving a Koreshi 
family in the Jhelum district that had mortgaged ancestral lands as collateral for 
debt.112 A suit was brought by a member of the family to set aside the alienation of 
these mortgaged lands under the provisions of the act, according to which all Koreshis 
in the Jhelum district were classed as members of agriculturalist tribes. However, 
while acknowledging that their inclusion under the act was politically expedient for 
the Punjab government, the court excluded the family from its protection. Justice 
Henry Rattigan, Justice William Rattigan’s son, presided over the case. The plaintiff’s 
                                                
109 Denzil Ibbetson note on alienation, 7 March 1889, in Barrier, The Punjab Alienation, 107-109, 
Appendix C. 
110 Kenneth W. Jones, Arya Dharm: Hindu Consciousness in 19th-century Punjab (Berkley; London: 
University of California Press, 1976), 177. 
111 David Gilmartin, ‘Religious Leadership and the Pakistan Movement in the Punjab’ in Modern Asian 
Studies 13, 3 (1979), 485-517. 
112 Jawahir Singh v Yaqub Shah (1904) 7 PLR 59, at 168-172. 
 42 
father, who had mortgaged his lands, was depicted in his ruling as being ‘all that is 
vile and vicious’ and a ‘dissipated spendthrift’ who lived off the security of his 
lands.113  This uncertainty, the ability of the Punjab court to set aside legislative 
provisions, would have made conforming to the norms embodied in property law 
more compelling for those classes protected under the Act.  
Punjab laws reflected a colonial understanding of Punjab society as being 
shaped by the interaction between urban classes and rural classes, rather than a rigid 
caste system. In his description of Punjab society, colonial official Denzil Ibbetson 
collapsed the four-tier caste system into a distinction between upper-caste Brahmins 
(including ‘trading’ castes) and lower-caste Sudras (including ‘agriculturalist’ castes): 
Khatri, Arora, and Bania were identified as Brahmin trading castes, while Jats, 
Rajputs, and Arain were identified as Sudra agriculturalist castes according to his 
classification. 114  Ibbetson conceptualized caste difference as the result of an 
interaction between urban and rural classes, which reflected a trend in European 
scholarship towards examining interactions between capital and labour. 115   He 
interpreted caste structures in the Punjab not in terms of racial theories, but as arising 
from the material and political conditions that existed in the Punjab before the 
annexation. His occupational interpretation of caste inverted the racially based 
interpretation of Sudras as indigenous people who were conquered by Aryan invaders. 
Rather, he described agriculturalist castes as being of Scythian and Aryan origin. 
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However, these same agriculturalist castes continued to be identified as Sudra under 
Hindu personal law.116  
Punjab laws did not reflect an understanding of Punjab agrarian society that 
conformed to pre-modern European society, in which a rigid class structure separated 
large landowners from agricultural labourers.117 The application of customary law 
over agricultural tribes validated marriages that recognized a large degree of social 
mobility between people at different ends of the socio-economic spectrum. Customary 
law allowed landowners with tenures that equated with baronetcies in England to 
marry cultivators whose position equated with European peasants because they fell 
under the umbrella of ‘Sudra’ under Hindu personal law and were regulated by caste 
customs that permitted their intermarrying.118 
By invalidating marriages between caste Hindus and Sudras, however, 
colonial courts regulated social relations between urban capital and rural property.  
The first attempts at large-scale commercial banking in the Punjab resulted from the 
cooperation of educated, higher caste Hindu elites of the ‘trading castes’ who 
belonged to Hindu reformist organizations the Arya Samaj and the Brahmo Samaj.119 
The Punjab National Bank was established in 1895 under the management of Lala 
Dalpat Rai, the brother of Arya Samaj leader Lajpat Rai. The Punjab Brahmo Samaj 
centred around Harikshen Lal, who established the Bharat Insurance Company and 
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the People’s Banking and Commercial Association shortly afterwards. As higher caste 
Hindus, the law recognized these groups to be governed by Hindu personal law and 
their financial assets held within the Hindu joint family. Punjab laws kept the 
members of this corporate body from acquiring agricultural land, while Hindu 
personal law restricted their marriage to agriculturalists. According to principles 
regulating the Hindu joint family and agnatic theories inherent in customary law, both 
of which directed the devolution of wealth to male heirs, a marriage uniting capital 
and property wealth was unlikely in practice anyway. 
The Punjab Land Alienation Act was associated with the social and economic 
interests of Muslims in the province. One of the enactment’s main drivers, Septimus 
Thorburn, publicized the need to restrict alienation of agricultural land as the need to 
protect Muslim peasants from Hindu moneylenders in Mussalmans and the 
Moneylenders in the Punjab (1886).120 The problem—that of the ‘natural lords’ being 
sunk into serfdom to the moneylender—was to do with British law: ‘In the eyes of the 
law [the peasant and the moneylender] were equal. In sober truth, the peasant was in 
money-matters a crass and hardly-intelligible simpleton; the moneylender, a sharp and 
unscrupulous business-man, whose sole study was self-interest.’121 The enactment 
resembled a similar identification of economic behaviour with religious identities in 
Europe.122 On a policy level, Denzil Ibbetson was concerned with the economic 
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conditions of Muslims in particular, fearing that Muslims unsettled from their lands 
would be politically restive.123  
This identification of Muslims with agriculture and Hindus with trade was 
imprecise. While the majority of ‘agriculturalists’ in the Punjab were Muslim, at least 
40 per cent of them were not.  Rural Hindus, such as Hindu Rajputs prominent in 
eastern Punjab, and about 70% of Sikhs in the Punjab were also classed as belonging 
to agriculturalist tribes.124 Nor did the Act simply protect ‘agriculturalists and other 
ignorant and illiterate people’ against higher caste Hindu moneylenders.125 As B. R. 
Ambedkar would argue in 1930, the Punjab Land Alienation Act discriminated 
against depressed class people who cultivated agricultural lands but were denied any 
right to own them because they did not belong to designated ‘agriculturalist’ tribes.126  
Though it was framed in communal terms as protecting Muslims in particular, the 
legislation also restricted land from transferring to ‘urban’, non-agriculturalist 
Muslims as well.   
 
Evolutionary Legal Theories and Islamic Law  
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Evolutionary legal theories as articulated by Maine led colonial officials to 
reinterpret Islamic law. ‘Orthodox’ Islamic law based on textual sources was 
interpreted not as sacred and immutable, but as the product of legal codification by 
Muslim lawyers that was historically contingent. This meant that legal reformers 
could ‘modernize’ Islamic law by bringing it back to its original precepts, which 
would make it more elastic and adaptable to social change. These legal theories were 
taught at government schools in the Punjab to Punjabi Muslim lawyers who were 
conscious of the economic backwardness of their religious community.  
The Indian census exposed western educated Indians to a sociological 
interpretation of religion. The census was produced and published every ten years 
from 1871, and it impacted upon the religious identities of the English literate, Indian 
subjects whom it classified and described.127 Denzil Ibbetson’s 1881 Punjab census 
purported to contain descriptions of religion as it was practiced in the Punjab, gleaned 
from early settlement reports written by district officers and different than their 
idealized versions found in scriptural texts and authorized by religious scholars.128 
According to Ibbetson, the Punjab was of particular interest to the sociologist because 
it offered to him a ‘virgin field’ for investigation into customs and superstitions that 
the weaker grip of orthodoxy in the province had been unable to dislodge.129 He 
conceived of religion as ‘a social rather than religious institution’, in which 
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conversion between religions signalled ‘change in community rather than conduct and 
inner life’.130   
Based on this sociological interpretation of religion, the 1881 census defined 
rural Muslims as economically backward compared to their Hindu and Sikh 
neighbours. Moving through a tract of land inhabited by Muslims and Hindus, the 
census identified the property of Muslims by ‘the greater idleness, poverty, and 
pretension, which mark the Musalman.’131 Hinduism, which was conceived as being 
the ‘outcome and expression’ of the native character, was characterized by ‘quiet 
contented thrift.’132 The census assumed the rural Muslim Punjabi to be descended 
from Hindu converts, and described his productivity as a cultivator and economic 
behaviour in terms of this conversion. His conversion to Islam invariable filled him 
with ‘false conceit,’ disinclined him from honest toil, and rendered him ‘more 
extravagant, less thrifty, less contented, and less well-to-do than his Hindu 
neighbour.’133 According to the official census, the Punjabi Muslim villager expected 
God to provide and had a strong tendency to blame government for his problems, 
while his Hindu neighbour asked little of his gods or his government except to be left 
alone. 
This description of Muslim agriculturalists as economically backward 
reflected the Punjab administration’s policy concerns. Punjab officials proposed 
measures to remedy the economic conditions of Muslims that conformed to their own 
economic principles. The administration attributed some degree of peasant 
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indebtedness to ‘extravagance’, taking measures to curb expenditure on weddings and 
funerals using the influence of local leaders at the level of panchayats.134 According 
to one commissioner in the Peshawar division, which was incorporated into the 
Punjab district at that time, hospitality was more ruinous for Muslims than marriages 
and funerals.135 He described these practices as suiting the conditions of poverty 
existing in Peshawar: ‘Without [customs of hospitality] the poorer classes could 
hardly travel, and the poorest would often starve.’136 He described how a beggar could 
walk from one end of the Punjab to the other without want of food, warm clothing, 
and shelter, whereas in Europe his only choice would have been between the 
workhouse and starvation. But while these practices benefited the community in times 
of poverty, it impoverished the individual in times of plenty and was not conducive to 
economic prosperity based on individual wealth accumulation.  
At the same time that the Indian census exposed Punjabi Muslims to a 
sociological examination of the economic backwardness of their community, Indian 
lawyers were trained in the Punjab understand law as a tool for social reform. They 
were also trained as potential innovators of European laws. As vice-chancellor of 
Punjab University in 1901, Lewis Tupper’s convocation speech described a role for 
the study of law in the Punjab for advancing legal studies in general.137  Tupper said 
that the basis for jurisprudence was to be found in works of Utilitarian legal 
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philosophers Jeremy Bentham and John Austin, who described law as it ought to be 
across legal systems.138 He described Henry Maine as equally important to developing 
jurisprudence into a science. According to Tupper, the science of jurisprudence that 
Maine introduced through the historical and comparative method was a branch of 
sociology. Maine’s evolutionary legal theories were ‘a set of consistent 
generalizations from known facts in the growth of legal institutions and ideas’ that 
were necessary to understanding the evolution of society.139  Indian law students were 
thus taught that evolutionary legal theories were a means of re-writing law as it ought 
to be. An understanding of their own customary law in parallel with modern laws 
would lead to a revision of Utilitarian laws, not only progressing Indian society but 
honing the legal tools of progress generally.140  
In the late nineteenth century, colonial officials interpreted Islamic law 
according to evolutionary legal theories. These interpretations reconciled the co-
existence of pragmatic land laws and contradictory Islamic injunctions. Justices 
William Rattigan and Raymond West defined ‘orthodoxy’ in Islam not as correct 
belief but the product of the codification of Islamic law by Muslim lawyers during the 
eighth and ninth centuries, when the traditional schools of law were founded. In 
accordance with evolutionary legal principles, they understood Islamic law to have 
developed from an elastic law based on ethical precepts.141 This elasticity allowed it 
to adapt to diverse environments and assimilate pre-existing laws. They theorized that 
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the period of elasticity in Islamic law ended when Muslim lawyers assumed authority 
over Islamic law and, as with Brahmin Pandits in Hindu law, acted as religious clergy.  
Rattigan understood Islamic law as capable of developing into a progressive 
and enlightened legal system. According to him, Islamic law had become inelastic as 
a result of the curtailment of ijtihad by Muslim lawyers. Ijtihad is an Islamic legal 
term that means independent reasoning. Within the tradition of Islamic jurisprudence, 
it was used to arrive at a legal decision when none could be reached through the 
Quran and traditions of the Prophet Muhammad (hadith).  According to Rattigan, 
restoring the use of ijtihad to Islamic law turned it into a rational science. This 
interpretation of Islamic law meant that the closer one travelled to the foundations of 
Islamic law, its originating precepts, the closer one arrived at its rational basis.142  
 The Muslim legal authority Ameer Ali (1849-1928) also adopted an 
evolutionary understanding of Islamic law. Ali was the only Indian Muslim during 
colonial times to sit on the Privy Council, reaching the highest level within the 
colonial legal system that any Indian could attain. In 1904, he wrote that critical and 
analytical study of Islamic law was lacking and that passages from Islamic legal 
sources were cited in courts without reference to ‘the evolution of the principle 
involved in discussion’.143  He interpreted the crystallization of ‘orthodox’ doctrines 
as contingent on politics and historical circumstance. This he illustrated with the case 
of the Mutazilas and the refutation of Mutazilas doctrines in the twelfth century 
Abbasid court. He described Mutazilas as medieval Islamic ‘dissenters’ or 
‘Protestants’ who expressed a liberality of views, rationalist ideas, and a belief in free-
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will. Their doctrines were adopted by Abbasid ruler Abdullah al-Muman and his 
successors but ‘Patristicism’ or the theology of the ulama prevailed.144 
 
Muslim Sects 
 
Colonial courts interpreted sectarian difference in Islam according to a liberal 
understanding of religion as private belief and conscience.145 This was reflected in the 
1881 census description of Muslim sects. The Government of India instructed census 
enumerators to classify Muslims as Sunni, Shia, Wahabi, or Farazi.146 Sunnism was 
described as the Church of Islam and included four schools of law (fiqh): Hanbali, 
Shafi, Maliki and Hanafi. While all were considered equally orthodox, Islamic law in 
India was based on the Hanafi fiqh. The census described the Punjabi peasantry as 
being 98 per cent Sunni because they knew nothing else, ‘not by deliberate choice or 
conviction.’147 They were described as ignorant of the major sectarian divisions 
within Islam between Shia and Sunni Muslims.  
‘Sectarian’ divisions within Islam were described as constituting minor 
deviations in dogma or forms of ‘protest against modern innovations and a reversion 
towards the faith in its original purity.’148  The 1881 Punjab census commissioner 
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Denzil Ibbetson described sects as ‘schismatics’ and analogous to dissenting bodies 
from the Church of England within Protestant Christianity.149 The census defined 
Wahabis as Muslim ‘purists’ who ‘claim[ed] liberty of conscience and the right to 
private interpretation’ and rejected the authority of religious intermediaries between 
God and the individual. 150 Denzil Ibbetson described people who called themselves 
‘Ahl-i-Hadis’ (People of the Traditions), ‘Muwahidin’ (Unitarians), and ‘Muhammadi’ 
as Wahabis under different names. He assumed that they adopted alternative names to 
escape the political stigma attached to Wahabism, who were associated with rebellion 
against the British government.  
A famous dissenting judgment by Justice Mahmood in Queen Empress v. 
Ramzan (1885) also associated Wahabis with religious liberty.151 In this case, a 
mosque in Benares was being used by Sunni Muslims (‘orthodox’ of the Hanafi 
tradition), according to whose tenets the word ‘amen’ is intoned in a low voice during 
prayers. Ramzan, a member of the Wahabi sect, joined the congregational prayers and 
called out amen in a load tone of voice during prayers. As a consequence, the mosque 
attendant filed a complaint against him and he was convicted by a magistrate in 
Benares of voluntarily disturbing a religious assembly under section 296 of the Penal 
Code.152  
Upon appeal, Justice Mahmood reframed the case as one relating to religious 
liberty. Before his judgment, reference in this case had only been made to section 296 
of the Penal Code. Instead, he argued that determining whether or not Zaman’s action 
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was lawful raised a question of civil right, which bound the criminal court to resort to 
the civil branch of law. Some sections of the Penal Code, including section 296, 
depended entirely on a correct interpretation of civil law. In this case, if Zaman was 
justified under civil law to call ‘amen’ aloud, he could not be convicted of a criminal 
offence under section 296 of the Penal Code.153  
Mahmood’s judgment established a broad legal definition of who could be 
counted as a Muslim. In order to determine whether Zaman was within his civil rights, 
Mahmood first needed to establish that he was a Muslim. According to the mosque 
attendant’s complaint, by rejecting the four orthodox schools of law, Wahabis (or 
Muhammadis) intended to ‘set up a new form of worship for themselves’ and were no 
longer Muslims.154 Mahmood treated this claim as relevant by first referring to the 
Muslim law of waqf, according to which when a mosque was built and consecrated by 
public worship, it ceased to be the property of the builder and vested in God.  Under 
British Indian law this meant that every Muslim had the legal right to enter it and to 
pray according to his own tenets, as long as the form of worship that he took was in 
accord with the rules established under the Muslim ecclesiastical law.155 
Mahmood rejected the mosque attendent’s claim because all parties involved 
in the case claimed to be Sunni, and reciting ‘amen’ aloud was accepted practice 
within the ‘orthodox’ schools of law.  Here, what mattered in determining a Muslim 
was his or her claim to being so through orthopraxy (correct practice) rather than 
orthodoxy (correct belief). Zaman’s judgment was not that as a member of a 
‘dissenting’ sect, Wahabis or Muhammadis, had the right to worship with an 
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‘orthodox’ congregation. Rather, he determined that it was Zaman’s right to worship 
in a public mosque according to Zaman’s interpretation of ‘orthodox’ Islam. 
Mahmood explicitly denied the right of a majority, whose claim to ‘orthodoxy’ was 
that they maintained the most obvious interpretation of the Quran and traditions, from 
denying membership into the ‘Muslim community’ to a minority whose interpretation 
of Islam differed.156 As will be shown in the following chapter, the Ahmadiyya was 
defined as a Muslim ‘sect’ in the 1901 census and interpreted within colonial courts in 
a similar manner.   
 
Summary  
 
Drawing from late nineteenth-century legal commentaries, this chapter 
provided an overview of the principles that guided colonial courts in their 
understandings of personal law across caste and religious categories. It moved from a 
general overview of personal law in British India to a closer look at personal law in 
the Punjab. It then examined late nineteenth-century interpretations of Islamic law. 
These interpretations were underpinned by evolutionary legal theories that were 
influential among Punjab administrators at the time. The chapter ended by examining 
the ‘Muslim sect’, a category that the colonial censes and law conceptualized 
differently than the caste and religious categories relevant to personal law. 
Personal law defined caste and community boundaries through rules of 
inclusion and exclusion, and intermarriage. Muslim personal law, compared to Hindu 
personal law, defined boundaries that were open to outsiders and tended to distribute 
wealth widely, contrary to European principles of wealth accumulation. Within the 
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Muslim community governed by Muslim personal law, colonial courts recognized 
Khoja and Memon Muslims as belonging to communities that retained their caste 
customs distinct from Muslim laws of inheritance. In the Punjab, customary law 
defined Muslims who belonged to designated ‘agriculturalist’ tribes in a similar 
manner. Muslim ‘agriculturalists’ continued to follow what was understood to be their 
ancient village customs distinct from Muslim rules of inheritance. 
This chapter also examined some of the economic principles behind the law. 
The codification of customary law created legal boundaries that distinguished Muslim 
agriculturalists from Muslim non-agriculturalists, and it differentiated their land rights 
and rules of inheritance. This differentiation was part of a legal intervention aimed to 
stabilize the position of agriculturalists, threatened by high rates of indebtedness and 
land transfer. It was underpinned by evolutionary legal theories, according to which 
orthodox Islamic law was a product of codification by classical Muslim lawyers that 
impeded social and legal development. While colonial ethnography interpreted Punjab 
agriculturalists as economically backward and ignorant of Islamic law, Punjabi 
lawyers were trained to understand legal reform through evolutionary principles as a 
means of social reform. The religious identity of ‘Muslim sects’ was described 
differently as based on conscience and belief, and within personal law they were not 
recognized as following their own customs like Muslim minority communities.  
The next chapter will examine how these categories applied to the Ahmadiyya 
by examining the system of land administration in place where the Ahmadiyya 
emerged, the class background of the Ahmadiyya founder and prominent leaders 
within the community, and the Ahmadiyya’s classification as a Muslim sect in the 
Punjab census. It will examine the Ahmadiyya’s interpretation of Islamic law within 
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this context, and analyse how colonial courts interpreted the Ahmadiyya’s religious 
status within the Muslim community.  
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Chapter 2: The Ahmadiyya: a ‘Muslim Sect’ 
Introduction 
 This chapter examines the emergence of the Ahmadiyya in late nineteenth-
century Punjab within the context of colonial laws. The Ahmadiyya formed as a 
religious community with clear doctrinal boundaries and was identified within the 
colonial census as a Muslim sect. According to the logic by which colonial law 
interpreted Muslim sects, adherence to Ahmadi doctrines was treated as a matter of 
private interpretation. Although the Ahmadiyya practiced customs that altered their 
social relations with other Muslims, a Muslim’s conversion to Ahmadiyya was not 
recognized as altering his or her status under personal law. In the civil suits examined 
in this chapter, Muslims who wished to legally alter their social relations with 
Ahmadis could only do so by arguing that Ahmadis were not Muslim in terms of their 
beliefs. This would have also led to the loss of property rights attached to religious 
office and civil rights attached to religious identity, had not a court determined that 
Ahmadis were Muslim and Ahmadi beliefs derived from legitimate interpretations of 
Islamic sources of law.   
The first section of this chapter examines the position of Mirza Ghulam 
Ahmad, the founder of the Ahmadiyya, within the political economy of the Punjab. 
Ghulam Ahmad belonged to a landowning class whom the colonial administration 
recognized as intermediary between the state and the rural majority, a class whose 
position in rural society late nineteenth-century legal interventions were designed to 
protect. The second section examines the doctrines that distinguished the Ahmadiyya 
as a Muslim sect. By claiming authority to reinterpret Islamic law as the Messiah and 
Mahdi anticipated within Islamic sources, Ghulam Ahmad decreed that armed 
struggle in the way of Islam was no longer sanctioned under Islamic law. This section 
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shows his articulation of Ahmadi doctrines in opposition to interpretations of jihad 
pronounced by members of the Hindu reformist movement Arya Samaj, Christian 
missionaries, and the ‘sectarian’ Ahl-i-Hadis’. The final section examines how the 
Ahmadiyya were interpreted under colonial law. Colonial courts distinguished 
Ahmadis from ‘orthodox’ Sunni Muslims by their beliefs in accordance with its 
understanding of sectarian difference, and the Ahmadiyya’s status as non-Muslim was 
contested in court on these grounds. 
This chapter introduces two Punjab court cases that demonstrate how religious 
authority was entangled in land rights in the Punjab, and which have not been 
examined in secondary literature.157 The first case is Hussain Shah v. Gul Muhammad 
(1920), which was a family dispute over land in Qadian that determined the 
legitimacy of a religious endowment there. This endowment established a form of 
religious authority that the Punjab administration defined as Sunni Muslim religious 
authority. The second case is Mir Yad Ali v. Mubarak Ali (1905), in which a Hanafi 
Sunni congregation in Sialkot sued to have their mosque’s imam Mubarak Ali 
removed from his office on the basis of his conversion to Ahmadiyya. The imam’s 
removal from office was complicated by fact that he had inherited his office and it 
was attached to lands endowed to the mosque by the colonial administration.  
The third court case that this chapter examines is Narantakath Avullah v. 
Parakkal Mammu (1921), which is examined to understand how colonial law 
interpreted the Ahmadiyya. This judgment has received attention in historical studies 
because it provided the essential beliefs necessary to be defined as a Muslim 
according to colonial law.158 The court in this case was compelled to determine 
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whether or not the Ahmadiyya were Muslim as a result of an apostasy law that 
automatically dissolved the marriages of apostates from Islam. The automatic 
dissolution of marriage for apostasy from Islam will be examined in greater detail in 
chapter 5. The ruling demonstrates that colonial law determined that Ahmadi 
doctrines derived from legitimate interpretation of Islamic sources in accordance with 
its understanding of Muslim sects. It also described membership within the Muslim 
community as being grounded on common belief.    
These legal cases give insight into the views and strategies of Ahmadi litigants, 
and they also help to distinguish personal law as it was theorized from personal law as 
it was experienced. In Hussain Shah v. Gul Muhammad (1920), for example, the 
lawyer Zafrullah Khan argued that the family of the Ahmadiyya founder followed 
customary law rather than Islamic law in matters of inheritance. In a case one year 
later, Narantakath Avullah v. Parakkal Mammu (1921), Zafrullah Khan argued that 
Ahmadis were conscientious and believing Muslims. The implication that one could 
follow customary law and be a conscientious Muslim was not contradictory, though it 
might contradict the idea of a Muslim community unified be common belief and 
governed by Islam law. In all of these cases, Ahmadi litigants went to court to defend 
the rights defined by their status under personal law—whether that be the right of the 
son to inherent the property of his father, or the marital right of the husband.   
 
Qadian 
 
Mirza Ghulam Ahmad descended from a family of Mughal Barlas, a tribe of 
central Asian origin, which held superior land rights in the vicinity of a town called 
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Qadian.159 The history of Qadian reflects the broader history of the province under 
Islamic and Sikh rule. Qadian was part of the agrarian hinterland of the Mughal 
administration, which was taken over by independent Sikh chiefdoms and later 
incorporated into Ranjit Singh’s kingdom. The British administration’s land 
settlement of Qadian took place shortly after the British annexed the Punjab in 1849. 
This section begins with an account of the genealogy of Ghulam Ahmad’s family, 
which was compiled along with those of other landowning families in the Punjab by 
colonial officer Lepel Griffin in 1865. 160  These were the families that the 
administration treated as rural ‘aristocracy’, and as such their genealogies are relevant 
to the land rights that they possessed and their position within the colonial social order 
in the Punjab.  
The history of Ghulam Ahmad’s family linked the family’s settlement in the 
Punjab with the establishment of Qadian. Ghulam Ahmad’s ancestor Hadi Beg 
emigrated from Samarkand to the Punjab during the reign of Emperor Babur (r. 1526–
1530), the founder of the Mughal Empire. He settled ten miles east of the 
administrative town of Batala, where he was said to have established the town of 
Qadian. From there the Mughal administration appointed him as a qazi with 
jurisdiction over an area of 70 villages. The family held government offices under the 
Mughal administration for several generations after the founding of Qadian. However, 
it lost its position and its land when Mughal control over the Punjab weakened. The 
Sikh Ramgharia state took control over Qadian and pushed Ata Muhammad (Ghulam 
Ahmad’s grandfather) to flee south to Kapurthala, also a Sikh state but under different 
rule.  
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Ghulam Ahmad’s family eventually regained their lands under the Sikh ruler 
Ranjit Singh. Ata Muhammad remained in exile for 12 years, during which time 
Ranjit Singh consolidated power in the Punjab and appropriated the land in Qadian 
from the Ramgharia state. Ata Muhammad’s sons joined Ranjit Singh’s army and 
received a jagir, a land grant for military and administrative service, near Qadian. 
They continued to serve in the Sikh army under Ranjit Singh’s successors and 
maintained their position after the British annexation of the Punjab in 1849. During 
the 1857 mutiny, Ghulam Ahmad’s cousin fought under British officer John 
Nicholson.  
The British settlement of the Punjab altered the nature of the land rights held 
by Ghulam Ahmad’s family under the Mughals and Ranjit Singh. The British 
administration took over the family jagir and awarded Ghulam Ahmad’s father 
Ghulam Murtaza and his uncles a pension of 700 Rs. and proprietary rights in seven 
villages. Qadian continued to be the name of a town, but also designated the 
agricultural villages that were owned by Ghulam Ahmad’s family.161 
The town of Qadian was ten miles east the commercial centre of Batala, which 
had developed into a center of trade, administration, and law under Muslim rule.162  
Batala had been founded in the fifteenth century, when the Punjab was still under the 
rule of the Lodi dynasty, the last dynasty of the Delhi Sultanate before the founding of 
the Mughal Empire.163 It was founded by Ram Dev, a Bhatti Rajput who had 
converted to Islam and was contracted to collect revenue by the Lodi governor in the 
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Punjab. From Batala, Dev worked to encourage agrarian settlement in Batala’s 
sparsely populated countryside. Batala and its countryside continued to develop 
during Mughal times. Privately sunk irrigation wells sustained market gardens 
cultivated by Arain Muslim Rajputs. Shamshir Khan, a revenue collector in Batala 
under Akbar, constructed a large water tank in the town. The Shah Nahar canal built 
under Shah Jahan (r. 1628-1658) carried water from the Beas River into Batala.164 
Land settlement also encouraged conversion to Islam among cultivators in the 
region, which resulted from the Mughal policy of settling agricultural land through 
Sufi saints, men remembered for their social and charitable work.165 Akbar granted 
agricultural lands surrounding Batala to Sayyid Muhammad Shah of Bukhar, who 
used the revenue he collected to build a charitable kitchen for residents and travelers 
to Batala.  
Batala became an administrative center where generations of Mughal 
appointed revenue collectors were stationed. Locally recruited qanungos, quasi-
officials recognized by the Mughal state as revenue record keepers for the area, were 
also stationed there. It served as a market center, or qasba, where agricultural surplus 
was sold; manufactured goods such as cotton and silk textiles were produced and 
exported. It also became a center for Islamic law where judicial officers, qazis, 
resolved disputes and dispensed justice.166  
When the British settled of the region surrounding Qadian in 1852, they 
included Qadian and the town of Batala in the Gurdaspur district, an agriculturally 
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rich tract of land that extended to the Jammu province of Kashmir. The Gurdaspur 
district was divided into four sub-districts, which came to be called tehsils. Qadian 
and Batala were located in the Batala tehsil, the southernmost tehsil. During the 
colonial administration of the Punjab, Batala town remained the largest urban center 
in the Gurdaspur district. The Amristsar-Pathankot railway built in the late nineteenth 
century passed through it and facilitated a large export of sugar and grain from the 
countryside.167 It also continued to produce manufactured goods, including cotton and 
silk.   
Centuries of agricultural development left abundant well irrigation in the 
countryside surrounding Batala, valuable market gardens and orchards. It also left a 
large proportion of Muslims in the Batala tehsil compared to other regions in the 
district. In the Gurdaspur district overall, Muslims made up about 49 per cent of the 
population, while Hindus made up 40 per cent and Sikhs, 10 per cent of the remaining 
population.168 The 1892 revenue settlement report for the Gurdaspur district noted that 
Hindus predominated the hills and upper submontane regions in the north, while 
Muslims predominated the lower submontane and plains region where Batala was 
located. The predominant ‘agriculturalist’ tribes in the region were Jat and were 
comprised of Muslims, Sikhs, and Hindus. Arain Muslims, tribes that the British 
ethnography classified as ‘agriculturalist,’ were also prominent in the region.169 The 
Arains’ caste identity was occupationally based on their cultivating market gardens, 
but also their historic conversion to Islam. Batala town accounted for much of the 
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Muslim population in the tehsil. Almost two-thirds of Batala town’s population of 
27,365 were Muslim.170  Muslims in the area of Batala lived in both rural and urban 
conditions—they were both ‘agriculturalist’ and non-agriculturalist in terms of 
personal law and property rights.  
Muslims in the Gurdaspur district were described as being particularly prone 
to indebtedness. The 1892 settlement report for the Gurdaspur district mirrored Denzil 
Ibbetson’s 1881 census description, attributing cultural attitudes to the economic 
backwardness of Muslims. It noted patterns of ‘conversion to Islam’ (i.e. 
agriculturalists who were Muslim) in the region because it held that the land’s 
population was ‘as important a factor in its revenue paying capacity as its natural 
characteristics.’ 171  It described Muslims, and only Muslims, as ‘indolent and 
extravagant.’ If they appeared industrious, it explained that this was because the 
pressures of overpopulation in the region made them so. It also described them as ‘the 
least satisfied with British rule of any class in the district.’172 The report explained 
that their pride in being the original owners of the country made Muslims loath to sell 
the land that they were only too ready to encumber with debt.  
Attributing the economic backwardness of Muslims to cultural attitudes and 
behaviors seems to have justified a laissez faire approach to the problem of rural 
indebtedness. The 1892 settlement report’s description of Muslims was produced 
during a time when, as the report noted, agricultural debt and the transfer of land from 
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old proprietors to new ones were ‘prominent features of the agricultural horizons.’173 
Eight years before the Punjab administration passed the Punjab Alienation of Land 
Act, the report concluded that Muslim indebtedness was not a situation that required 
remedy on the part of the administration.  
However, it seems instead that a combination of superior land rights and 
inheritance customs contributed to land fragmentation and the impoverishment of 
Ghulam Ahmad’s family estate in Qadian. His family was the only Muslim 
landowning family of note in the Gurdaspur district that was included in Lepel 
Griffin’s Punjab Chiefs.174  It was, along with a proportionately larger population of 
Muslim ‘agriculturalists’ who resided in its vicinity, assessed at a fuller revenue rate 
compared to other regions in the district. 175  Despite occupying a socially and 
politically privileged position in Punjab society, his family was impoverished by the 
colonial land administration system, and their influence over local Muslims 
diminished as a consequence.   
Ghulam Ahmad’s family estate, as a talukdari land tenure, was a rarity among 
existing patterns of land rights in the Gurdaspur district. It gave them superior land 
rights over the several villages that they owned in a district characterized by village 
coparcenary tenures.176 Most villages in the Gurdaspur district were held in bhaichara 
and pattidari land tenures.  In both types of tenure, estates were parceled out to 
shareholders. Shareholders managed only their allotted lands and paid revenue 
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through a village headman. In the Batala tehsil, where the preponderate Jat 
agriculturalists were considered ‘less sticklers for ancestral shares than the highest 
castes,’ the administration tended to access individuals according to equal shares.177 
Only 55 square miles of the 1,889 square miles that made up the Gurdaspur district 
were held in superior land tenures.178  
Their position as Muslim landowners seems to have been recognized by the 
colonial administration as one of influence over the rural Muslim population in that 
region. Lepel Griffin described Ghulam Ahmad’s father Ghulam Murtaza as having 
had considerable local influence in Qadian at the advent of colonial rule. This status 
was also implicit in the family holding a talukdari land tenure. In 1891, the Gazetteer 
of the Gurdaspur District published that the only well noted cases of talukdari land 
tenures in the Gurdaspur district were ‘the Kadian Mughals and of the Talh Khatris of 
Kalanaur.’ These families, the gazetteer explained, were representatives of the old 
qanugos in Mughal times and as such still received a small allowance [assessed as a 
cess on land revenue] from the state.179 The administration interpreted such tenures as 
markers of a Mughal aristocracy who was granted land and the collection of revenue 
under Mughal rule. It understood such tenures to have ‘in the decadence of 
Mussulman power’ become hereditary offices and sometimes assumed the power of 
civil government. Ghulam Ahmad’s family was described as having had ruling power 
in Qadian.180   
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Maintaining some of these tenures was a means for the colonial administration 
to maintain control over the rural population. The Punjab administration gave these 
landowners access to government employment, which integrated them into the 
colonial administration and helped maintain their local influence.181  This was the 
case with Ghulam Ahmad’s family. Ahmad’s elder brother Ghulam Qadir was a 
superintendent in the Gurdaspur district. When Ghulam Qadir’s only son died in 
infancy, he ‘adopted’ his nephew and Ghulam Ahmad’s youngest son Sultan Ahmad, 
who the British administration then regarded as the head of the family. Sultan Ahmad 
held various positions within the Punjab administration.182      
However, while the colonial state granted his family some political privilege 
in the form of access to government employment, their economic position began to 
deteriorate after the first British settlement. Their estate was burdened by a high rate 
of revenue assessment. This seems to have been the result of revenue divisions 
created by the British settlement, which did not reflect centuries of uneven 
agricultural development and the mostly decentralized administration of land in the 
region before colonial times. The Mughal administration had organized revenue units 
by pargunnas—groupings of 20 to 200 villages organized around a town center.183 
The British retained the terminology of the Mughal administration, dividing their 
administration into pargunnas. However, the pargunna signified a larger revenue 
area—divisions that would come to be called tehsils.  
Under the British administration, revenue circles defined the rate of revenue 
assessment of a given area. Qadian was included within the same revenue circle as 
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Batala town despite its past development apart from it. The revenue circle 
encompassing Qadian and Batala did not conform to previous administrative divisions 
that separated the two towns. Before the annexation of the Punjab, Batala and Qadian 
were part of different states within the Sikh confederacy: Batala formed part of the 
Kanya state, while Qadian formed part of the Ramgurhis state. They were also 
administrated differently after the British settlement. The 1856 revised settlement 
report for the Gurdaspur district listed Qadian and Batala as having been separate 
jagirs under Ranjit Singh. They were incorporated administratively in 1862, when the 
colonial administration consolidated their control over Batala. They managed to do so 
by transferring jagirs held by Raja Tej Singh, a dying landowner without heirs, from 
the North to Batala. The Punjab administration granted 186 villages in the southwest 
area of Batala to Tej Singh shortly before his death, organizing these villages into 
their own jurisdiction around the town of Batala. The British administered those 
villages not included within Tej Singh’s jagir separately from Qadian, which had 
‘escheated’ to the state after the death of Ranjit Singh’s ‘reputed’ heir.  With Tej 
Singh’s death, the separate jurisdiction around Batala was abolished, and Singh’s jagir 
was amalgamated into what had been the revenue area of Qadian. The administrative 
headquarters of the new tehsil shifted to Batala.184 The town of Qadian and the 
villages around it were included within a single revenue circle with the urban center 
of Batala—the Bangra circle. As part of an assessment that included the abundant 
well irrigation and market gardens of Batala, Qadian was taxed at a fuller revenue rate 
compared to other revenue circles in the district.185 
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The judgment in Hussain Shah v Gul Muhammad (1920) provides information 
about how land devolved within Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s family. It was divided 
among multiple heirs. This may have been in accordance with the family’s adherence 
to Muslim laws of inheritance, which recognized equal shares for sons and shares for 
daughters at half that of sons.186  The family owned seven villages, over which at least 
Ghulam Ahmad’s father Ghulam Murtaza and paternal uncle Ghulam Mohi-ud-din 
had separate shares of land. Upon their deaths, land devolved to their sons in equal 
shares. The 1852 and the 1865 record-of-rights also entered female heirs as co-sharers 
of the land.187 
Individual land shares within the family further diminished through 
subsequent land alienations. Superior land rights did not place the restrictions to 
alienation of land that village coparcenaries with shared land rights did. Like so much 
of the agricultural land in the province, land once owned by the family passed out of 
their hands. By 1885, a greater portion of the family estate had been sold to a single 
buyer. Further alienations of land through mortgages, sales, exchanges, and gifts took 
place after 1885. 188  Qadian thus reflected the broader patterns of economic 
transformation taking place in the Punjab at the time, which led to legal interventions 
like the 1900 Land Alienation Act. 
As ancestral landowners, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s family occupied a similar 
position within the colonial order in the Punjab as rural religious leaders, the pir and 
                                                
186 Hussain Shah v Gul Muhammad (1920) 25 PLR 59 at 144. This information was produced in land 
dispute involving Ghulam Mohi-ud-din’s heir. It did not state all of the family members with land 
rights, only those relevant to the case.   
187 Ibid. at 149. 
188 Ibid., at 147.  
 70 
the sajjada nashin.189 These were the heirs of the baraka (blessings) of Sufi saints, and 
as such they exerted a strong influence over the rural majority that made pilgrimage to 
the saints’ shrines. Like large landowners, the Punjab administration’s policy treated 
them as influential intermediaries between the state and the masses and sought to 
instill loyalty among them to the British government.  The British incorporated them 
into their rural administration, particularly in west and southwest Punjab, where they 
served as zaildars (revenue officials), magistrates, and district board members.190 
Classed as ‘landed gentry’ in the Land Alienation Act, they were entitled to 
government land grants in canal colonies after 1900.  
Muslim rulers in the Punjab had long given patronage to Sufi shrines as a way 
to bring the Punjab countryside within the administrative orbit of the state.191 In this 
respect, the British land policies maintained religious structures that already existed. 
Sultan Muhammad ibn Tughluq (d. 1351) used local revenue to support the 
successors of the Chishti saint Babi Farid (d. 1265).192  Babi Farid’s successors, in 
turn, gave patronage to local Jat chiefs. By the early seventeenth century, Jat 
agriculturalists were initiated into the Chishti Sufi order at the hands of Babi Farid’s 
successors. Thus by giving patronage to Babi Farid’s successors, the Sultanate exerted 
control over the numerous Jat tribes that had settled in the Punjab countryside before 
the Sultanate was established.  
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These linkages, which organized the rural population in the Punjab around the 
spiritual authority of the pir, were formalized through an initiation ceremony called 
ba’yat. This rite of initiation was performed when the disciple (murid) placed his 
hands on those of his pir (spiritual guide) and declared his belief in the Islamic creed 
and his membership in the spiritual order to which his pir belonged.193 In the 
seventeenth century, bay’at into the Chishti order carried political and perhaps even 
military obligations. By the end of the nineteenth century, the Indian census found 
that the majority of Muslims in the Punjab had entered into ba’yat with a Sufi pir.194 
However, while Muslim ancestral landowners were in a similar position as the 
pir and sajjada nashin (custodians of Sufi shrines), their land rights were different 
under the Punjab administration. While superior land tenures gave Ghulam Ahmad’s 
family the right to alienate their ancestral land (e.g. sell or mortgage it), the sajjada 
nashin or pir’s land right was attached to the Sufi shrine. In the Punjab, these shrines 
were categorized with other religious endowments as public waqfs, and they 
functioned as a trust that prevented the alienation of land attached to them. Around 
1885, a section of Ghulam Ahmad’s family began a process of transferring their 
individual property shares in Qadian to a type of waqf called a takia. This resulted in 
the legal recognition of a sajjada nashin in Qadian, and the property rights attached to 
that office.  
Ghulam Ahmad’s uncle Ghulam Mohid-ud-din had left his property in Qadian 
to his three sons in equal shares.195  One of these sons, Kamal Din, managed 
cultivation of the land and became a fakir or ‘holy man’ in the Naushauhi Qadiri order. 
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In 1894, Kamal Din set up a takia. The takia was classified under British Indian law in 
the Punjab as a religious endowment in the same category as Sufi shrines (durgahs). It 
was defined as the residence where a fakir imparted his religious teachings to his 
followers. Should that fakir reach a high enough stature to attract a large following of 
disciples, the ‘takia’ became a ‘khankah’ while he lived and a ‘durgah’ after his death. 
When the takia was set up, Kamal Din and one of his brothers gifted around 23 kanals 
worth of land to it.196 This was recorded within the colonial record-of-rights, which 
named Hussain Shah, a cultivator and disciple of Kamal Din, as manager of the takia. 
From 1894 and 1901, Kamal Din’s brothers transferred property to Kamal Din. From 
1907 and 1910, Kamal Din transferred the property into the takia. This protected the 
land from alienation: as manager of Takia Kamal Din, Hussain Shah was responsible 
for paying revenue to the state and was entitled to a portion of the produce of the land, 
but had no power to alienate that land. Upon the death of Kamal Din in 1912, Takia 
Kamal Din remained a takia to which a total of 82 kanals of agricultural land in 
Qadian was endowed. Hussain Shah v Gul Muhammad (1920) arose as a property 
dispute between the hereditary heir of this ancestral land and Hussain Shah, its 
manager. The Lahore high court resolved this dispute by recognizing Hussain Shah as 
the sajjada nashin of Takia Kamal Din. As such, he had a property right attached to 
his office that superseded the absolute property right of the hereditary heir.  
Takia Kamal Din established a form of religious authority that was rooted in 
Qadian, centred around the residence of Kamal Din and endowed through his 
ancestral lands. It was a takia and remained so after Kamal Din’s death, suggesting his 
limited discipleship and the localized nature of his authority. He preached to a 
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following described as ‘sweepers’—a term applied to depressed classes lacking 
property ownership rights.197  
Takia Kamal Din also established what the colonial administration defined as 
‘orthodox’ religious authority in Qadian. The Naushahi branch of the Qadiri order to 
which Kamal Din belonged was defined within the official census as part of Sunni 
orthodoxy. As discussed in chapter one, Ibbetson’s 1881 census interpreted divisions 
within Islam in sectarian terms: ‘sects’ dissented from the ulama, a class of religious 
scholars who interpreted Islamic law. The 1891 census maintained the division of 
Muslims into Sunni ‘orthodox’ Muslims and ‘sectarian’ Muslims. However, it now 
described Sufi orders, to which a majority of Muslims in the Punjab belonged, as 
being part of Sunni ‘orthodoxy.’ 198  Sunnis belonged to four main orders:  the Chishti, 
Qadiri, Naqshbandi, and Saharwardi orders. The Qadiri order to which Kamal Din 
belonged was, according to the census, the Sufi order to which most Sunni maulvis 
belonged. The 1901 census of India maintained this taxonomy by describing the 
structure of ‘orthodoxy’ in Islam as the twofold priesthood of the ulama and the pir: 
while the ulama interpreted law and dogma, the pir facilitated spiritual submission 
and communion with God. This census held that: ‘with the exception of the Ahl-i-
Hadis or Wahabbis [sic], almost all Muhammadans of the Sunni sect go through the 
ceremony of initiation [bay’at] by a pir.’199 
Hussain Shah v Gul Muhammad illustrates how the establishment of certain 
forms of ‘orthodox’ religious authority depended upon how property rights were 
configured by personal law. In this case, Ghulam Mohid-ud-din’s heir claimed 
                                                
197 Hussain Shah v. Gul Muhammad (1920), at 147. 
198 E. D. Maclagan, Census of the Punjab and its Feudatories, vol. 19: pt. 1 (Calcutta: Superintendent, 
Government Printing, 1892), 193. 
199 Risley and Gait, 1901 Census of India, 375. 
 74 
hereditary rights over the land endowed to Takia Kamal Din, a claim that depended 
upon the court determining that the takia was invalid.  Making this determination 
came down to whether Ghulam Ahmad’s family followed customary law or Muslim 
personal law. Ultimately, the court determined that his family followed Muslim 
personal law, according to which the alienation of agricultural land away from 
Ghulam Mohid-ud-din’s hereditary heir was valid. Had the court determined that the 
family followed customary law instead, agricultural land in Qadian would have been 
restricted to Mughal Barlas.200 The case illustrates the uncertain nature of personal 
law and how easily the ‘rural and urban distinction’ blurred. Despite the hereditary 
heir’s argument that his family followed customary law, the creation of the takia was 
itself evidence of that the family followed Muslim personal law. 
The establishment of Takia Kamal Din as a public waqf protected Kamal 
Din’s land from fragmenting and established what the colonial administration defined 
as ‘orthodox’ religious authority in Islam. Around the same time that Kamal Din 
created Takia Kamal Din in Qadian, the Ahmadiyya community formed around the 
religious authority of Ghulam Ahmad. This religious authority was defined by the 
colonial census as ‘sectarian’, which interpreted Ahmadis as dissenting from the 
religious authority of the ulama according to a liberal understanding of religion as a 
private matter of belief and conscience.  
 
The Doctrinal Boundaries of the Ahmadiyya 
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In 1901, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad petitioned the Punjab administration to have 
his religious followers recognized as a Muslim sect called the Ahmadiyya in the 
upcoming census.201 The census’s identification of them as such defined them as a 
religious group that dissented from the religious authority of the ulama as a matter of 
individual conscience and belief. This section will examine the aspects of the 
Ahmadiya that conformed to the colonial administration’s definition of a Muslim sect. 
It will do so by examining the form of religious authority that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad 
claimed over his followers, which was superior to that traditionally claimed by the 
ulama, and his interpretation of Islamic doctrines. The identification of his followers 
as a Muslim sect by the colonial administration circumscribed Ghulam Ahmad’s 
religious authority over his followers and identified them with his particular 
interpretation of Islamic law. This section will examine the social context in which 
Ahmadi doctrines emerged, relating the Ahmadiyya’s identification as a Muslim sect 
to the social position of its prominent members within this context.  
Ghulam Ahmad was known for participating in interreligious debates with 
Christian and Hindu missionaries. 202  Christian missionaries were particularly 
successful in gaining converts to Christianity in the Gurdaspur district where these 
debates took place.203 The decade between 1881 and 1891 saw a sharp increase in the 
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amount of native Christians in districts including Amritsar, Lahore, and Gurdaspur.204 
During this period, Christian missionaries in the Punjab took to a particularly 
aggressive form of street preaching, which included playing music to attract large 
crowds before preaching against Hinduism and Islam.205  They proselytized through 
print as well. Missionaries were involved in setting up the first printing press in the 
province, established in Ludhiana in 1836 by the American Presbyterian Mission.206 
Among Ghulam Ahmad’s earliest religious tracts was one written in response to 
arguments against Islam made by a Christian missionary who had converted from 
Islam.207  
The Arya Samaj also competed with Christian missionaries for converts to 
Hinduism. The Arya Samaj was a Hindu religious organization established in the 
Bombay in 1874 by Dayanand Saraswati (1824-1883).208  They were reform minded, 
stressing monotheism, ritual simplicity, and caste reform of ‘orthodox’ Hinduism. 
Dayanand taught that the Arya Samaj was a return to Hinduism’s Vedic teachings, 
which unlike Christianity and Islam were divinely inspired. 209  Arya Samaj 
missionaries performed what they called shuddhi, a ceremony that was meant to 
purify lower castes of untouchability and bring them within the fold of Hinduism. 
Shuddhi brought the Arya Samaj into competition with Christian missionaries and 
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Muslims. Like Christian missionaries, the Arya Samaj founded newspapers and 
engaged in street preaching.  
The main thrust of the Arya Samaj’s attack against Islam was that it promoted 
violence and divided the world into believers and infidels.210 The ‘doctrine of jihad’ 
was a frequently occurring topic in Arya Samaj newspapers in the late nineteenth 
century. Jihad was a term found in the Quran that connoted a Muslim’s duty to 
struggle in the way of Islam and could be interpreted to mean a Muslim’s duty to 
wage religious war against non-Muslims. In British India, it connoted a Muslim’s 
duty to oppose British rule, particularly for the British government’s opposition to the 
Ottoman Sultan. In 1880, newspapers reported that the Amir of Afghanistan had 
written a treatise on jihad and circulated it amongst his subjects, that he was using 
jihad to assemble a Ghazi army that was ready to attack the British at any time.211 
When a British woman was attacked and killed by a Pashtun on a railway platform, 
newspapers called it ‘the Ghazi outrage.’ 212  One newspaper wrote: ‘Let the 
English…bear in mind that the sacred books of the Muhammadans enjoin the 
destruction of infidels; that it is unlawful for them to obey an infidel, that the Pathan 
[Pashtun] have thoroughly learnt the lesson of Jihad, and that the idea of shedding the 
blood of infidels has taken a strong hold on their minds.’213  
The Ahl-i-Hadis were concerned with counteracting the Arya Samaj’s writings 
about jihad. Like Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, many came from the class of men 
intermediary between the colonial state and the masses: approximately ¼ of those 
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who identified themselves as Ahl-i-Hadis occupied government or princely service.214 
In Amritsar, Ahl-i-Hadis or Wahabis (the two were conflated before 1891) 
represented propertied Muslims in associations and local government. A prominent 
figure among the Ahl-i-Hadis was Muhammad Husain of Batala. In 1876, 
Muhammad Husain wrote a treatise on jihad.215 His treatise argued that Islam did not 
permit Indian Muslims to wage jihad against the British government in India because 
it guaranteed to Muslims religious liberty and security of life and property. Following 
this treatise, Ghulam Ahmad published a book called Barahin-i-Ahmadiyya (Ahmadi 
Proofs), which also argued that Indian Muslims were not permitted to wage jihad 
against the British government. Ahmad’s position on jihad closely aligned with 
Muhammad Husain’s position, and Husain wrote a lengthy and positive review of the 
book.216  
While Ahl-i-Hadis leader Muhammad Husain argued that Muslims in India 
were bound to obey the British, the British administration associated the Ahl-i-Hadis 
with violent revolt against non-Muslim rule through its census. As discussed in 
chapter one, the 1881 Punjab census classified Ahl-i-Hadis, Muhammadi, etc., as 
‘Wahabis.’ This reflected the colonial censuses’ tendency to differentiate Muslims 
using taxonomies that were imprecise and broad. ‘Wahabism’ designated various 
groups who did not recognize the religious authority of the ulama and the pir.217 At 
the same time, being classified as ‘Wahabi’ associated these groups with past 
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revolutionary movements. 218   Ibbetson’s 1881 census traced Wahabism to the 
teachings of Muhammad Abdul Wahhab, a late seventeenth-century Muslim reformer 
from the Arabian Peninsula. It traced Wahabism in India to the teachings of Syed 
Ahmad of Bareilly (1786–1831). In doing so, it associated Wahabis with Muslim 
uprisings against non-Muslim rule in India: Syed Ahmad had waged jihad against 
Sikh rule in the Punjab. In 1864, the colonial administration imprisoned a number of 
people it labeled as Sayed Ahmad’s followers for preaching jihad against the British 
following the 1857 mutiny.219 However, not all colonial officials had agreed with 
Ibbetson’s broad use of the term Wahabis. Some colonial officials had discerned a 
line between ‘Wahabis’ who were ‘purely religious’ and those that were ‘political 
fanatics.’220 In The Indian Mussalmans (1876), W. W. Hunter made this distinction 
one between Ahl-i-Hadis purists and Wahabis fanatics.221 
Muhammad Husain attempted to distinguish his followers as a separate sect 
from Wahabis.  In 1886, Muhammad Husain sent a letter to the Secretary of the 
Punjab governor asking that the term Wahabi not be used to describe members of the 
Ahl-i-Hadis in official correspondence. The Government of India took up the matter, 
and as a result Husain received an official letter requesting that Muslims refrain from 
calling Ahl-i-Hadis members Wahabi or face criminal prosecution for defamation.222  
Finally, in 1891, the census of India began to classify Ahl-i-Hadis and Wahabis as 
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separate sects.223 The census’s recognition of finer distinctions among Muslims 
distanced Muhammad Husain’s followers from politically subversive interpretations 
of Islamic doctrines associated with Wahabism.  
Mirza Ghulam Ahmad became prominent as a Muslim religious scholar for 
debating against Pandit Lekh Ram, a member of the Arya Samaj.224 Lekh Ram 
published a number of treatises against Islam, including a book arguing that jihad was 
the foundation of Islam.  He also published treaties against Ghulam Ahmad in 
particular, including a refutation of his Barahin-i-Ahmadiyya. This book, called 
Takdhib-i Barahin-i Ahmadiyya, was published in 1886. Because of the abusive 
language to the prophet Muhammad contained in the book, Muslims called for the 
prosecution of Lekh Ram and the publisher of Takdhib-i Barahin-i Ahmadiyya.225 
That same year, Ghulam Ahmad and Lekh Ram publically debated in Hoshiyapur. In 
the end, Ghulam Ahmad and Lekh Ram agreed to a mubahala, which meant an act of 
cursing each other: opponents in a debate invoked the curse of God upon the one who 
was wrong.226 
Lekh Ram was murdered eleven years later by an unidentified assassin, which 
led Ghulam Ahmad to publish a notice of the mubahala in an Arya Samaj 
newspaper.227 This generated a lot of attention in smaller Urdu newspapers in the 
                                                
223 Risley and Gail, 1901 Census of India, 375.    
224 This account is drawn from Jones, Arya Dharm, 146-153; Friedmann, Prophecy Continuous, 8-9; 
and Lavan, The Ahmadiyah, 33-34. 
225News of this intended lawsuit was published in the Muslim newspaper Chaudhwin Sadi 
(Rawalpindi), 1 September 1896, Selections, IOR L/R/5/180.  
226 Definition in Friedmann, Prophecy Continuous, 6.  
227 The notice was published in Bharat Sudhar (Lahore), 13 March 1897, Selections, IOR L/R/5/181. It 
begins: ‘Ten years ago, in accordance with a revelation made to me by the Almighty, I issued a notice 
on the 20th February 1886 to the effect that God had resolved upon punishing Pandit Lekh Ram for his 
blasphemy (beadbian and gustakhian). I offered to reveal the form of punishment and the time within 
 81 
Gurdaspur district, mainly Arya Samaj newspapers (with a circulation of between 100 
and 300). It fed into the already simmering tensions between Hindus and Muslims in 
Lahore and attracted the attention of the larger Lahore newspaper Paisa Akhbar (with 
a circulation of 10,000). 228  Muslim newspapers criticized Ghulam Ahmad for 
publishing the mubahala because it seemed to feed into allegations made in Arya 
Samaj newspapers that Lekh Ram’s murder had been committed by a Muslim. 
The doctrinal boundaries separating Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s followers and 
Muslims who identified as Ahl-i-Hadis were likely fluid for a time. However, they 
solidified after Ghulam Ahmad’s followers began to pledge allegiance to him 
formally through the Sufi institution of bay’at, which took place in Ludhyana in 1889. 
In 1891, also in Ludhyana, Ahmad publicly debated with Ahl-i-Hadis leader 
Muhammad Husain.229 In this debate, Ghulam Ahmad used the Quran to argue that 
Jesus had been alive when he was taken down from the cross and died a natural death 
in Kashmir.  This position was based on the authority of Ghulam Ahmad’s own 
interpretation of the Quran. This interpretation conflicted with traditions held by 
Muhammad Husain as authoritative. It also did not conform to Muslim eschatological 
expectations that derived from these traditions, according to which the Mahdi would 
appear on earth accompanied by Jesus and lead Muslims to redemption. Belief in the 
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Mahdi, the ultimate redeemer for Muslims, was particularly strong among Wahabi 
(and Ahl-i-Hadis) Muslims in India.230   
Ghulam Ahmad began to assert a religious authority to interpret Islamic law 
that was higher than the ulama by claiming prophetic status. His earliest claim 
towards divine communion with God was a majaddid, a figure who came every 
century from a line of reformers to lead Muslims back to true Islam and give them 
guidance within the contemporary world.231 He also claimed to have been muhaddath, 
a person spoken to by an angel or God.232 These claims were less controversial at the 
time than his later claim to having been the Mahdi and Messiah.233 According to 
Ahmadiyya belief, the return of Jesus foretold in Islamic sources was figurative. 
Ghulam Ahmad appeared in the spirit of Jesus. 
Ghulam Ahmad claimed to be a prophet, but did so while making a distinction 
between law-bearing and non-law-bearing prophets. While he recognized Muhammad 
as the last prophet to bring a divine law, he held that prophecy continued after him. 
Accordingly, Ghulam Ahmad interpreted Muhammad’s designation as ‘Khatam-e-
Nabuwat’ (seal of the Prophets) in the Quran differently than the Islamic traditions 
held to be authoritative during his time and afterward, according to which Muhammad 
was the last prophet. Ghulam Ahmad interpreted ‘Khatam-e-Nabuwat’ to mean that 
Muhammad was the stamp of prophets and all prophets after him would bear his 
stamp. Prophecy after Muhammad continued within the parameters of the law that he 
founded. Thus Ghulam Ahmad claimed to be a non-law bearing prophet whose 
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interpretation was restricted to the Quran, hadith, and sunna. While Ghulam Ahmad’s 
interpretation of Khatam-e-Nabuwat existed in early Islamic traditions, in 
contemporary times belief in the unqualified finality of Muhammad’s prophecy has 
become a cardinal article of faith for Muslims.234  
For at least some Muslims at the time, Ghulam Ahmad’s claim to being a 
Mahdi was more controversial than his claims to being a prophet. Muhammad Husain 
disputed his claim to being the Mahdi in his newspaper Ishaatur Sunah, writing: ‘he 
never thought the ‘Mirza’ being a ‘Mogul’ would claim ‘Mehdi’ [Mahdi] who must 
be a ‘Syad’ [a descendent of the Prophet].’235 Husain demonstrated here that he 
believed in the notion of a Mahdi, and yet he also suggested that belief in the Mahdi 
was in itself subversive to the British government: he concluded the same article by 
writing that he no longer considered Ghulam Ahmad loyal to the British. This 
suggests the political implications attached to claiming to be Mahdi in the late 
nineteenth century. In the Lahore newspaper Wafadar, one writer called on other 
Muslims to reject Ghulam Ahmad as Promised Messiah and Mahdi because he would 
not have come during a time of peace and liberty. The writer went on to reject that he 
is even a prophet, suggesting that this is the lesser claim.236  The appearance of the 
Mahdi implied political as well as moral disorder prevailed.  
In the late nineteenth century, belief in the Mahdi was associated with violent 
uprisings. Around the time that the Ahmadiyya emerged in the Punjab, Mahdi-
inspired uprisings occurred among Muslim tribes in West Africa and the Sudan 
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against an Egyptian administration. 237  Ghulam Ahmad fulfilled messianic 
expectations for his followers without the expectation of political revolution through 
potentially violent means. According to the hadith whose authority he drew upon to 
support his claim, the Mahdi would destroy the cross, abolish the jizya (tax for non-
Muslims), slay the pigs, and come during a time when Muslims had adopted Jewish 
and Christians ways that were contrary to Muslim teachings. Ghulam Ahmad 
interpreted this hadith not to mean that the Mahdi would go to war against 
Christianity. Rather, the Mahdi would bring about a trend that would lead to all 
Christians gradually entering the fold of Islam through conversion.238  In print, the 
Ahmadiyya argued against the notion of a ‘bloody Mahdi.’239 This argument was 
made within the context of religious debate, but it served to define Ahmadiyya 
doctrine in contradistinction to other expectations of the Mahdi. 
Different from Muslim leaders who argued that jihad was not legitimate under 
the conditions created by British rule, Ghulam Ahmad reinterpreted the meaning of 
jihad for Muslims as being historically contingent. The historical circumstances under 
which jihad by the sword was permitted no longer existed anywhere or in any 
jurisdiction. The arrival of the Mahdi, who signaled the final redemption of Islam, 
meant that those conditions would never exist again. Jihad through argument, 
however, was now and would be in the future necessary for every Muslim. Non-
violent jihad was part of Ahmadi eschatological expectations for Ghulam Ahmad and 
linked to Muslim redemption: Ahmad wrote that ending violent jihad was necessary 
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for Muslim prosperity.240 He declared that there was ‘no sword except the sword of 
arguments and proofs.’241    
The institution of bay’at and the religious authority that being Mahdi 
conferred on Ghulam Ahmad created a centralized form of religious authority among 
Ahmadis. In contrast to the Ahl-i-Hadis, this form of religious authority left no room 
for doctrinal ambiguity over the meaning of jihad among his followers. Muhammad 
Husain advocated an interpretation of jihad in which the conditions for jihad against 
the British had not been met. However, while Husain may have represented the 
beliefs of his own Ahl-i-Hadis followers, the Ahl-i-Hadis were dispersed throughout 
India without any single religious authority to articulate doctrine. They tended not to 
recognize hierarchical structures of religious authority, rejecting Sufi pirs as spiritual 
mediums between God and the individual. 242  Muslims in India who identified 
themselves to be Ahl-i-Hadis expressed a range of doctrinal positions, including 
religious opposition to the British government. They also expressed different 
eschatological expectations, which included violent revolution. 243  A centralized 
authority meant that Ghulam Ahmad defined what jihad meant for his followers. In 
1901, he defined his followers as Ahmadiyya through the Indian census. In doing so, 
he labeled his followers and associated them with a set of doctrines that did not spell 
certain violent insurrection against British rule among Muslims.  
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Different than ‘Ahl-i-Hadis’, Ghulam Ahmad rejected the authority of ulama 
in India to interpret Islamic law without rejecting the Sunni schools of law. The Ahl-i-
Hadis identified themselves with the ‘Ahl-i-Hadith’ who emerged during the first 
centuries of Islam and opposed the schools of law. They instead favoured the direct 
use of textual sources by individual jurists.244  According to Ghulam Ahmad the main 
sources of law were the Quran, followed by the sunna (sayings and deeds of 
Muhammad) and the hadith (the Islamic traditions). If all three sources of law did not 
provide a solution, Ghulam Ahmad referred to the Hanafi school of law and ijtihad 
(independent reasoning, interpretation).245 As will be explained in the next section, the 
Ahmadiyya developed the institutions to train its own class of ulama.  
The Ahmadiyya’s interpretation of jihad had material implications for 
Muslims in the same class as Ghulam Ahmad. British fear of Muslim rebellion 
seemed to correlate with government policies for promoting educational and 
employment opportunities for Muslims. In 1871, Governor-General Lord Mayo asked 
Bengal civil officer W. W. Hunter to write on ‘the burning question of the day:’ were 
Muslims religiously bound to rebel against the Queen?246 At the same time, there was 
a growing disparity between Hindus and Muslims in education and government 
employment. The government attributed the poor showing of Muslims in government 
schools to religious and cultural reticence to receive an irreligious education.  Mayo 
was concerned that British policy should encourage Muslims to attend government 
schools. For Indian Muslims in particular, the British government correlated 
government education with less religiosity, and religiosity with rebellion. 
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Interreligious debates between Muslims and the Arya Samaj also seemed to 
have material implications in the Punjab, where competition for merit based 
appointments took the form of competition between religious groups.247 Western-
educated Punjabis organize with their co-religionists rather than as a class. Sikhs 
organized into Singh Sabhas that tended to focus internally on Sikh orthodoxy and 
apostasy. Educated Hindus from commercial castes—Khatri, Arora, and Bania—
affiliated with the Arya Samaj. 248  Muslims tended to organize into anjumans 
(associations) modeled after associations in Britain, like the Anjuman Islamia (1869). 
This anjuman was established in Lahore by the British administration with the two-
fold aim of protecting Muslim interests and fostering Muslim loyalty to the British.249 
The Anjuman Himayat-i-Islam (e. 1884) in Lahore attracted Muslims in the 
intermediate elite between the British administration and the masses. Its members 
included Fazli-Husain, Muhammad Iqbal, and Muhammad Shafi—all of whom would 
become prominent Muslim politicians in representative government after its 
expansion in 1919.250 Until at least 1897, Ghulam Ahmad participated in the Anjuman 
Himayat-i-Islam and a significant number of his followers were its members.251 
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Ghulam Ahmad, who was then known for his religious debates with the Arya Samaj, 
spoke before the anjuman and published through its auspices.252  
 In the Punjab, there was a low proportion of Muslims to Hindus in 
government education and professional employment. In 1883, 54 Muslims held the 
executive post of extra assistant commissioner against 38 Hindus. When included 
with the administrative posts of tahsildar, munsif, and superintendent of settlements, 
Muslims occupied 45 per cent of the 312 positions.  However, Muslims only occupied 
23.1 per cent of positions where professional and examination qualifications were 
required, such as in medicine and education.253 Those castes that comprised the Arya 
Samaj, on the other hand, dominated the colonial education system in the Punjab and 
filled the majority of professional positions. Anjuman Himayat-i-Islam was 
established to promote western education among Punjabi Muslims, establishing 
primary schools among rural Punjabi Muslims as an alternative to the religious 
education provided by madrasas. These schools followed a curriculum that included 
compulsory English and emphasized female education.254  
The Anjuman Himayat-i-Islam’s advocacy of mass education among rural 
Punjabis was in synch with a shift in the colonial government’s education policy 
under Viceroy Lord Curzon (1899-1905). Law council Lord Macaulay’s (1835) had 
established a policy of promoting education as a means by which European culture 
was inculcated into an Indian elite. By the late nineteenth century colonial officials 
had come to associate this style of education with the rise of nationalist feelings 
among Indians, and shifted towards a policy that promoted education as a means to 
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employment and a vehicle towards social advancement for all classes in India.255 
Unlike madrasas, which relied on private donations, these schools were aided by the 
colonial administration through a system of grants-in-hand, which combined 
government agency with the private philanthropy of educated and wealthy Indians, 
who were typically driven by nationalist, sectarian, and caste group interests.256  
The prospect of social advancement through secular education also brought 
converts into the Ahmadiyya fold. Conversion to Islam through Ahmadi missionaries 
was central to the Ahmadiyya’s eschatological expectations, as it was to the 
Ahmadiyya’s doctrine of jihad. According to Ahmadiyya belief, missionizing 
replaced the notion that Islam would spread by force with the notion that Islam would 
be spread through persuasion. Its missionary activities were directed at various social 
levels, as was reflected in print: Ghulam Ahmad published prophecies and religious 
arguments that reflected the religious debates in the Punjab in an Urdu daily, Al 
Hakam, and articles directed at a western educated readership in an English monthly 
journal called The Review of Religions, which was produced from 1902 for 
distribution abroad.257 Spencer Lavan described the Ahmadiyya as a ‘middle-class 
religious resurgence’ that was aimed towards attracting literate and educated 
Indians. 258  On the other hand, the Ahmadiyya established schools and internal 
                                                
255 Ibid., 16-17. 
256 Susanne Rudolph and Lloyd Rudolph, ‘Introduction’ in Education and Politics in India: Studies in 
Organization, Society, and Policy, eds. Susanne Rudolph and Lloyd Rudolph Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 1972).15-22. 
257 For example, the journal’s editor Muhammad Ali argued against western Orientalist scholarship on 
Islam in The Review of Religions (May 1906), 214. 
258 Lavan, Ahmadiyah, 11. 
 90 
institutions that provided a material incentive for the less educated and non-literate to 
join the fold.259    
 
The Ahmadiyya from a Legal Perspective 
 
As described in chapter 1, community boundaries within personal law were 
constructed through rules of inclusion and exclusion—such as those that placed 
restrictions on marriage within the community—and rules that regulated the 
devolution of wealth within the community. Personal law recognized minority 
Muslim communities that existed within the Muslim community and followed ancient 
marriage and inheritance customs. The Khojas and the Kutchi Memons were 
paradigmatic Muslim minority communities, as were Muslim ‘agriculturalists’ 
belonging to ‘village communities’. ‘Muslim sects’, on the other hand, formed out of 
doctrinal dissent. According to this logic, colonial law defined the Ahmadiyya as a 
Muslim sect and determined whether Ahmadis were Muslim or non-Muslim on 
account of their doctrines, but did not treat them in a similar manner as it did minority 
Muslim community.  
The Ahmadiyya community was organized by its own customs of marriage 
and wealth distribution within the community. From 1898, Ghulam Ahmad restricted 
Ahmadi women from marrying non-Ahmadi men. In 1905, Ghulam Ahmad 
established a waqf. This religious endowment functioned as a community trust, and he 
established an association to oversee its management. Members of the community 
could gift property to the association, which would be used to fund missions and 
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support new converts without sufficient means of livelihood. The trust also provided 
for a burial ground at Qadian for pious Ahmadis who bequeathed one-tenth of their 
property to the association.260  
However, unlike Muslim minority communities recognized under personal 
law, Ahmadi customs were not sanctioned under the law. Ahmadi marriages 
conformed to Islamic and customary rules of marriage sanctioned under personal law. 
When Ahmadi families could not find suitable matches for their daughters from 
within the Ahmadiyya community, Ghulam Ahmad offered to arrange marriages from 
within the same caste or between castes that intermarried.261 He stipulated that gifts 
made to the Ahmadiyya waqf required consent by the property’s heirs and were 
subject to land laws.262 Ahmadi customs thus operated within the rules of personal 
law. 
Hussain Shah v. Gul Muhammad (1920), which determined that the Mughal 
Barlas of Qadian (Mirza Ghulam Ahmad's family) were governed by Muslim personal 
law, illustrates that the distinction between ‘orthodox’ and ‘sectarian’ Islam was not 
aligned with the distinction between Muslim personal law and customary law.263 
While family members who set up the takia belonged to what the administration 
considered to be an ‘orthodox’ Sunni order, Ghulam Ahmad was the founder of a 
‘sect’ that dissented from ‘orthodox’ authority. Yet the court was not concerned with 
an apparent division within the family between orthodox and sectarian Muslims. The 
land dispute was settled on the basis that the entire family followed one personal law, 
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and personal law was determined by their belonging to the same tribe of Mughal 
Barlas. In the Punjab, where systems of personal law were underpinned by caste 
categories, the Ahmadiyya were not legally fixed within the Punjab social order as a 
minority community. Rather, as an emergent Muslim community, the Ahmadiyya 
admitted Ahmadi converts across caste lines. 
At the same time, prominent Ahmadi leaders were aware of the jurisdictional 
boundaries created by these caste lines. Prominent Ahmadi missionaries were trained 
as lawyers in the Punjab. The most prominent among them were Muhammad Ali and 
Khwaja Kamal-ud-din. They received Western educations and legal training in the 
Punjab. Muhammad Ali was educated at Punjab University and Government College 
in Lahore, studying English literature before training as a lawyer. There he met 
Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din (b. 1870), who was a follower of Ghulam Ahmad at the time, 
and converted around 1899.264 Kamal-ud-din was educated in Lahore at Forman 
Christian College and Islamia College, where he trained in law. He converted 
sometime in the early 1890s.265 He served as a lawyer on the Lahore High Court 
circuit.266 In 1912, he travelled to Britain and established the Woking Muslim Mission 
in Surrey. Muhammad Ali never practiced law. He instead settled in Qadian, where he 
wrote for and managed the Ahmadiyya journal. 
Another Punjabi Muslim convert to Ahmadiyya was Zafrullah Khan (1893-
1985), a prominent lawyer who wrote prolifically on Islam. He was educated at 
American Mission School in Sialkot, then Government College in Lahore, and trained 
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as a lawyer at King’s College in London. He began his career practicing law in 
Lahore and ended his career as an international jurist at the International Court of 
Justice. His writings included translations of Islamic texts: he translated the Quran 
and Riyadh as-Salihin, a thirteenth-century selection of hadith (traditions of the 
Prophet Muhammad) by the Iraqi religious scholar Imam Nawawi.267 He wrote in 
English on what might be described as ‘modernist’ interpretations of Islam, including 
writing a book entitled Islam: Its Meaning for Modern Man.268 He wrote in English 
on Islamic law, including the Islamic punishment for apostasy and a work on Islam 
and human rights.269 And he also wrote prolifically on the Ahmadiyya, producing 
separate biographies of two Ahmadi heads and translations of the writings of Mirza 
Ghulam Ahmad.270 As lawyers and Islamic scholars, Khwaja Kamal-ud-din and 
Zafrullah Khan conformed well to Mitra Sharafi’s description of India lawyers and 
judges as engaging with the law to form ‘cultural portraits’ of their community and 
related communities.271  As a Muslim sect, Ahmadi lawyers represented their own 
community’s beliefs. In doing so, they also represented an interpretation of Islam that 
colonial courts upheld as valid. 
As lawyers within the colonial judicial system in the Punjab, these men 
assumed a role that more closely approximated the ‘ulama’ under Mughal rule than 
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the ulama that emerged as a new class of Islamic scholars under colonial rule.272 
Learned men in the past were trained to fill state functions, such as judicial roles. The 
ulama during colonial times trained in madrasas to seek their own employment as 
teachers, religious debaters, and the guardians of mosques and shrines. Their judicial 
opinions, fatwas, guided Muslims in their daily lives but did not hold up as evidence 
within a court of law because they seldom reflected a consensus.273 Khwaja Kamal-
ud-din followed in his family’s tradition: his role as a scholar and lawyer 
approximated that of his grandfather Khwaja Abdur Rasheed, who was a poet and 
qazi in Lahore under Sikh rule.274   
By recognizing the authority of colonial courts, western trained Ahmadi 
lawyers recognized separate spheres for religious law and temporal law. The 
Ahmadiyya recognized a separation between spheres of personal law and criminal law, 
and opposed the introduction of Islamic law within the sphere of criminal law in India 
(e.g. the Ahmadiyya head opposed reforms to colonial law that would criminalize 
alcohol consumption among Muslims).275 At the same time, the Punjab judicial 
administration gave the Ahmadiyya a degree of autonomy over personal law through 
its policy of allowing arbitration courts to operate. The Punjab administration’s policy 
was to allow arbitration courts called panchayats to operate on the village level or, as 
was the case in the North West Frontier Provinces, shar’ia courts.276 As in Africa, the 
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British allowed ‘traditional’ courts to operate because they did not challenge the 
legitimacy of British rule, being expressly subordinate to and subject to the 
intervention of the colonial state.277  As the Ahmadiyya developed institutionally, it 
also established seminaries that trained scholars in Islamic law and set up arbitration 
courts that adjudicated between Ahmadis.278 
As a consequence of how religious authority was entangled in land rights in 
the Punjab, sectarian disputes between Ahmadis and Hanafi Muslims took the form of 
land disputes and vice versa.279 Hussain Shah v Gul Muhammad (1920) was likely a 
religious dispute within Ghulam Ahmad’s family that took the form of a land 
dispute.280 As discussed above, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s cousins transferred their land 
shares into a religious endowment which functioned like a public waqf. The lands 
attached to this waqf came under the management of his cousin Kamal Din, who was 
a pir within a Qadiri Sufi order (defined under the umbrella of Sunnism according to 
the census), before passing to his religious disciple. In validating the religious 
endowment, the court determined that the lands attached to it were under the 
management of Kamal Din’s religious disciple, disinheriting Kamal Din’s hereditary 
heir. Ahmadi lawyer Zafrullah Khan represented Kamal Din’s hereditary heir (his 
adopted son and nephew) in this case, arguing against his religious disciple having 
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proprietary rights over Kamal Din’s land. This case may have been an attempt to 
recover the land for Kamal Din’s hereditary heir, or it may have been an attempt to 
oust a Qadiri pir from Qadian.   
Similarly, in Mir Yad Ali v Mubarak Ali (1905), it was argued before the 
Lahore High Court that Ahmadis were not Muslim in a case that had implications for 
land rights. In this case, Khwaja Kamal-ud-din represented Mubarak Ali, an imam (a 
leader of a Muslim congregation) who had converted to Ahmadiyya. Mubarak Ali’s 
Hanafi Sunni congregation sued to have him removed from his hereditary position on 
the basis that Mubarak Ali’s belief in Ghulam Ahmad’s prophetic claims constituted 
apostasy from Islam.281 However, the court held that Mubarak Ali was not merely a 
servant of the congregation and that the mosque’s congregation did not have the right 
to remove him from his office at their will. In this case, Mubarak Ali’s right to his 
religious office was also attached his right to lands endowed to that office. While the 
mosque and Mubarak Ali’s house were built by funds raised by the Hanafi Sunni 
congregation, these buildings were attached to lands endowed to the mosque through 
free grants by the government. Mubarak Ali’s office was inherited from his father and 
included in his office was the management of lands attached to the mosque.  
The court in this case did not consider the argument of Mr Beecher, the lawyer 
representing the Hanafi Sunni congregation, that Ahmadis were non-Muslim. As 
evidence, Mr. Beecher had produced a fatwa that declared Ahmadis as non-Muslim 
for their belief that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was a prophet.  Rather, the court dismissed 
the case on a technicality, finding that the suit had exceeded the statute of limitations 
from the time of Mubarak Ali’s conversion. In accordance with its understanding of 
sectarian difference in Islam, the imam’s belief in the prophetic claims of Mirza 
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Ghulam Ahmad did not infringe upon the civil rights of his Hanafi Sunni 
congregation.   
In discounting the argument that it was the civil right of a congregation to pray 
behind an imam with the same sectarian beliefs, this judgement was in accordance 
with another court’s judgement that Ahmadis did not have the right to pray separately 
from a Hanafi Sunni congregation behind its own imam. In Hakim Khalil Ahmad v. 
Malik Israfi (1917), a small Ahmadi community in Monghyr town, Monghyr district 
had been prevented from entering a public mosque after they started forming a 
separate congregation behind their own imam. They brought a suit against the Hanafi 
congregation to restore their right to worship at the mosque and form a separate 
congregation, while the council on behalf of the Hanafi congregation argued that the 
Ahmadis were not Muslim. The subordinate judge ruled in this case that the 
Ahmadiyya were Muslims but did not have the right to form a separate congregation 
from Hanafi Muslims.282   
A colonial court did not take it upon itself to determine whether or not 
Ahmadis were Muslim until Narantakath Avullah v. Parakkal Mammu (1921).283 
According to colonial law’s interpretation of Islamic law, apostasy from Islam 
automatically dissolved the marriage of a Muslim apostate.284 As a consequence of 
her husband Narantakath converting to Ahmadiyya, a Moplah woman sought the 
advice of a Muslim religious teacher. The religious teacher advised her that by 
becoming an Ahmadi her husband was no longer a Muslim and her marriage 
dissolved as a consequence. She then remarried and Narantakath brought a criminal 
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suit against her for bigamy. She was acquitted when a North Malabar court 
determined that Ahmadis were non-Muslim based on the testimony of a Hanafi Sunni 
Muslim religious teacher.  Narantakath Avullah v. Parakkal Mammu (1921) was the 
result of Zafrullah Khan moving the government to revise the court’s decision 
because it affected the status of Ahmadis as Muslims. 
The court’s ruling in the case involved first determining what tests could be 
used to legitimately determine who was or was not Muslim. Two non-dissenting, non-
Muslim judges, Justice Oldfield and Justice Krishnan, presided over the case. They 
eliminated three such tests in their ruling: the opinion of Hanafi Sunni religious 
scholars, the consensus of the community at large, and individual interpretation. 
While not invalidating the first two tests as means of ascertaining legitimate 
interpretations of Islamic belief, both judges found them inappropriate for the case at 
hand. Oldfield dismissed the testimony of Hanafi Sunni religious scholars, including 
two qazis, because they had only local authority; Krishnan found them to be interested 
in denouncing a new sect. They also dismissed a Hanafi Sunni fatwa that pronounced 
Ahmadis to be non-Muslim. As for the second test, that of the Muslim community 
reaching a consensus about Ghulam Ahmad’s teachings, Oldfield found that sufficient 
time had not passed since his death (he died in Lahore in 1908). Krishnan added that 
consensus as a source of law or doctrine was not universally accepted in Islamic 
jurisprudence. Eliminating these tests allowed the court to judge Ahmadiyya belief on 
the basis of its own interpretation of textual sources. It allowed Zafrullah Khan to 
represented Ahmadiyya beliefs as legitimate interpretations of Islam before the court. 
Oldfield and Krishnan pinpointed the areas were Ahmadi beliefs diverged from those 
beliefs generally held by Muslims by relying on an Ahmadi pamphlet that had been 
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submitted as evidence: ‘What distinguishes Ahmadees from Non-Ahmadees’ by Sher 
Ali.285  
The two rulings, though reaching the same judgment, arrived at very different 
conceptions of how Ahmadi belief differed from that of other Muslims. Yet both 
adhered to the Indian census’s conception of sectarianism in Islam. Krishnan’s 
judgment listed the points of difference between Ahmadis and Non-Ahmadis and 
concluded that these differences were only over minor points of doctrine that were not 
essential to being Muslim. From that he reasoned that Muslims, in adopting these 
beliefs, could not be considered apostates from Islam.286 In contrasting Ahmadis with 
non-Ahmadis, this judgment described a non-permeable, doctrinal boundary 
separating the two—which described Ahmadi identity as distinct from Muslims.  
The differences that Krishnan listed were: 1.) Non-Ahmadis believed that 
Muhammad was the last prophet to whom God spoke; Ahmadis believed that God 
continued to speak to holy men as he had in the past; 2.) Non-Ahmadis interpreted the 
reference to Muhammad in the Koran (33:40) as ‘Khatam-e-Nabuwat’ (seal of the 
Prophets) to mean that Muhammad was the last prophet; Ahmadis interpreted 
‘Khatamun-Nabiyyin’ to mean that prophets arising after Muhammad must be 
followers of him and bear his seal; 3.) Non-Ahmadis did not recognize prophets that 
Ahmadis recognized: Zoroaster, Buddha, Krishna, and Ramachandra; 4.) Non-
Ahmadis believed that Jesus was physically delivered to heaven before his crucifixion 
and that he would return to earth during the time of the Mahdi; Ahmadis believed that 
Jesus was crucified but did not die on the cross. Rather, he was taken down alive and 
travelled to Kashmir, where he died and was buried. They believed that he came back 
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in spirit in the person of Ahmad; 5) Non-Ahmadis believed Islam would spread 
through religious war after the arrival of the Mahdi; Ahmadis believed that Islam 
would spread through arguments and heavenly signs.287 
Like the 1881 census’s sociological understanding of Muslim sects, Oldfield’s 
judgment described sects as creating elasticity that was vital to the development of 
religion in synch with the development of society. 288  Oldfield found that 
contemporary interpretations of Islamic sources were necessary to maintain the 
vitality of Islam: ‘every creed must be subject [to reinterpretation], so long as it 
retains life and growth and adapts itself to altered conditions.’289 According to 
Oldfield, the Ahmadiyya interpretation of jihad was an example of Islam’s adaptation 
to modern conditions: ‘since the cessation of militant conditions [between Muslim 
countries and non-Muslim countries] and the permeation by Muhammadans of [non-
Muslim] countries to whose law they owe allegiance.’290  
Oldfield’s judgment emphasized the use of ijtihad in judging Ahmadiyya 
theology. According to his understanding of ijtihad, it was a legitimate means to 
interpret Islamic theology as it was acknowledged to be a legitimate means to arriving 
at legal solutions.291 Ahmadiyya theology was to be judged by whether, in the 
exercise of ijtihad from Islamic sources, it retained the fundamental principles of 
Islam. He reasoned that Ahmadi doctrines derived from legitimate interpretations of 
Islamic sources.  
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Krishnan’s judgment mentioned but did not address a ‘point that ha[d] been 
most pressed before [the court],’ which was that Ghulam Ahmad had by the act of 
having ‘set himself up as a prophet’ become an apostate—and that his followers, as 
followers of an apostate, were also apostates.292 Ghulam Ahmad’s making of a new 
community of followers, the Ahmadiyya, emerged out of an interpretation of jihad. 
This in turn was a product of legislative innovation, or ijtihad, that his claims to being 
a non-law bearing prophet gave him authority to make. However, controversy over 
Ahmadiyya doctrine on jihad became secondary to the controversy over the 
Ahmadiyya’s status as Muslim in the early twentieth century. Adherence to any one 
interpretation of jihad is not today considered essential to Muslim identity whereas an 
acceptance of Muhammad as being the last prophet is.293  
 
Summary 
  
This chapter examined the emergence of the Ahmadiyya within the context of 
the colonial administration of land in central Punjab, against the backdrop of 
interreligious debates over Islamic doctrines taking place there at this time, and as 
being defined according to the logic of personal law that guided colonial courts. This 
analysis demonstrated some of the legal complexity inherent in the Ahmadiyya’s 
identity as Muslim. Examined in the context of the colonial administration of the land, 
Islamic law as ‘Muslim personal law’ contributed to the economic impoverishment of 
Muslim landowners like Ahmadiyya founder Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, while the 
codification of customary law was designed as an intervention to stabilize their 
                                                
292 Ibid., at 1002. 
293 Friedmann, Prophecy Continuous, 82-83. 
 102 
position. The Ahmadiyya’s identification as a ‘Muslim sect’ defined them as 
dissenting from orthodox authority; however, examined against the backdrop of 
interreligious debates, Ahmadiyya doctrines were articulated in opposition to 
interpretations of Islamic law put forward by Christian missionaries and the Arya 
Samaj. This suggests a linking of ‘orthodox’ doctrines with polemical interpretations 
of Islamic law. Examined according to the logic of personal law, a number of civil 
suits involving the Ahmadiyya demonstrate that Muslim religious authority might be 
entangled in land rights, while Ahmadi civil rights were attached to their religious 
identity as Muslim. 
The next chapter will examine the Ahmadiyya’s inclusion as Muslim political 
representatives within the structure of political representation in the Punjab. It will 
argue that this structure was underpinned by the same principles that underpinned 
evolutionary legal theories and the codification of customary law in the Punjab and an 
evolutionary interpretation of Islamic law.  
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Chapter 3: Divisible Sovereignty: Customary Law and Islamic Law 
Introduction 
This chapter examines how the Punjab administration related ideas of 
‘divisible sovereignty’ to personal law. The idea of ‘divisible sovereignty’, first used 
by Henry Maine to define sovereignty under international law as states’ rights over 
their internal laws and administration, came to be associated by the Punjab 
administration with the right of Indian communities to retain their personal laws. 
Punjab governor Michael O’Dwyer (1912-1919) described the right of rural Punjabis 
over customary law, including rural Muslims, as being opposed to attempts by 
‘majority communities’ to impose religious law over them. This chapter examines 
how customary law and Muslim personal law connoted different forms of sovereignty: 
one shared between village community and the British government in India, the other 
shared between Muslim community and Muslim political power. 
This chapter also examines how, in the writings of Punjab administrators, 
principles derived from evolutionary legal theories cut against claims by Muslims to 
interpret Islamic law over a unified Muslim community, and charted a course of 
political development that implied the inclusion of Indian Muslims under an emerging 
international law. It examines a style of Muslim representation in the Punjab, 
demonstrated by the Unionist party and the Ahmadiyya, which reflected these 
principles. These Muslims represented the social and economic interests of 
agriculturalists in the Punjab provincial legislature, and described separate electorates 
and representation for Muslims as analogous to such reservations for lower-caste 
Hindu communities in India—as a temporary measure to remedy social and economic 
inequalities between communities rather than as a reflection of the sovereign rights of 
 104 
the Muslim community in India over their laws and administration. 294  These 
principles and the idea of divisible sovereignty were reflected in how the Ahmadiyya 
understood the sovereign rights of Islamic states to be restricted by an emerging 
international law. The Ahmadiyya understood their allegiance to the British 
government in India as implying the duty of the British and its Western allies to 
protect their lives, even as this meant the intervention of Western powers into the laws 
and administration of Islamic states.   
This chapter examines these political principles within the historical context in 
which they were expressed. The first section of this chapter examines the idea of 
‘divisible sovereignty’ and political development in India expressed in the writing of 
Punjab administrator C. L. Tupper in the late nineteenth century. Principles of 
divisible sovereignty and double allegiance defined political relations between Indian 
communities and the British, while evolutionary legal theories charted a path of 
political development in India that decentralized political power away from all-India 
groups. These theories conceived of the Punjab to be comprised of heterogeneous 
societies of ‘tribe’ and ‘caste’ that existed at different stages of political development. 
They were reflected in a style of politics in which Punjabis demonstrated allegiance to 
the British government in exchange for land rights, which is examined in the second 
section. This section examines the Ahmadiyya’s inclusion within the Punjab Unionist 
party after First World War, a Muslim-led and cross-religious alliance that 
represented agricultural interests.295 The Ahmadiyya recognized the legal authority of 
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the British government over that of competing legal authorities (i.e. that of the 
Ottoman sultanate and the ulama) during the First World War and the first Non-
Cooperation Movement in India.  The final section examines the Ahmadiyya’s 
obedience to British laws in India as interrelated with their interpretation of 
international law. During the 1920s the Ahmadiyya sent missionaries trained in 
Qadian to various countries in Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, and to England 
and the United States. It adopted an interpretation of Islamic law that was compatible 
with private international law, allowing for the migration of Muslims to non-Muslim 
countries, and with emerging human rights norms that included the right to freedom 
of belief and conscience.    
 
Divisible Sovereignty 
 
Punjab administrator C. L. Tupper, who had codified Punjab customary law 
according to Henry Maine’s legal theories, applied Maine’s legal theories on 
international law to articulate what he called Indian political law: the rules and 
principles that governed political relations between the British government and Indian 
princely states.296 Indian princely states were ‘quasi-sovereign’ polities that covered 
nearly one-third of Britain’s Indian territories and were indirectly ruled through native 
rulers.297  Ostensibly, princely states were kept from being amalgamated into British 
India through treaty agreements between princely rulers and the British government 
and a pledge from Queen Victoria in 1858 to ‘respect the rights, dignity and honour of 
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the native princes as [her] own.’298 These rules and principles charted a path to 
political development in India, and mirrored principles upon which an emerging 
international law in Europe was built. 
Tupper’s Indian political law was based on the principle that the sovereignty 
was divisible. The idea of divisible sovereignty was a necessary building block to 
laying a theoretical foundation for international law among late Victorian legal 
scholars.299 From the 1830s, international law had been closely associated the legal 
philosopher John Austin’s (1790-1859) positivist conception of law.300  Proper laws 
according to Austin emanated directly by command and/or a determinate source (as in 
God’s law or positive law) ‘which oblige[d] a person or persons to a course of 
conduct.’301 This conception of the law led Austin to dismiss international law as a 
‘law improperly so called.’302 International law did not emanate from either command 
or a determinate source, but rather consisted of a set of positive moral rules 
established by the general opinion of an indeterminate source. Though Austin allowed 
room for certain positive moral rules being considered proper laws because of their 
imperative nature, international law was expressly not among them. 
Austin’s dismissal of international law related to how he understood 
sovereignty as indivisible. He defined sovereignty as a person or a determinate body 
of persons who commanded obedience from a population and was not under the 
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command of any other person. All independent political communities possessed a 
‘sovereign’.303 The indivisibility of sovereignty meant that the sovereign’s authority 
to command a population necessarily resided in one source or would cease to be 
sovereign. This obviated the development of international law because there could be 
no determinate source from which a law between nations would develop. This notion 
of sovereignty, which granted absolute and unlimited power to state governments, is 
not consistent with the contemporary usage of the term by modern jurists’.304 
Although Austin was concerned with the sovereign power of constitutional 
governments, his conception of sovereignty suggested the absence of constitutional 
law as a restraining force to the executive powers of a state’s government.    
The divisibility of sovereignty was core to Maine’s argument that international 
law had existed in the past among primitive men and was certain to develop among 
modern nations in the future.305 According to Maine, sovereignty in international law 
designated a collection of clearly defined rights. They included the right to make war 
and peace, the right to administer criminal and civil law, and the right to legislate new 
laws. A sovereign state that possessed all of these rights was an independent 
sovereign state. However, sovereignty could also be divided between one state and 
another. It was, therefore, distinguishable from independence. A sovereign state 
retained autonomy over its internal laws and administration. Other rights, such as the 
right to make war, might then be lodged with a superior power without the state losing 
its sovereignty. Those individuals belonging to a community whose sovereignty was 
divided (e.g. Indian princely states) were bound by obey both their own state’s 
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command and that of the superior power’s (e.g. laws enacted by British government). 
Tupper, citing Maine’s approval, wrote: ‘If the sovereignty is divided, then obedience 
must be divided, and in like proportion.’306   
The idea that sovereignty was divisible was used by Tupper to describe the 
system of Indian protectorate, which defined the superior position of the British 
government over ‘sovereign’ princely states. Tupper modified Maine’s theories to 
distinguish between an international law, which he applied to European nation states, 
and ‘political law’ that applied to British colonies.307 International law defined 
relations between equal nations, not the superior position of the British government 
over princely states—although they developed according to the same principles. 
Political law did not infer that princely states had a uniform set of codified rights that 
limited the paramount powers of the British government. Rather, Tupper noted that 
treaties between them and the British gave them varying degrees of autonomy over 
their laws rather than uniform rights among them.308 Moreover, this autonomy over 
their laws was not absolute, and Tupper pointed out that princely states were always 
subject to British laws, whether enacted in the British parliament or the Indian 
councils.309 Rather, their most definite sovereign rights were over collecting revenue. 
In that sense, princely rulers were British subjects who possessed privileged land 
rights. 
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Tupper envisioned India as comprised of not one but ‘numerous 
heterogeneous societies’ that existed at various stages of political development.310  
These boundaries separating these societies created ‘innumerable dividing lines’ that 
ignored political boundaries.311 This vision of India was evolutionary. It came out of 
Maine’s theory that the early phases of sovereignty were non-territorial: sovereignty 
without a ‘definite portion of the earth’s surface,’ like that of a tribe not settled upon 
the land was, according to Maine, an ancient idea that preceded the association of 
political communities with land. Tupper identified this non-territorial, nascent form of 
sovereignty in the Punjab among the Baluchis and Pathans. These groups were to him 
‘specimens’ if not of early kingship, then at least of semi-political groups from which 
early kingship would arise.312  
This conception of Indian society obviated the development of all-India 
nationalism. The British Empire in India, analogous to the Roman Empire, would 
develop into not one but many nations.313 Tupper described expressions of an anti-
British, all-Indian nationalism as idiosyncratic to the sentiments held by the vast 
majority of Indians who belonged to societies defined by tribe or caste. Nationalism 
was associated with the Indian National Congress and came from a discontented, 
Western educated elite.314 
This conception of Indian society also suggested that decentralized 
government was not only expedient, but also suited to India’s natural course of 
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development. According to Tupper, the devolution of political power to local agents, 
including to native rulers of princely states, allowed India to develop along these 
social contours. Central government might be inclined to apply laws better suited to 
European societies than India. Local governments and princely rulers, on the other 
hand, could enact laws appropriate to their localities. This view was in line with a 
policy of decentralization already in place in India. Decentralization of political power 
towards provincial governments began in 1861 with the Indian Councils Act, which 
established provincial councils in Bengal, Madras, and Bombay. In 1882, municipal 
and local boards were established in the provinces.  
The notion of nascent forms of non-territorial sovereignty in India also 
supported a notion of non-territorial representation for Indians in legislative 
assemblies.315 A move towards decentralization of political power in India was 
accompanied by an expansion of representative government. In the late nineteenth 
century, the policy of the government of India was against territorial representation 
despite Indian political opinion’s insistence on it.316 Non-territorial representation was 
perceived to cut against the development of Indian nationalism. Any scheme of 
territorial representation, including a scheme for setting up electoral colleges that was 
devised by Secretary of State John Morley in 1909, would have returned large 
numbers of Congress lawyers. Instead, the government favoured separate 
representation for closely circumscribed interests. The Punjab legislative council 
established in 1897 applied the principle of non-territorial representation by 
circumscribed urban and rural interests. The Morley-Minto reforms of 1909, on the 
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other hand, recognized separate electorates and representation for Muslims, 
circumscribing the interests of an all-India religious community.317  
Indian nationalist histories since 1909 have theorized that the introduction of 
separate electorates by the British was a strategy to foment inter-communal conflict 
and prevent the development of Indian nationalist resistance to foreign rule.318 In 
contrast to this ‘divide and rule theory’, colonial officials positively interpreted 
separate electorates as a means of preserving the autonomy of interests of 
communities to safeguard them against upper-caste dominance. 319 H. H. Risley, a 
colonial administrator whose understanding of caste difference in India was based on 
a racialist interpretation of caste, advocated separate electorates as a way to 
circumscribe the interests of India’s various social groups against upper-caste 
oppression— he argued that without separate electorates caste groups would become 
political machines that could threaten voters with social ostracization.320  Similarly, 
according to Tupper, except for a small minority of western educated Indians, Indians 
were as yet unable to develop civic feelings that would transcend caste difference.321   
Ameer Ali advocated separate electorates and representation for Muslims. 
Adopting the positive inferences of non-territorial representation, he understood them 
to be a necessary and temporary measure to redress inequalities suffered by a minority 
community:   
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Any attempt at amalgamation [of Indians] at the present stage would mean the 
submergence of an ill-organized, badly equipped, and badly trained minority 
under a majority vastly superior in numbers, and immensely better organized. 
No one acquainted with the social, religious, and moral conditions of the 
Muslims can view such a contingency without the greatest misgivings...unity 
of sentiment and consciousness of identity of interest which in due course will 
remove the necessity of special representation is clearly developing at the top 
and if details are rightly handled it should not take long before it reaches the 
bottom.322  
 
According to Ali, separate electorates for Muslims were not intended to create 
disunity among Indians. Rather, it was a temporary measure that guaranteed the 
development of an Indian unity that was based on more equal relationships between 
its communities of people. Importantly, this understanding of ‘special representation’, 
which would be adopted by the Punjab Unionist Party and the Ahmadiyya,323 was not 
analogous to the sovereign right of a political community. It did not conflict with a 
notion of India as a sovereign state, projected into the future, or a notion of village 
communities as having quasi-sovereign authority, projected into the past. 
In his legal textbook for Indian students, William Rattigan placed a particular 
emphasis on the sovereign authority of village communities in the Punjab. Rattigan 
wrote that John Austin’s conception of law as contingent on the existence of political 
sovereignty was qualified by knowledge of societies like the Punjab, in which rules 
emanating from village communities were as absolute as any from a political 
sovereign.324 According to Rattigan, Austin’s conception of law was only strictly 
accurate when applied to a political community that conformed to ‘the modern notion 
of a civilized state’ in which new laws were created by a legislature. However, rules 
that emanated from more ‘traditional’ sources, like customary rules of inheritance in 
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village communities, governed people as absolutely as any set by a political superior. 
Though these rules could not be called laws, they were not merely moral rules either. 
Austin’s narrow conception of international law and sovereignty ‘failed to take into 
account the Customary Law of archaic communities.’325  Rattigan description of 
village communities and agricultural tribes was in a pre-modern sense ‘international’.  
In summary, evolutionary theories underpinned theories of political 
development that supported decentralized government in India and a system of 
separate electorates that weakened the representation of higher caste Hindus in India. 
The core principles that guided political development along evolutionary lines were 
those of divisible sovereignty and double obedience to the law, which defined the 
paramount power of the British government over its protectorates as well as the 
relationship between equal states within a federation.326 In addition to having political 
implications in India, suggesting the development of not one Indian nation but a 
federation of Indian nations, evolutionary principles also suggested India’s inclusion 
within a developing international law. Evolutionary principles implied that what were 
unequal political relations now between European countries and the colonies that they 
ruled would at one point in the future be levelled out in tandem with the levelling out 
of social and economic inequalities between diverse communities within the colonies.  
 
Muslim Political Allegiance  
 
In 1915, Punjab judicial administrators met in Simla to discuss the desirability 
of codification to bring about greater uniformity in customary law governing 
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agricultural lands.327 The codification carried out by Tupper had recorded a significant 
degree of variation in the customs practiced between agriculturalist tribes. The 
judicial administration in the Punjab was now to review the mass of collected custom 
to determine regions where they operated in common, restricting codification to 
customs governing land (i.e. the enjoyment, devolution, and alienation of agricultural 
lands). This manner of codification, which would bring about greater uniformity of 
custom and more centralized legislative powers, would also leave less discretionary 
powers to local agents.328 Punjabi political representatives for whom the perpetuation 
of diversity and decentralization meant more discretionary power opposed this project. 
One the other hand, the application of a more unified customary law over 
agriculturalists was attractive to judicial administrators who sought to reduce 
litigation and ease the administration of land in the Punjab. Justice T. P. Ellis (1873-
1936) favored greater uniformity in custom rather than ‘the perpetuating of 
diversity’329 Justice Shadi Lal proposed that under no circumstances should a female 
be entitled to sue an alienation of land, believing that this conformed to custom. 
However, Muhammad Shafi, who himself came from an agriculturalist caste, 
disapproved of measures that might limit the rights of female heirs. According to 
Muhammad Shafi, greater uniformity of customary law through codification inferred 
the extension of the agnatic theory of land succession, which he felt had been too 
zealously applied by past judicial administrators. He opposed Shadi Lal’s limits to a 
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female’s right to contest land alienations as being contrary to the customs of tribes 
that recognized absolutely superior rights of females.330  
In his report on the conference, Punjab governor Michael O’Dwyer (1912-
1919) framed the codification of customary law in the Punjab as protecting the rights 
of agriculturalist tribes against the claims of religious communities.331 O’Dwyer 
defined the rural population as ‘minorities’ belonging to ‘classes who [were] 
admittedly governed by custom.’332 Their rights were protected against the claims of 
urban population, who ‘as a rule’ were governed by Hindu or Muslim law.333 
According to O’Dwyer, ‘a section in the urban population’ was ‘under the delusion’ 
that the government intended to upset the rights of agriculturalists by replacing their 
time honoured traditions with Hindu and Muslim personal law.334 By defining rural 
Punjabis as minorities, O’Dwyer implied that urban Punjabis belonged to a majority. 
Because rural Muslims were numerically greater than urban Muslims in the Punjab, 
this implied that urban Muslims belonged to a community that extended beyond 
provincial boundaries (i.e. an all-India community of Muslims) and that rural 
Muslims belonged to communities that did not (i.e. village or tribal communities).   
O’Dwyer also framed codification as protecting community rights against individual 
rights. Alienation of land inter vivos or by will, through registered declaration or 
contract, could not supersede customary law. To allow this would be to allow the 
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individual to ‘go against the sentiments and traditions on which social relations in 
India are based’ and allow the individual to take the law into his own hands.335  
O’Dwyer’s comments on codification asserted the autonomy of ‘minority 
communities’ to determine their customary laws in principle, but the sovereignty of 
the British government in practice. He noted the conflicting views towards 
codification expressed during the conference—a negative view of codification as 
creating a ‘caste-iron jacket’ that restricted development, and a positive view of 
codification as the only means of providing legal certainty and thus necessary for 
modern development.336 O’Dwyer referred to a resolution passed during the 1915 
conference: ‘The declaration by a large majority of a community as to its wishes 
regarding the customs which it will follow in the future, irrespective of those followed 
in the past, should be accepted as having the force of law.’337 He stated that the spirit 
behind this resolution was to maintain elasticity in private law despite codification. 
However, O’Dwyer backtracked on what he called a ‘flight of verbal inexactitude’.338 
The community did not have the power to change its laws, but could only initiate 
legislation to be undertaken by the British government in India. Contrary to 
evolutionary theories, codification of customary law in the Punjab was concerned 
with maintaining the position of ‘communities’ within a social order. 
Michael O’Dwyer framed codification of customary law in a manner that 
distinguished the rights rural minority communities from the claims of all-Indian 
urban majority communities during the First World War, when the administration 
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depended upon the political allegiance of rural Punjabis. During the war, army 
recruitment continued to be tilted towards the Punjab, and in the Punjab towards the 
rural population.339 On behalf of the British Empire, Britain committed its colonies to 
contributing financial and military assistance to the war effort. The largest 
contribution came from India, which contributed 683,149 combat troops and war 
investments and donations amounting to the equivalent of £700,000 in 1918. The 
largest share of that contribution came from the Punjab. Sixty per cent of those 
recruited during the war from India (349,688 recruits) were Punjabi.340 To meet the 
demand for troops, the Punjab administration relied upon and reinforced rural 
structures. In order to tap more of the rural population for recruitment, the 
administration shifted from class based recruitment to territorial recruitment. Regional 
catchments were replaced by district level recruitment units, which interfaced with the 
civil administration. Local officials, from village headmen to tehsildars, were 
responsible for recruitment from all classes, including landless rural labourers who 
had been previously excluded.341  
Land rights provided a material basis for an allegiance between rural Punjabis 
and the British government.342 The Punjab administration used terminology and 
symbols of divisible sovereignty—darbars, feudal titles, and sanads—to reward men 
for their demonstrated allegiance during the war.343 Rather than symbolizing the 
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nesting of miniature sovereigns into imperial rule, as had been the case under Indo-
Muslim and Hindu rulers before the British, these symbols represented privileged land 
rights. Colonial officials met with rural men of influence at district darbars, awarded 
titles of nobility (i.e. Khan, Raja, etc.) for services rendered, and granted sanads that 
entitled their recipients to cash rewards, revenue free land grants, and tax exceptions 
for village communities.344 The administration allocated 180,000 acres of land from 
canal colonies to Indians who served during the war with distinction and 150,000 
acres for Indians who aided the government in recruitment.345  
The Punjab administration’s recruitment policies fostered a localized, cross-
religious Punjabi identity. Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims were carefully distributed 
across regiments in the Indian army, which was made up of uniform companies as 
their basic unit.346 Punjabis were recruited during the war into companies formed on a 
local and tribal basis: for example, a special company of Niaza Pathans, Awans and 
Jats from the Mianwali district attached to the Baluchistan Infantry, a special 
company of Bishoi Jats.347 The administration also organized a battalion of Indian 
Christians, but did not form other units that were based on supra-tribal and religious 
identity.  
A recruitment policy that fostered Punjabi identity over religious identity was 
expedient during the war in part because of the Punjab administration’s reliance on 
Muslims to fight opposite the Turkish sultanate, which was interpreted to be in 
contravention of Islamic law. Half of the soldiers recruited from the Punjab were 
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Muslim. 348  In the predominantly Muslim western regions of the Punjab, large 
landowners and influential pirs were able to secure large numbers of recruits more 
easily than smaller peasant proprietors in central and eastern regions. A single pir, Pir 
Ghulam Abbas of Makhad, enrolled 4,000 of his followers.349 These soldiers were 
dispatched abroad, including to Muslim lands. By 1915, more than 80,000 Indian 
combat troops were sent from India to France, Mesopotamia, Palestine, and Egypt. 
The Indian army was responsible for holding the Persian oil fields and the Suez Canal, 
areas crucial to the Britain’s war strategy. 350  Muslim involvement in the war 
contradicted an ‘orthodox’ interpretation of Islamic law that made the allegiance of 
Indian Muslims to the British government conditional on Britain’s support of the 
Ottoman Sultanate. This interpretation was endorsed in the 1880s by a group of Sunni 
Hanafi ulama, who published it and other conditions of allegiance in an English 
newspaper printed in British India. It was held to be authoritative and applicable to 
the majority of Indian Muslims by N. B. E. Baillie, the eminent scholar of Muslim 
law in India at the time.351  
However, O’Dwyer described the British opposition to the Sultanate as not 
compromising the allegiance of rural Muslim Punjabis to the British. O’Dwyer wrote 
that the wartime services of Punjabi Muslims demonstrated their loyalty to the British 
and willingness to fight against a Muslim ruler. He attributed any apprehension that 
they would not be loyal to the British to a lack of understanding of the rural 
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population in the Punjab.352 If this understanding was based on the empirical data 
gathered by Denzil Ibbetson, as O’Dwyer’s memoir suggests it was, their loyalty to 
the British was partly due to their ignorance of Islamic law and partly due to their 
customary allegiance to tribal leaders rather than Muslim rulers. The implication was 
that while rural Muslim Punjabis could be trusted, the loyalty of urban Muslims might 
reasonably have been doubted.   
During the First World War, the Ahmadiyya community demonstrated its 
allegiance to the colonial state in a similar manner as pirs and village headmen in the 
Punjab. Ghulam Ahmad died in 1908, leaving his community to be led by a line of 
khalifas (spiritual successors). A close disciple of Ghulam Ahmad, Hakim Noor-ud-
din, led the community from 1908 until his death in 1914. In 1914, Ghulam Ahmad’s 
son Bashir-ud-din Ahmad became the second khalifa. Bashir-ud-din Ahmad drew 
army recruits from within his own community. However, unlike tribal groups, the 
Ahmadiyya was not organized into separate companies, but was organized along the 
regular pattern of recruitment.353   
After the First World War, the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms of 1919 
introduced a system of diarchy that distributed powers between the central 
government and provinces, and between provincial governors and Indian 
representatives.354  It reserved powers at the centre for the British government that 
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were indisputable, indivisible, and unitary.355 Powers reserved at the centre included 
external defence and internal law and order. Other specified powers devolved to 
provincial governments, giving them greater autonomy over their finances and 
legislative concerns. This ‘polarized responsibility’ and devolution of power implied 
federalist development.356 Thus it implied the same potential that Indian political law 
did for Tupper. The Montagu-Chelmsford reforms expanded representative 
government, forming Indian majorities in the central and provincial legislatures and 
introducing Indian ministers in eight of the nine provinces. By reserving powers for 
the provincial government, diarchy diverted political power away from all-India 
political organizations. Diarchy ensured that less essential powers to imperial rule 
were distributed to Indian representatives and ministers.  
Diarchy allowed the Punjab administration to maintain continuity in its 
agrarian policies after 1919. Land administration continued to be directed towards 
maintaining political stability and appealing to the material wellbeing of rural 
Punjabis. This was reflected in the distribution scheme of the Lower Bari Doab 
Colony, the largest tract of land colonized from 1905 to 1925.357 Colonization 
maintained the agrarian social order: 68 per cent of land grants were awarded to 
landholding peasants belonging to agriculturalist tribes, while large land grants were 
reserved for landowning families listed in Lepel’s genealogies of Punjab chiefs. While 
the political exigencies of the time changed, the administration continued to award 
land grants for demonstrated allegiance to the colonial state. Within this colony, 
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75,000 acres of land were allocated to army veterans after the start of First World War. 
After the war, land grants required recipients to make a loyalty oath and were 
awarded by the administration for work to counter agitation against the Rowlatt Act 
and the Non-Cooperation Movement (1920-1922).358 This compelled rural leaders 
within the Punjab to demonstrate their allegiance to the colonial state. Both sections 
of the Ahmadiyya community, prominent pirs, and the Sikh Khalsa College Staff 
Association were among those who vocally opposed the Non-Cooperation 
movement.359  
Diarchy contributed to the development and later regional dominance of the 
Punjab Unionist Party, a Muslim led but cross religious community alliance that 
represented rural interests and included Ahmadis as well as Hindus and Sikhs.360 The 
1919 reforms worked in the Punjab to tilt representative government towards rural 
interests and away from centres of all-India politics—Lahore, Jullandur and Ambala. 
The reforms overwhelmingly favoured Muslim landowners in western Punjab, where 
the majority of large landowners were located. Twenty-nine seats went to the rural 
areas, of which 23 were in Muslim-majority districts west of Lahore.361 Two Ahmadis 
held sets in the newly configured provincial legislative assembly, both in rural 
constituencies east of Lahore in central Punjab. Pir Akbar Ali from Ferozpore was 
elected into the first legislative assembly in 1921, and Zafrullah Khan was elected into 
the assembly in 1926. Both jointed the Punjab Unionist Party after their election. 
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The Punjab Unionist party comprised of a loose alliance of rural landowners 
who agreed upon a set of existing principles.362 Voters generally voted not on party 
lines but based on personal or tribal considerations. Among Ahmadis, candidates who 
desired to obtain votes from electors made a written request to an official at Qadian, 
who then directed Ahmadi electors to vote accordingly. In legislative and local 
governments, Bashir-ud-din Ahmad instructed Ahmadi electors in any particular 
constituency to vote together and to avoid wrangling.363  Candidates joined the 
Unionist party after being elected if their political outlook was in line with Unionist 
principles.364 The Unionist principles were: it was open to all communities; worked 
for the uplift of backward rural areas; sponsored measures to protect backward people 
of the Punjab. Its political objectives included: to attain Dominion status for India 
within the British Commonwealth by constitutional means; provide special 
government assistance to backward classes and rural areas; fair distribution of taxes 
between urban and rural areas; and to check exploitation of economically backward 
classes by economically dominant classes.365  
The dominance of the Unionist party depended upon non-communal alliances 
between Muslim and Hindu politicians, and to a lesser extent Sikh politicians, who 
supported of rural interests.366 Because most legislative seats were allocated to 
western Punjab districts after the 1919 reforms, the Unionist Party was made up 
primarily of Muslim landlord families and Muslim pirs. However, it also included 
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mostly Hindu Jat landholding cultivators from eastern districts. Pir Akbar Ali and 
Zafrullah Khan were socio-economically and ethnically more akin to Hindu Jat 
landholding cultivators than Muslim landlords and pirs within the Unionist party 
ranks. They represented a constituency in central Punjab of smaller landowners who 
cultivated their lands or managed the cultivation of the lands. 
The socio-economic makeup of Punjab constituencies was reflected in the 
British codification of customary law, which varied by region and thus varied rural 
structures of influence by region. The evolutionary theories that underpinned 
codification of customary law recognized its development as the outcome of historical 
processes.367  Eastern Punjab’s proximity to ‘Hindustan proper’ was thought to have 
steered custom there in the direction of Hindu personal law, interpreted by Punjab 
administrators to be similar to the customary law of village co-parcenaries. Central 
Punjab’s preponderate Jat and Rajput tribes and the historical conditions that gave rise 
to the Sikh religion were understood to have favoured the preservation of village 
customs against the influence of Hindu and Muslim personal laws. By 1924, the 
project of codification proposed by the 1916 report was only carried out in central 
Punjab—a region that included ten out of the twenty-nine districts in Punjab: Lahore, 
Amritsar, Gurdaspur, Sialkot, Gujranwala, Sheikhupura, Ferozepore, Jullundur, 
Ludhiana and Hoshiarpur. Codification brought about greater uniformity in customary 
law among Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh agriculturalists in this region by validating 
agnatic theories of land succession. For rural Muslim politicians from central Punjab, 
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village communities provided an alternative source of political representation than 
that of an all-India, Muslim community.368 
Customary law in central Punjab also inferred conversion from Hinduism—
imbuing central Punjabi Muslims with a different religious identity and ethnicity than 
that of Indian Muslims from western regions. The origins of much of the western 
region’s population were ascribed to migration from Muslim lands such as 
Afghanistan and Iran, rather than conversion among lower-caste Hindus.369 Sir Umar 
Hyat, a large landowner from Western Punjab, saw Muslim legislative assembly 
representatives from central Punjab as the only true representatives of Muslim 
agriculturalists.370  
The Unionist party founder Fazli Husain came from a similar socio-economic 
and ethnic background as Pir Akbar Ali and Zafrullah Khan, originating from central 
Punjab and descending from Bhatti Rajputs in the region, a designated ‘agriculturalist’ 
tribe.371 His ancestor, Qaimuudin, was a revenue officer for religious endowments 
who settled in Batala around 1500.372 Husain was born in Peshawar, where his father 
was stationed as a civil service officer, and was educated in Oxford. He too aspired to 
enter the civil service but, having failed his qualifying examination, became a lawyer. 
Upon returning to India, he joined the Anjuman-i-Hamayat-i-Islam in Lahore, which 
had also attracted Ghulam Ahmad’s followers towards issues of rural education of 
social uplift. In 1904 and 1907, he joined the Indian National Congress and the All-
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India Muslim League, holding dual membership with both organizations. At this time, 
he also worked as a lawyer in Sialkot and the Lahore High Court circuit, representing 
a string of lawsuits that dealt with issues of conversion and gave him popular 
recognition among Muslims.373  He was appointed to the Punjab legislative council in 
1916. In 1921, he was a member of the reformed Punjab legislative assembly and 
appointed minister of education. In 1923, he founded the Unionist party with Chhotu 
Ram, who represented Hindu Jats from eastern Punjab.374 In 1930, he was appointed 
as a member of Viceroy Willingdon’s executive council with the Education, Health, 
and Lands portfolio.375  
Compared to the large Muslim landowners from western districts, Husain 
came from a relatively modest background and at least identified the Unionist party’s 
aims with alleviating peasant indebtedness and improving their lot. According to his 
son, who wrote his biography and published his diaries, he followed the tradition of 
paternal administration in the Punjab: 'he indicated how necessary it was for the state 
to take the initiative in raising the standard of living of the man behind the plough, 
and how this could be done by legislation and governmental machinery long before 
the masses were able to help themselves.’376  In line with this aim, the Unionist party 
introduced compulsory primary education and built schools and dispensaries in rural 
areas.377 Husain supported measures to introduce formal education of vernacular 
languages in ‘Anglo-Vernacular’ schools so that western educated Punjabis could 
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continue to communicate in their mother tongues.378  He supported measures to 
establish vernacular medical institutions to train students to practice medicine in rural 
areas. According to Husain, villages were unable to afford to keep western trained 
medical doctors or hospital assistants. Traditional hakims were replaced by men who 
‘possess but little intelligence’ and no knowledge of basic hygiene and they needed to 
be destroyed and replaced by another class of medical men.379 He suggested further 
measures to produce medicine in India that would be affordable to the rural poor, 
which would combine cheaper traditional medicine with and western scientific 
expertise.  
Importantly, Fazli Husain expressed dissent from ‘orthodox’ religious 
authority in Islam. Speaking before the Anjuman-Himayat-i-Islam in 1902, he said: 
[English] priests, allow me to tell you, are incomparably superior to your 
ignoramus Mullahs. They are men of culture who take orders after having 
obtained good Varsity Degrees, and having studied Divinity. Their churches 
are far better taken care of than ours. With Mullahs so ignoramus, with 
mosques tottering, with youths ignorant of religion, with no adequate 
arrangement for the spiritual and religious welfare of the people, with no 
effective organized charity, am I to understand that you consider yourselves 
superior to the British in religious affairs?380 
 
This suggests that Husain did not consider the ulama (i.e. ‘ignoramus’ Mullahs’) as 
legitimate interpreters of Islamic law.  They did not effectively distribute resources to 
the poorest: they had no ‘effective organized charity.’ Husain’s negative comparison 
of Muslim mullahs to British priests and his lamenting a general lack of religion or 
spiritual training, rather than specifically Islamic training, also suggests an ecumenical 
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conception of religion. This is important as it reveals something of the nature of Fazli 
Husain’s political representation of Muslims, which was not religious representation 
particular to Muslims only.  
The measures that Fazli Husain and Ahmadi politicians supported in the 
Punjab legislative assembly concerned improving the showing of Muslims in 
professions created through western education. While Fazli Husain was Minister of 
Education in the reformed Punjab council, Pir Akbar Ali put before him questions 
about communal representation in the medical college in Lahore (only 33 out of 103 
students were Muslim) and communal representation in educational service (only 19 
out of 74 posts were Muslim).381 He put before the administration questions on 
communal representation in medical services in the Punjab for permanent assistants 
(20 out of 91 were Muslim) and sub-assistant surgeons (105 out of 463 were 
Muslim).382  The Unionist party under the leadership of Fazli Husain pushed for 
measures that gave Muslims a protected quota in educational and medical services.383  
Fazli Husain and Ahmadi politicians advocated separate electorates for 
Muslims be maintained on an all-India level, which they argued was a temporary 
measure to redress institutional inequalities that disadvantaged Muslims.384 In doing 
so, they adopted the positive inferences of separate electorates as protecting minorities 
against upper-caste dominance in the professions and civil services, rather than its 
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negative inferences as a colonial strategy to divide and rule.385  Reflecting their 
common viewpoint, Fazli Husain recommended Zafrullah Khan as a Muslim delegate 
to the Round Table Conferences in London (1930-1932) to advocate separate 
electorates be maintained for Muslims in under the scheduled constitutional reforms. 
In 1932, he helped secure Khan’s appointment to the Viceroy’s council.386  
Like Fazli Husain, Zafrullah Khan publicly identified Muslim interests with 
those of rural Muslims in the Punjab. Khan described his religious views as having 
been influenced by researching land records while working in his father’s law practice 
in Sialkot:  
[My father] told me that I could best use my time with him by making myself 
familiar with the system of land records and the method of tracing the history 
of every plot of land backwards to 1855, i.e., almost to the advent of the 
British administration into that part of India. That was one great benefit that I 
derived from my association with considerable influence over my outlook on 
life, particularly over my religious views.387 
 
Although he left his meaning vague in this statement, Khan frequently attributed the 
economic backwardness of Muslims in India to the interaction of Islamic laws with 
other laws. In a 1935 public speech, Khan interpreted economic principles in Islamic 
law in terms of class issues that were not restricted either to Muslims or to Indians. He 
recounted a discussion that supposedly took place between him and an unnamed 
Muslim delegate to the Joint Select Committee of the Round Table Conference in 
London in 1933, which related to the Quranic prohibition of interest (riba). The 
delegate’s view was that Muslims must accept the interest in order to improve their 
economic position. Khan’s view was that if that meant ‘there should be a member of 
the millionaires in every community, and the poor working classes should live in 
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distress from day to day, Islam has no solution.’ According to Khan, Islam aimed ‘at a 
state where wealth revolved and did not accumulate at any time within a few hands’ 
and did not aim at those rules of economic society developed during the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. As an example of the manner by which Islam revolved wealth, 
Khan said that the Islamic system of inheritance allowed one-third of an individual’s 
wealth to be given away while requiring that two-thirds be distributed among a very 
large number of heirs.388 It might be inferred from Khan’s story that Muslim leaders 
who were concerned only with raising the economic position of the Muslim 
community were compelled to depart from fundamental principles of Islam that 
prevented wealth from accumulating.   
Khan understood the ‘communal problem’ between Hindus and Muslims as 
resulting from economic and social inequality within Indian institutions and laws.389  
Because these inequalities worked to the benefit of those representing the 
predominantly Hindu majority, Khan argued, they would not be redressed without 
structural adjustments and constitutional provisions to balance the interests of 
Muslims against those of Hindus. Khan described what he believed was a separation 
between Hindus and Muslims in Indian society into ‘water-tight compartments’ 
despite close physical proximity. This separation was due to restrictions observed by 
Hindus, ostensibly for religious reasons but with economic effect, that discriminated 
against Muslims (e.g. he interpreted restrictions against eating food handled by 
Muslims as a form of economic boycott). Muslims experienced discrimination in their 
everyday lives because they were easily identified by their names, the manner of their 
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dress, and their physical features. Furthermore, this discrimination was entrenched in 
commercial associations, educational and government institutions.  
  Contrary to signifying separatism or communalism, Khan described the 
recognition of religious distinctions as necessary to bring about a social unification 
that transcended religious, racial, and national boundaries. The organization of 
Muslims in the All-India Muslim League and the Muslim demand for separate 
electorates was, according to Khan, not to draw indelible communal or separatist lines 
across the Indian nation.390 Rather, it was necessary to organize Muslims in order to 
speed their progress in ‘fields of activity’ in which they lagged behind other 
communities in India. Muslims lagged behind other communities because of the 
universal nature of Islam. According to Khan, Islam sought to extend beyond racial 
and national communal boundaries and unite the entire human race. As a result, 
Muslims were ‘apt to forget their immediate communal needs and requirements.’391  
In a similar manner, Khan described Muslims who identified themselves as 
Ahmadis as doing so not because they intended to separate themselves from other 
Muslims, but so as to bring about greater unity between different groups of men.392 
He described the Ahmadiyya not as a new interpretation of Islam, but as a new 
dispensation of the original message of Islam that was suited to a ‘new universe.’ He 
went on the describe Islam’s role in the new universe as one of reconciliation between 
the factors that led to discord.393 He blurred the distinction between Islam and other 
religious traditions by describing all spiritual teachings as having one common 
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source.394 As will be shown, Khan’s interpretation of Islam accorded with the 
Ahmadiyya’s view that international law and the recognition of universal human 
rights was in accordance with Islamic precepts.  
 
Ahmadis Across Political Boundaries 
 
Legal theories prevailing in Europe during the late nineteenth century, which 
theorized the development of a law between nations, placed permanent boundaries 
between European societies and Islamic societies. 395  These theories inferred that 
people in the Islamic world were incapable of developing to an equal position with 
European people because of innate and biological differences between them. In 
contrast, Maine’s historical and comparative approach invited comparison between 
ancient village communities that had existed in Europe and those existing in India, 
including those to which Punjabi Muslims belonged.  Maine found that Indian village 
communities resembled the Teutonic mark that had existed in Germany, displaying 
similar rules governing in-group and out-group relations, patterns of co-sharing, and 
exclusion of female heirs. He theorized that European societies had progressed from 
status to contract in private law because circumstance had allowed them to move 
beyond the stage in development when custom had been given a ‘sacred caste, and 
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rendered unchangeable.’396 This suggested a potential for rural Punjabi Muslims to 
progress along the same evolutionary schema under the right circumstances. 
Indian students of law were trained at Punjab University to seek out 
similarities between their customary laws and the laws from which modern European 
laws developed using evolutionary legal theories. Justice William Rattigan, who 
served as vice-chancellor of Punjab University in 1887, wrote a legal textbook 
designed for Indian students of law that fashioned an awareness of the place of India 
and the Punjab within an international and comparative legal framework, and included 
a chapter on international law.397 According to one reviewer, Rattigan’s textbook 
fulfilled the need for Indian law students to ‘be constantly reminded of parallelisms or 
contrasts between Indian Law and Western Jurisprudence.’398  
They were also trained as potential innovators of European laws. As vice-
chancellor of Punjab University in 1901, Lewis Tupper’s convocation speech 
described a role for the study of law in the Punjab for advancing legal studies in 
general.399  Tupper said that the basis for jurisprudence was to be found in works of 
Utilitarian legal philosophers Jeremy Bentham and John Austin, who described law as 
it ought to be across legal systems.400 He described Henry Maine as equally important 
to developing jurisprudence into a science. Tupper went on to say that the science of 
jurisprudence that Maine introduced through the historical and comparative method 
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was a branch of sociology. Maine’s evolutionary legal theories were ‘a set of 
consistent generalizations from known facts in the growth of legal institutions and 
ideas’ that were necessary to understanding the evolution of society.401  Indian law 
students were taught that evolutionary legal theories were a means of re-writing law 
as it ought to be. An understanding of their own customary law in parallel with 
modern laws would lead to a revision of Utilitarian laws, not only progressing Indian 
society but honing the legal tools of progress generally.402  
However, racial distinctions in colonial law created an international boundary 
between India and Europe that implied that India would not develop to a position of 
equality with the British.403 This, in turn, suggested that societies within India would 
not develop to a position of equality with one another. A legal distinction between 
Indians and Europeans was made salient to the Indian elite by the failure of the Ilbert 
Bill (1883), which sought to repeal a law that gave Europeans the right to be tried by a 
British jury in criminal trials.404 Tupper had argued that this racial separation in 
criminal courts was justified by the distinctions observed by Indian communities, such 
as rules that separated Sudras from Brahmins.405   
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In 1917, Secretary of State Edwin Montague and the Viceroy Lord 
Chelmsford met with representatives of various associations and communities in India, 
who were invited to submit memorials with their views on the future constitution of 
India. Zafrullah Khan, accompanying the Ahmadiyya head Bashir-ud-din Ahmad, 
presented the Ahmadiyya community’s memorial to the administration.406 Their 
memorial seemed to reconcile this contradiction between the theories of political 
development prominent in the Punjab, which suggested equality between India nad 
European countries, and the distinction within colonial law between Indians and 
Europeans, which suggested continuing inequality. At the same time, their memorial 
recommended maintaining special representation for minorities.  
The Ahmadiyya memorial claimed ‘exceptional opportunities for obtaining 
direct information concerning the lives of all classes throughout India. 407  The 
memorial attributed popular discontent among Indians to four causes: a lack of 
sympathy from English officials, the distinctive treatment given to Europeans under 
the law, changes in social and economic conditions caused by decreased productivity 
of the soil and high prices, and the lack of education suited to the needs of the 
agriculturalist classes.408  
The Ahmadiyya memorial emphasised the rights of minority communities, 
adopting the positive inferences of separate electorates. It recognized Indian society as 
being characterized by social differences of a kind that made representative 
government undesirable for minority communities. It stated that ‘a nation labouring 
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under disadvantages in the face of acute religious and racial differences would be 
cursed and not blessed by self-government.’ According to the memorial, the 
Ahmadiyya’s own experience of religious bigotry was testimony to this. The 
Ahmadiyya was a small community that ‘believ[ed] in the truth of all prophets’ and 
yet was ‘persecuted by the followers of the different religions which flourished in 
India’.409 Thus it advocated for the cautious introduction of representative institutions 
accompanied by separate electorates and weightages for minority communities within 
legislative and executive councils. In addition to politically significant minority 
communities like Indian Muslims, it advocated that special arrangements should also 
be made for the representation of small minorities. It did not recommend that Muslim 
law be administered within an Islamic legal system by ulama, as memorials submitted 
by delegates from the Muslim seminary in Deoband and the Muslim organization 
Majlis Muid-ul-Islam in Lucknow did.410 
While the Ahmadiyya memorial agreed with Tupper’s analysis that religious 
and racial inequalities in India made national self-rule undesirable in the immediate 
future, Bashir-ud-din Ahmad recommended the repeal of the laws that made a racial 
distinction between Indians and Europeans. Montagu recorded in his diary that during 
his conversation with Bashir-ud-Din Ahmad, the religious leader objected to the right 
of Europeans to claim British juries.411 The Ahmadiyya memorial pointed to the 
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Indian Arms Act of 1878 as exemplifying racial inequality in the law.412 This act 
made it legal for Europeans to carry arms in India, while making it illegal for Indians.  
The removal of this racial distinction within the law suggested India’s 
inclusion within a developing international economic order. The Ahmadiyya head 
described race as an economic barrier to India’s development. 1930, Bashir-ud-din 
Ahmad wrote that there were no essential differences between the east and west that 
would send them on alternative paths of legal and political development.413 India’s 
equality with nations that had once been British dependences (i.e. the Commonwealth 
of Nations) depended upon British people remaining in India ‘proud to serve India in 
the capacity of a citizen of the country and not as a foreigner’.414 Racial feelings 
would serve to bond Britain to settler colonials (i.e. New Zealand, Australia, the 
United States, and Canada), but in the case of India, they were an impediment to 
maintaining such a connection. Without this connection, Ahmad wrote that the 
independence of India would leave it in a position of dire economic dependence on 
the West, which he described as worse than slavery. Furthermore, while religious 
distinctions existed in Islamic law, racial distinctions did not. According to Zafrullah 
Khan, Islam differed from other systems in how it regulated racial relations, the most 
important of which was marriage, regarding it as a private matter.415  
The Ahmadiyya interpreted Islamic law as commanding the obedience of 
Indian Muslims to British laws, but this obedience was predicated on Indian Muslims 
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being able to move across political boundaries. Following the Montagu-Chelmsford 
reforms, Mohandas Gandhi (1869-1948) initiated the Non-cooperation movement 
(1920-1922) to protest British laws like the Rowlatt Act, a martial law ordinance that 
defined post-war India to be in a state of emergency and allowed the British to hold 
Indians without trial. 416  The movement supported a mass boycott of British 
institutions and goods. Ulama joined the All-India Khilafat Committee and the Jamiat 
al-Ulama e Hind (JUH) in support of the movement and expressed their opposition to 
British rule as religious duty. The Ahmadi head opposed Muslim participation in the 
Non-cooperation movement, arguing that only those countries whose people had an 
innate reverence to the law could progress. In the case of an unjust or tyrannical 
government, it was a Muslim’s duty to ‘sacrifice all worldly advantages to the 
conscience and leave the country.’417   
The Ahmadiyya’s obedience to British laws in India was also justified by the 
presence of Ahmadi missionaries in Britain. It was thus predicated not only on 
Muslims’ ability to migrate across political boundaries, but also their right to spread 
Islam across those boundaries. He argued that Muslims must show obedience to 
British laws as long as they did not force Muslims to leave Islam. Ahmadi 
missionaries in Britain demonstrated that this was not the case.418  
During the 1910s and 1920s the Ahmadiyya sent missionaries from Qadian 
around the world. In 1912, Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din left India for England, setting up 
the Woking Muslim Mission in Surrey. His mission emphasized the universality of 
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Islam and its permeability across cultural borders through its monthly journal The 
Islamic Review. In 1913, his message led directly to the conversion of Lord Headley. 
Together with Headley, he wrote that ‘compassionate regard for the welfare and 
happiness of others is a characteristic feature of the Buddhist, Christian and Islamic 
Faiths, and the last named, being the simplest and most free from dogmatic 
encumbrances, is most likely to be the universal religion of the world.’419 Lord 
Headley’s conversion was significant. Firstly, Headley was a prominent member of 
British peerage and an outspoken representative of Islam, founding in 1914 the British 
Moslem Society. His conversion meant that not only could Islam cross racial lines, 
but the conversion of one of the British ruling aristocracy meant that it had crossed an 
important class line as well. In British India, these were lines that separated a subject 
population from a foreign ruling class.420 British Muslim converts could represent the 
interests of Indian Muslims in Britain as members of the same religious community, 
even identifying with the same class interests. This was the case with Lord Stanley 
(1827-1903), who was a member of the House of Lords and professed to be Muslim. 
He was a staunch proponent of legal reforms in India that would allow wealthy 
Muslims to keep their estates intact through private waqfs.421 
In 1914, the Ahmadiyya community split into two branches. As provincial 
agrarian policies moved rural and urban populations apart, so too could the split 
within the Ahmadiyya movement be characterized as one between urbanized and rural 
Ahmadis. While one section continued to direct its allegiance towards Qadian and 
recognized the authority of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s son and the institution of 
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Ahmadiyya khilafat, Muhammad Ali separated and established a new organization in 
Lahore. While recognizing the claims of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as Mahdi, the Lahore 
Ahmadis disassociated from any concept of a central authority in the form of khilafat. 
With Muhammad Ali also went Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din, Lord Headley, and the 
Woking Muslim Mission. While emphasizing the universal nature of Islamic 
teachings, the Lahore Ahmadis also tended to emphasize the sectarian nature of the 
Qadian Ahmadis, arguing that ‘sects’ impeded Islam on its way to being recognized 
as a universal truth.422 In this manner, their polemics fed into political expressions of 
Islamic unity, in which sectarianism was conceived of as politically divisive and 
negative.423 However, despite these polemics the two groups kept good relations in 
London. By the time that the Qadian Ahmadis built a mosque in Southfields in 1924, 
the Woking mission and the British Moslem Society were centres of the Muslim 
community at the metropolis.424   
Returning to our focus on the Qadian Ahmadis, the Ahmadiyya mission in 
America was particularly successful among African-Americans. The historian 
Richard Turner has accounted for the success of the Ahmadiyya movement in 
America as owing to it timing, when the ‘internationalist’ perspective of Marcus 
Garvey’s Universal Negro Improvement Society (UNIS) in the 1920s influenced 
African-Americans to view themselves in solidarity with the ‘darker races of the 
world’ against white Europeans Americans.425 Black leaders were given leadership 
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roles within the movement, including a prominent Garveyite James Conwell from 
Chicago. Garveyites joined the movement and retained their identification with UNIS, 
with at least six converts pictured attending Friday service at the mission in Chicago 
wearing Garveyite uniforms.426  Yet Ahmadiyya offered African-Americans aware of 
a ‘colour-line’ a non-racialist interpretation of Islam among other forms. Turner finds 
that the Ahmadiyya represented a ‘heterodox and universalist Islam,’ that competed 
with ‘heterodox and racialist’ forms of Islam that emerged from within the African-
American experience. 427 The Ahmadiyya mission in America lauded the conversion 
of a white man, Alexander Russell Web, as the first known convert to Islam in the 
country, and Web assisted the Ahmadis in translating the Qur’an in 1911.428   
Other missions that the Ahmadiyya set up included a mission in Mandate 
Palestine and a mission in Sierra Leone, which was positively received by the 
‘orthodox’ Muslim leader Ahmed Alhadi and the Aku people. An attempt to set up a 
mission in Freetown, on the other hand, was defeated by the hostility of local men.429 
Lahore Ahmadis set up a mission in Berlin in 1923, which led Egyptian nationalists in 
Berlin to oppose them. Leaders of the Egyptian National Party, on the basis that 
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Ahmadis had separated themselves from the community of believers because they 
kept aloof, in turn began instigating anti-Ahmadi propaganda in India.430 
The movement of Ahmadiyya missionaries across political boundaries 
depended upon their belonging to a religious organization whose obedience to 
territorial laws was tested. After WWI, missionaries operating within the British 
Empire were required to obtain a permit from the India Office that was subject to their 
‘undertaking to co-operate loyally with the Government of the country’ in which they 
operated.431 The British government formulated this scheme during WWI, when the 
India Office’s attention was drawn to the ‘exceptional facilities for influencing for 
good or evil the peoples of India’ that missionaries possessed.432  During the war, it 
was feared that philanthropic institutions or missionary societies might exert political 
or cultural influence contrary to ‘public interest’.433 As Under-Secretary of State Lord 
Islington pointed out, issuing licenses to ‘cosmopolitan’ organizations such as those 
under the Roman Catholic Church was impolitic because ‘racial recognition [was] 
practically obliterated’.434  The fidelity to British laws of an individual Jesuit from 
Sweden or an individual Jesuit from Switzerland, for example, could not be tested by 
his nationality. However, Catholic and Protestant leaders wanted organizations and 
not individual missionaries to be held accountable. They held that requiring licenses 
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for individual missionaries infringed upon religious liberty.435 The British initiated a 
tiered system of licensing missionaries that attempted to balance the principle of 
religious liberty with powers of the state. The first tier included missionary societies 
under strong central bodies that were trusted to ‘exercise effective moral control.’ 
This tier included mainly British societies under the National Missionary Council. 
The second tier included societies under unrecognized central bodies, which were 
required to take out permits or licenses. The third tier included ‘unrecognized 
societies’, in which individual missionaries were required to take out permits. This 
tier included ‘non-Christians of all sorts’. Under this system, individual Ahmadi 
missionaries as British subjects in India were required to obtain permits to operate in 
London under close surveillance by British intelligence agencies.436  
The right of missionaries to operate across political boundaries was also 
recognized within the international legal framework established by the Mandate 
system. It was a particular right of nations within the League of Nations to send 
missionaries to fellow League nations.437 This right still had force the 1960s in a case 
involving the Mandate territory of South West Africa, which had been brought before 
the International Criminal Court of Justice (ICCJ) by Ethiopia and Liberia. Though 
Ethiopia and Liberia had no direct interest in the case, the court determined that 
violation of their particular right (i.e. to send missionaries to South West Africa) was 
valid grounds to bring legally binding litigation before the court. In this case, 
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litigation was meant to challenge the trusteeship of apartheid South Africa over South 
West Africa. 
Ahmadiyya missions also benefited from the British consulate system and 
being centrally organized from Qadian. During political instability in Syria, the 
Ahmadi missionary headquarters at Qadian kept in contact with their missionaries 
through the British consulate in Damascus.438 The consulate in Moscow assisted in 
tracing and repatriating an Ahmadiyya missionary arrested in Bokhara, with the 
assurance that the Ahmadiyya headquarters would repay the cost incurred.439  
This movement of Ahmadi missionaries across political boundaries required 
an interpretation of Islamic law that was allowed for the presence of Muslims under 
non-Muslim governments. The conversion of people in non-Muslim countries to 
Islam conflicted with an ‘orthodox’ interpretation of Islamic law expressed by N. B. E. 
Baillie, which separated the ‘Muslim world’ from the ‘non-Muslim world’ by making 
Muslim religious identity dependent upon nationality: 
But though foreigners are all deemed to be of one religion as opposed to 
Mohammedans, their division into separate nationalities is distinctly 
recognized by the law. Mohammedans, on the other hand, though living under 
separate governments, are held to be of the same nationality; insomuch, that 
when a Mohammedan goes to a foreign country, he is supposed to have the 
animus revertendi [with intention to return], however long he may continue to 
reside in it, until he actually apostatizes from the faith.440  
 
A similar interpretation of Islamic law as dividing the world into Dar-ul-Islam (‘the 
country of safety and salvation’) and Dar-ul-Harb (‘country of the enemy’) was also 
                                                
438 Letter to the Foreign Office from the Consul in Damascus, 24 December 1925, Political and Secret 
Department Records, IOR P/PS/11/4399. 
439 Memorandum from the Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office, 12 March 1927, Political and 
Secret Department Records, IOR L/PS/11/677. 
440 Baillie, ‘On the Duty which Mohammedans in British India Owe’, 429.  
 145 
included in Baillie’s textbook on Islamic law.441  Baillie defined the Dar-ul-Islam as 
the country under the government of Muslims or, in the absence of a Muslim 
sovereign, a territory where people were bound together by Islam. Baillie’s textbook 
can be considered ‘orthodox’ because colonial courts frequently deferred to it. It 
precluded Muslims from adopting European nationality, or European nationals from 
adopting Islam as their religion. They either ceased to be Muslims or were compelled 
to immigrate to Muslim countries.  
In contrast, Ameer Ali understood the ‘orthodox’ interpretation of nationality 
under Islamic law as historically contingent. The presumption that a Muslim 
domiciled in the ‘Dar-ul-Harb’ was an apostate from Islam was, according to his 
understanding, the natural result of the hostilities that developed between Muslims 
and neighbouring countries following the death of the Prophet. However, the rigour of 
this stricture had relaxed as hostilities between Muslim sovereigns and European 
powers had ceased. According to Ali, this was due to treaty agreements between 
Muslim sovereigns (the Ottoman Empire) and European powers, and to ‘Christendom’ 
renouncing its former bigotry towards Muslims.  Muslims were now able to acquire a 
foreign domicile without renouncing Islam. Muslims born within the British Empire 
could settle in Britain and Ireland.442  Private international law determined what 
personal law governed a Muslim domiciled in Europe. Under Italian or French laws, 
that meant a Muslim carried his personal law with him. In England, it meant that he 
continued to be bound by the moral and religious portions of Islamic law but was 
governed by English common law.443   
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As a consequence of the expansion of Ahmadi missions across political and 
jurisdictional borders, the Ahmadiyya adopted an interpretation of Islamic law that 
was compatible with private international law. The Ahmadi missionary Mufti 
Muhammad Sadiq’s took a legal position similar to that of Ameer Ali to reconcile 
Muslim personal law and territorial laws. Upon arrival in the United States in 1920, 
Sadiq was detained for seven months and released on the condition that he not preach 
polygamy. He responded by distinguishing commandments from permissions in Islam. 
Because Islam did not command polygamy, Muslims in lands where polygamy was 
outlawed relinquished their right to practice it.444  
The Ahmadiyya interpreted Islamic law as being compatible with the 
international norms established by the League of Nations, to which India was a 
founding member in 1919. Bashir-ud-din Ahmad wrote: 
Unfortunately we are so taken up with the questions of countries and 
nationalities that we have clean forgotten that we are all fellow beings united 
in the chain of one common brotherhood of humanity…Nations are 
intermixing and their angularities are being fast smoothed out and not only is 
there a lip desire to meet each other but the world is actually passing through a 
tribulation which is forcing all contending factors to fuse into one harmonious 
whole. A sort of unity is evolving. One of the most important harmonizing 
agents which Almighty God is bringing into action in this connection is the 
League of Nations.445 
 
The principle of international protection of minority rights is traced to the treaty of 
Westphalia in 1648. Concerning religious minorities, who were vulnerable to 
persecution after being transferred from one ruler to another, the treaty put in place 
vague and ultimately unenforceable terms of foreign intervention for their protection. 
However, it established a consensus among European powers that preventing violence 
against minorities or their expulsion from within nation states was necessary to 
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maintaining stability between nations. This principle was extended to national groups 
in central, eastern and southern Europe following the Congress of Vienna treaty of 
1815, but again the terms of its enforcement were left vague.  The Paris Peace 
Conference of 1919 created minority treaties, which put in place an international 
system for the protection of minorities in Germany and Soviet Russia.446 
The League of Nations provided a mechanism for the implementation of 
minority treaties, which included the establishment of a Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ) to determine disputed complaints against governments 
accused of treaty violations. This system, which remained in place until WWII, 
sought to balance conflicting principles. On the one hand, the treaties affirmed the 
principle of modern democracies (majority rule) and theoretically unlimited state 
sovereignty. On the other hand, the League sought to curtail states’ power by 
enforcing that they extended basic rights over their citizens including ‘national 
minorities’ and in some instances special rights, as was the case with Jews in Poland 
and Romania who were provided with religious and linguistic rights under the 
treaties.447 The treaties legitimated ‘friendly intervention’ by outside forces. Bashir-
ud-din Ahmad’s support for the League of Nations, as well as his denial of the 
essential difference between east and west, suggests that he inferred that the political 
development of India along federalist lines would parallel its inclusion within an 
emerging international law as a nation with equal rights to other nations. Federation, 
and the development of equality between Indians, preserved minority community 
rights and depended upon a central government in India devolving power to its parts 
(i.e. communities, provinces, states). International law, hypothetically and as 
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envisioned within the League of Nations, similarly restricted the powers of sovereign 
nations through treaty agreements.  
According to Bashir-ud-din Ahmad, Islam laid down rules for the settlement 
of international disputes that contemplated a body like the League. This was based on 
his interpretation of the Koranic verse 49:9. The parenthetical statements in the 
passage below are commentary added by Ahmad that function like tafsir, or Koranic 
exegesis: 
If two Muslim nations fall out, make peace between them (i.e., other Muslim 
nations should try to prevent war between them, and should try to remove the 
causes of friction and should award to each its just rights). But if one of them 
still persists in attacking the other (and does not accept the award of the 
League of Nations) then all must fight the former, till it submits to the 
command of Allah (i.e., till it is willing to abide by an equitable settlement) 
and when it so submits, make peace between them, and act with justice and 
equity, for God loves the just.448 
 
Although this verse specified Muslim nations, Ahmad did not distinguish between 
Muslim nations from non-Muslim nations. This may have been a product of the 
Ahmadiyya’s messianic expectation that Islam would spread throughout the world. 
Rather, he wrote that the League did not function properly because it was not Islamic 
enough. That is, it was not in accordance with the Koranic rules laid down by verse 
49:9. He also suggested that wars were immoral, and that they violated Islamic 
injunctions. According to Ahmad, international disputes arose because the conduct of 
nations was not judged by the rules of morality. He wrote that the international court 
of arbitration should settle disputes on Islamic principles.449 
However, India’s inclusion with Britain in a federation of nations under 
international law was controversial in Britain. In the 1920s, various schemes of world 
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federation were envisioned and popularly debated in Britain.450 British historian John 
Seeley offered an early model of federation between the British Isles and its settler 
colonies (i.e. New Zealand, Australia, and Canada) in 1883 that would equalize 
relations between these colonies and the British Empire.451  This scheme excluded 
India and tropical Africa, colonies inhabited by ‘alien’ people under British rule rather 
than people of the British nation. Seeley expressed this scheme of federation when 
Maine’s legal theories were most influential among Punjab civil servants.452 In 
contrast to Maine’s evolutionary theories that compared the customs of the Punjab 
village to those of the German Teutonic mark, Seeley euphemistically distinguished 
between connections that were ‘organic and enduring’ (settler colonies) and those that 
were ‘mechanical and thus easily sundered’ (India and African colonies).453  
More inclusive ideas of world federation were also advocated by popular 
British intellectuals. The writer H. G. Wells’ concept of world federation, on the other 
hand, did include India. Wells was expressly anti-nationalistic and espoused a 
cosmopolitan ideal.454 He envisioned the development of a world government based 
on free federation that would break down national barriers.455 He also worked towards 
the universal recognition of fundamental rights of man, which included freedom of 
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worship.456 He drafted a declaration of the Rights of Man in 1939, and included it in 
his book The New World Order. This draft was completed with the collaboration of 
others and its final version came to be called the ‘Sankey Declaration.’ Wells 
campaigned to give the declaration international exposure, personally having it 
translated and published in multiple languages. In addition to a preamble, the 
declaration included ten clauses that dealt with rights to nourishment, work, education, 
and worship 
In 1924, an affinity between this strand of thinking and the Ahmadiyya’s 
expectation to be included under universal norms was demonstrated when an 
Ahmadiyya missionary was executed in Afghanistan. In 1919, the Ahmadi missionary 
and Afghan subject Neymatullah Khan left Qadian to set up a mission in Kabul.457  
Ahmadi leaders felt assured that the missionary would be safely received: King 
Amanullah Khan (r. 1919-1929) was committed to modernization and toleration of 
minority religious communities. An Ahmadiyya delegation had received assurances 
that the community would be safe in Afghanistan by the Afghan foreign minister 
Sardar Mahmood Tarzi during his visit to India. However, Neymatullah Khan was 
stoned to death in 1924 as a capital offense for apostasy from Islam. Though 
instigated by religious leaders in the country, the Afghan government sanctioned the 
stoning.  
Bashir-ud-din Ahmad and Zafrullah Khan were in London participating in a 
world conference on religions when Neymatullah was executed. Bashir-ud-din 
Ahmad sent telegrams to the President of the League of Nations, Premiers of Britain, 
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France, and Italy, and the president of the United States asking that they make a 
formal protest to the Afghan government, which had proclaimed that it supported 
liberty of conscience.458 The Foreign Office deferred responsibility to the Government 
of India, which decided against making any formal or informal complaint. The British 
officer in Kabul consulted the Amanullah Khan and Tarzi about the incident. Though 
they expressed their horror at the stoning, they felt compelled to capitulate to a 
religious establishment whose support they needed. The situation in Afghanistan 
resulted in two more murders of Ahmadis in 1925. Following these murders, H. G. 
Wells, the Orientalist scholar R. A. Nicholson, A. Conan Doyle, and Francis 
Younghusband were signatories to a protest resolution that condemned Afghanistan’s 
conduct as being ‘so repugnant to notions of the civilized world’ and affirmed the 
principle that freedom of conscience was the birth right of humanity. 
 The protest campaign against the killing of Ahmadis in Afghanistan also 
demonstrated an affinity between the Ahmadiyya and religious leaders who 
understood religious difference as alternative expressions of the same universal 
principles. Following the stoning of Neymatullah, a meeting of religious leaders in 
London resolved that ‘this meeting of representatives of all classes and creeds 
strongly affirms the principles that freedom of conscience is the birth right of 
humanity and desires to convey to the Afghan Government its emphatic disapproval 
and condemnation.’459 Walter Walsh, the leader of the Free Religious Movement, 
moved the resolution, and Zafrullah Khan supported it.  Walsh was a Christian 
minister whose interest in historical criticism in Bible studies had led him to reject the 
New Testament, preach a universal religion, and invite his parish to abolish the 
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characteristically Christian elements from their church’s constitution. He founded the 
Free Religious Movement after a lawsuit was brought against him by a section of his 
congregation and a Scottish Court of Sessions ruled that in recognizing a universal 
religion his church ceased to be Christian.460    
Summary 
 
From evolutionary legal theories, Henry Maine articulated principles of 
international law to define relations between the British government and princely 
states. As the Punjab administration developed these theories, they also defined 
relations between the British government and Punjab agriculturalist tribes. These 
theories were based on notions of divisible sovereignty and double allegiance: Indian 
communities relinquished sovereign rights to wage war and engage in foreign 
relations, retaining a right to their administrations (in the case of princely states) or 
customs (in the case of Punjab agriculturalist tribes). Indian subjects owed allegiance 
to the British government and either their princely rulers or tribal leaders. During 
WWI and the non-cooperation movement, these theories inferred the allegiance of 
rural Punjab Muslims to the British and the allegiance of urban Punjabi Muslims to 
Muslim rulers. The administration’s policy army recruitment and awarding land 
grants among rural Punjabis materialized this divide.  
After 1919, representational government in colonial India expanded through a 
political system that decentralized political powers and circumscribed rural interests 
in the Punjab and Muslim interests in India through separate representation. This 
system contributed to the dominance of the Punjab Unionist Party: a Muslim led, non-
sectarian, cross-communal political alliance that represented agricultural interests. It 
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also perpetuated a style of political representation in which rural Muslim Punjabi 
leaders, including the head of the Ahmadiyya community, represented local and caste 
based interests. 
Evolutionary legal theories inferred that India would evolve into an 
independent federation that was politically equal to Britain as inequalities between 
caste and religious communities levelled out. Punjabi Muslim leaders including 
Ahmadis adopted the positive inferences that evolutionary legal theories inflected 
upon the unequal relations between Indian political communities and the British 
government. Separate electorates for Muslims and other minorities were necessary to 
weaken the powers of a Hindu-majority central government because those inequalities 
were institutionalized. For the Ahmadiyya, evolutionary legal theories inferred the 
development of an international law that extended beyond racial lines and restricted 
states from persecuting religious minorities. According to the Ahmadiyya’s 
interpretation of Islamic law, there was no legal boundary that separated a Muslim 
world from a non-Muslim world and Islam was compatible with this international law. 
The next chapter will tie principles of international law in the Punjab to 
Muslim agriculturalist land rights in princely states, which were defined through land 
revenue settlements carried out by Punjab administrators. It will examine how British 
paramountcy was interpreted by Muslim political leaders in the Punjab and the 
Ahmadiyya as inferring the duty of the British government to protect the economic 
and religious rights of Muslim agriculturalists in princely states. In contrast to this 
interpretation of paramountcy, this chapter will introduce Muhammad Iqbal’s 
argument that the colonial state must recognize the feelings of Muslims and define the 
Ahmadiyya as non-Muslim for their belief in prophecy after Muhammad.  
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Chapter 4: Muhammad Iqbal’s Concept of the Muslim Community and Exclusion of 
the Ahmadiyya   
Introduction 
This chapter examines Muhammad Iqbal’s 1935 argument that the British 
government must define the Ahmadiyya as non-Muslim for their belief in prophecy 
after Muhammad within its political context.461 This argument asserted the legal 
authority of the ulama over that of the British government to define membership 
within the Muslim community, and it was based on a conception of the Muslim 
community as unified, bounded by common belief, and weakened by foreign 
influences. This chapter will examine how Iqbal’s argument functioned as a legal 
construct that opposed principles of international law, undermined an interpretation of 
Islamic law that accorded with the principle of right to religious freedom, and upset 
the conceptual foundations upon which personal law defined the economic and 
political structure of representation in the Punjab. It will examine the economic 
implications that followed from it.  
The first section of this chapter examines the 1911 Punjab census, which 
replaced Ibbetson’s ethnographic description of Muslims in the Punjab with passages 
from works by Muhammad Iqbal on Islam. It also examines Iqbal’s argument that the 
British must define the Ahmadiyya as non-Muslim, which he published as an open 
letter in the Indian newspaper The Statesman in 1935. It looks at a number of political 
and legal assertions that Iqbal made concerning Islamic law the Muslim political 
constitution, which were consistent throughout these writings.  
The remainder of this chapter examines how Muhammad Iqbal’s argument 
functioned within the context of colonial law and administration in the Punjab. The 
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second section examines the Punjab administration’s settlement of land rights to 
Muslim agriculturalists living in Kashmir, Alwar, and Bharatpur, all of which were 
Hindu ruled princely states bordering the Punjab. Like in the Punjab, Muslim 
agriculturalists were understood as having ancient land rights through customary law. 
Iqbal’s interpretation of the Muslim community undermined the ideological basis for 
these land rights. It also undermined a style of politics adopted by Punjabi Muslims, 
including the Ahmadiyya, who used their influence in the Punjab to lobby the British 
government to intervene in Kashmir and Alwar to negotiate constitutional rights for 
Muslims with princely rulers. The final section of this chapter examines an alternative 
style of politics adopted by urban Muslim politician in the Punjab who formed an 
organization called Majlis-i-Ahrar (e. 1928). It examines the manner in which they 
represented Kashmiri Muslim interests in 1931 and their campaign during the Punjab 
legislative assembly elections in 1934. Ahrar campaigned on the religious issue raised 
by Iqbal, that Ahmadiyya doctrines were a danger to Islam, rather than the economic 
and social issues represented by the Unionist party.  
 
Muhammad Iqbal’s Argument   
 
Muhammad Iqbal’s argument that the colonial state must define the 
Ahmadiyya as non-Muslim mirrored a tendency within the European legal tradition 
that ran counter to notions of international law and universal human rights. On the one 
hand, Henry Maine’s comparative approach to understanding the legal systems under 
colonial rule contributed to the development of international legal theories that 
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restricted state powers.462 On the other hand, his emphasis on custom as a source of 
law was influenced by German historical jurisprudence, which contributed to the 
development of legal theories that asserted the sovereignty of nations against third-
party restrictions imposed by international law. 463  This tendency in historical 
jurisprudence was exemplified in the legal and political theories of German 
philosopher Carl Schmitt (1888-1985). In The Concept of the Political (1927 and 
1932) Schmitt posited that people constituted a political community through 
distinguishing friends from enemies: that is, by distinguishing themselves from 
outsiders who threatened their existence.464  Schmitt critiqued the liberal state and 
notions of international law that restricted the autonomous power of political 
communities and, he argued, threatening their very existence. If the state were to 
survive, Schmitt believed, it must be allowed to draw its legal boundaries so that 
citizenship coincided with membership within the political community.465  The liberal 
state, because of its failure to properly distinguish friends from enemies, extended 
membership rights to people who did not truly belong within it. This failure would 
result in the death of the liberal state through de-politicization, internal strife, or its 
being overwhelmed by more politically unified external enemies. 466  Schmitt 
                                                
462 Casper Sylvest, 'The Foundations of Victorian International Law,' in Victorian Visions of Global 
Order: Empire and International Relations in Nineteenth-Century Political Thought, (ed.) Duncan Bell 
(Heinemann, Cambridge, 2007), 47-66. 
463 Calvin Woodward, ‘A Wake (or Awakening?) for Historical Jurisprudence’ in The Victorian 
Achievement of Sir Henry Maine: A Centennial Reappraisal, (ed.) Alan Diamond (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 224-225. For Carl Schmitt’s theories on international law see: R. 
Axtmann, ‘Humanity or Enmity? Carl Schmitt on International Politics’ in International Politics 44, 5 
(2007), 531-551; W. Hooker, Carl Schmitt's International Thought: Order and Orientation 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
464 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political. 1932 ed. (trans.) G. Schwab (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2007), 26-35. 
465 Ibid., 19. 
466 Ibid., 69-79. 
 158 
concluded that the existence of political communities depended upon their own ability 
to make the friend-enemy distinction and to go to war to maintain that distinction if 
necessary, without the restraining interference of a third party.467  
Iqbal’s argument also conformed to a colonialist interpretation of Islamic law 
that conceived of Muslims as forming a distinct political community over which a 
third party (in this case a non-Muslim legal authority) could not legitimately govern. 
This ran counter to interpretations of Islamic law that conceptualized it as part of a 
plural legal system and thus able to accommodate international law. As discussed in 
the previous chapters, Lahore Chief Justice William Rattigan understood Islamic law 
to have been based on a rational science that could be learned by non-Muslim legal 
practitioners and incorporated into a plural legal system. Justice Oldfield’s judgement 
that Ahmadis were Muslim in Narantakath vs. Parakkal Mammu (1922) also 
validated an interpretation of Islamic law that was compatible with international law: 
by understanding the Ahmadiyya’s interpretation of jihad as a necessary adaptation to 
the proliferation of Muslims in Europe, he interpreted Islamic law as allowing 
Muslims to live as a minority community in Europe under European legal systems. In 
contrast to these interpretations, N.B.E Baillie interpreted Islamic law as defining 
those living beyond the jurisdiction of Islamic states as enemies.  According to Baillie, 
non-Muslims were termed kafir under Islamic law, and any kafirs not subject to 
Muslim rule were ‘generally treated by Muslim lawyers as hurbees, or enemies.’ He 
held that this distinction regulated the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims, 
whether they were natives of the same country or resided in different countries.468 
Baillie’s interpretation of Islamic law did not allow Muslims to live as a minority 
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community in Europe because any Muslim who took up residency outside of the 
jurisdiction of Muslim rulers became apostates.  
Iqbal conceived of Muslims as having a ‘peculiar form of nationality’,469 
which aligned community boundaries with religious belief. According to Iqbal, 
nationality in Islam was ‘non-temporal’ and ‘non-spatial’.470 Muslims shared the same 
‘mental outlook’ and a worldview that was created through their participation in the 
same historical tradition.471 They were ‘members of the society founded by the 
Prophet of Islam.’ According to him, dogma was ‘the point of universal agreement on 
which [Muslim’s] communal solidarity depend[ed].’ Iqbal described Muslims as 
having a distinct culture, which was a ‘cross-fertilization’ of Semitic and Aryan 
cultures.472  
By defining Muslims as having distinct communal boundaries, Iqbal redefined 
relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in rural Punjabi society. In the 1881 
census, Ibbetson had described ‘tribe’ as a more significant marker of identity and 
mode of social organization than religion in the Punjab. He described the lack of inner 
conviction among Punjabi villagers as making it difficult to ‘draw the line between 
one Indian creed and the other’. 473  In contrast, Iqbal described religion as 
manifestations of core beliefs: freedom from suffering in Buddhism, salvation from 
sin in Christianity, the ceaseless struggle between good and evil in Zorastrianism. 
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According to Iqbal, the core of Islamic belief was the attainment of freedom from fear 
and individual empowerment.474 
Iqbal described Islam as manifesting a distinctly ‘Muslim political constitution’ 
that was based on two ‘propositions’: the law of God was absolutely supreme and 
there was no authority in the social structure of Islam except for interpreters of 
Islamic law.475 In 1932, Iqbal translated this political ideal into a recommendation for 
constitutional reforms in India that would centralize legal authority over Islamic law 
and create greater uniformity in how Islamic law was interpreted. Iqbal proposed that 
an assembly of ulama be created, which would include Muslim lawyers trained in 
modern jurisprudence. The assembly’s purpose would be ‘to protect, expand and, if 
necessary, to reinterpret the law of Islam in light of modern conditions, while keeping 
close to the spirit embodied within the fundamental principles.’476 He proposed that 
all legislation affecting Muslim personal law be passed through this assembly before 
being considered by the Indian legislature.  
According to Iqbal divergent interpretations of Islamic law weakened the 
Muslim community from within and were to be guarded against if Muslim political 
power was to be preserved. Sectarianism was the influence of Hinduism: ‘one of the 
quiet ways that conquered nations revenge themselves on their conquerors.’ 
‘Dissenting forces in [Islam]’ were to be carefully watched and the influx of foreign 
elements was to be ‘checked and permitted to enter into the social fabric [of Muslim 
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society] slowly’. 477  The purpose of education was to produce a character that 
‘excludes from it all that is hostile to its cherished traditions and institutions.’478  Iqbal 
warned ‘fight not for the interpretations of the truth, when the truth itself is in 
danger.’479 Rationalism posed a threat to the Muslim community according to Iqbal. It 
was opposed to dogma and threatened to ‘disintegrate the communal synthesis.’ 
Converting religion into a speculative system was ‘absolutely useless’ and ‘absurd’.480  
In 1935, Iqbal argued that the British government in India should define the 
Ahmadiyya as non-Muslim in an open letter published in the Indian newspaper The 
Statesman.481 He framed the Ahmadiyya’s inclusion within the Muslim community as 
a political issue, arguing that the Ahmadiyya identified as Muslim to accrue political 
advantages because their small size (56,000 according to the 1931 Indian census) did 
not entitle them to a single seat in any legislature in India. This argument signalled a 
shift away from Iqbal’s previous position towards the Ahmadiyya, in which he treated 
Ahmadis as legitimate political representatives of Muslims.482 Iqbal was elected as a 
member of the Punjab legislative assembly from Lahore in 1926 and joined with the 
Unionist party,483 which under Fazli Hussain’s leadership included Ahmadis and 
followed a principle that party members not be excluded based on their religious 
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belief.484 He was involved in forming the All-India Kashmir Committee (e. 1931), in 
which prominent Muslims from the Punjab represented the religious, political, and 
material interests of Kashmiri Muslims to the British government. Nine of its 36 
members were Ahmadi, and Iqbal nominated Bashir-ud-din Ahmad to be president of 
the committee.485 However, his attitude shifted in 1933, when he took over as 
president of the AIKC, resigned, then invited its members to reorganize without 
Ahmadis.486 Yet despite Iqbal’s shift in attitude, the logic by which he excluded the 
Ahmadiyya was consistent with the logic by which he understood nationality in Islam.  
Iqbal’s argument for the exclusion of the Ahmadiyya from the Muslim 
community reinforced his conception of the Muslim community as being unified by 
common belief and culturally distinct from other religious communities. According to 
him, the doctrine of Finality of Prophethood was ‘perhaps the most original idea in 
the cultural history of mankind.’487 The doctrine separated Islam from what Iqbal 
called pre-Islamic Magian culture, which included Zoroastrianism, Judaism, and 
Jewish Christianity.  According to Iqbal, Magian ‘creed-communities’ believed in 
continuity of prophethood and lived in a state of expectation as a result, which led to 
the continual disintegration of old communities and founding of new ones by 
‘religious adventurers’.488 Iqbal considered the Ahmadiyya to have been ‘a modern 
revival of pre-Islamic Magianism’ that outwardly conformed to Islam but was 
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inwardly ‘wholly inimical to the spirit and aspirations of Islam.’ 489 Rather, the ‘idea 
of the continuity of the spirit of the Messiah’ in Ahmadi belief made it easy for him to 
regard the Ahmadiyya as a return to early Judaism.490  
Iqbal made a comparison between Islam and Rabbinical Judaism that 
suggested that the Ahmadiyya threatened the notion of a Muslim state and Islamic law. 
He compared the emergence of the Ahmadiyya in colonial India to the emergence of 
Christianity as a Jewish heresy in Roman Judea and compared Mirza Ghulam Ahmad 
to the Dutch Jewish philosopher Spinoza (1632-1677).491  His comparison of Ahmad 
to Spinoza was politically as well as religiously suggestive: suggesting that the 
Ahmadiyya threatened not simply religious orthodoxy, but Iqbal’s notion that Islam 
manifested a distinct political constitution. Unlike Iqbal, Spinoza argued that a higher 
political ideal was attainable only as a manifestation of ‘true laws’, or laws emanating 
from nature, which were universal rather than specific to a people—an idea that was 
understood to accord with liberal democratic states rather than states founded on 
religious identity.492 Spinoza distinguished between Moses as a law bearing prophet 
and Jesus as a philosopher in order to posit a distinction between human law and 
divine law. According to Spinoza, Moses introduced Mosaic law in order to raise the 
condition of Hebrews who had been enslaved in Egypt and were in need of social 
order and laws. He introduced the concept of divine election to appeal to their 
mentality not because it was true, but because it was necessary for the creation of the 
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state. Jesus as a philosopher introduced true laws, which were in accordance with 
nature and intelligible to any rational man. In making this distinction, Spinoza 
elevated universal law above religious law. 
Iqbal’s argument that the Ahmadis were non-Muslim accorded with Schmitt’s 
critique of international law, which challenged the legitimacy of a third party to 
interfere in a political community’s right to make the friend-enemy distinction. He 
argued for the right of Muslims to exclude the Ahmadiyya over the demand of the 
British government for religious tolerance. Iqbal described the Ahmadiyya’s 
remaining within the fold of Islam as threatening to disintegrate the Muslim 
community. According to him, the Muslim community was more sensitive to 
disintegrating forces than communities whose membership was based partly on race. 
It was instead ‘secured by the Idea of the Finality of Prophethood alone.’493   The 
animosity that the ‘average Muslim’ felt towards Ahmadis arose from an instinct 
towards self-preservation.494  The British in India were unable to grasp the feelings of 
Muslims and unfair in demanding tolerance from Muslims ‘against the forces of 
disintegration’. Iqbal wrote that the only recourse open to Muslims was self-defence 
in order to preserve their community. 
Iqbal’s argument that Ahmadis threatened the Muslim community’s existence 
had important implications for the targeting of Ahmadis through violent means. Iqbal 
argued that the Ahmadiyya’s interpretation of the doctrine of jihad and 
accommodating attitude towards colonial rule was the basis for the political 
subjugation of Indian Muslims.495 It might be inferred from this that for Iqbal an 
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interpretation of jihad that sanctioned violent struggle in defence of Islam was 
legitimate, in contrast to Ahmadi doctrine in which violent jihad was not religiously 
sanctioned in modern times. If this interpretation of Islam was legitimate and the 
Ahmadiyya threatened the Muslim community’s existence, this might suggest that 
violence against Ahmadis was legitimate according to Islam. Iqbal’s argument that 
Ahmadis were non-Muslim meant that Ahmadi missionaries who preached to 
Muslims might be interpreted as encouraging apostasy from Islam. This was the case 
in Afghanistan in 1924 when an Ahmadi missionary was stoned to death according to 
the decree of ulama. Iqbal interpreted the Islamic political constitution as not 
recognizing as legitimate any authority higher than Islamic law interpreted by the 
ulama. This delegitimized the Ahmadiyya’s appeal to the League of Nations as a 
higher authority over the Afghan government, which had allowed these stoning to be 
carried out. Furthermore, Iqbal’s exclusionary logic also bore a resemblance to anti-
Semitic literature in Europe. From the late nineteenth century, anti-Semitic sentiment 
was treated academically as a consequence of the separation of religious identity from 
national identity among Jews and the construction of racial binaries (Semitic and 
Aryan).496  
Iqbal’s construct of the Muslim community had implications for economic 
development in India. Iqbal did not account for the interaction of caste structures in 
Indian society on Muslims. Rather he detached religion from the local social 
structures through which Ibbetson had interpreted it. Ibbetson described ‘conversion 
from Hinduism to Islam [as having] not necessarily the slightest effect upon 
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[caste].’497 Viewed in this way, the egalitarian principles in Islam were a factor in 
accounting for the economic backwardness of Muslims as a community in India. 
Islam, Christianity, and Buddhism were commonly associated with low-caste and 
Dalit membership because they did not recognize caste barriers to conversion.498  
Iqbal, to the contrary, described Islam’s egalitarian principles as a source of political 
power: ‘the general principle of equality of all believers made early Mussulmans the 
greatest political power in the world.’499 According to him, religions’ transmitted 
beliefs that influenced the economic and social behaviour of the adherents. 
Christianity and Buddhism valorised ‘modes of activity which tend to weaken the 
force of human individuality’: these were ‘self-renunciation, poverty, slavish 
obedience’ which concealed themselves under ‘the beautiful name of humility and 
unworldliness.’500 Islam, on the other hand, looked upon poverty as a vice, an ethical 
principle that Iqbal discovered in the Quranic verse: ‘Do not forget thy share in the 
world.’501 Islam ‘gave the individual a sense of his inward power; it elevated those 
who were low.’502   
Iqbal’s construct of the Muslim community inferred that Muslim political 
representation of economic interests was not the Islamic ideal. According to Iqbal, 
nationality in Islam was not based on an ‘identity of economic interests’.503 Iqbal did 
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not take into consideration the operation of economic rules in Islamic law (e.g. the 
prohibition of interest and inheritance rules) as contributing to the economic 
conditions experienced by Muslims.504  Nor did Iqbal understand Muslim political 
power as enforcing such rules. In 1930, Iqbal described the Islamic conception of a 
state as ‘a contractual organism’ that was ‘animated by an ethical idea which 
regard[ed] man not as an earth-rooted creature…but as a spiritual being.’ Thus the 
Muslim state in India had never regulated rates of interest, and to do so was against its 
character. Iqbal stated: ‘in ancient India, the state framed laws that regulated the rates 
of interest; but despite Islam clearly forbidding interest, Muslim states imposed no 
restrictions on interest rates during Muslim times.’505   
Iqbal argument that the British government define the Ahmadiyya as non-
Muslim had implications for economic development in the Punjab because it 
subverted the urban and rural legal distinction. The distinction had been legitimized 
by the administration on economic grounds, as protecting the economic position of 
rural Punjabis against the operation of a free market in land. Iqbal closed his argument 
by calling for an end to the distinction, which he described as having ‘cut up the 
Muslim community into two groups and the rural group into several sub-groups 
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constantly at war with one another.’506 According to him, the distinction created 
disunity among Muslims and prevented real Muslim leaders from emerging.  
To briefly summarize, Iqbal’s construction of the Muslim community the 1911 
census was not compatible with international law, a plural legal system in which 
power was vested in a legal authority higher than the ulama. His demand that the 
British government define the Ahmadiyya as non-Muslim asserted the right of the 
Muslim community to distinguish friend from enemy over the British government’s 
claim to uphold the universal principle of religious tolerance. When contextualized in 
terms of legal currents prevailing in Europe at the time, Iqbal’s argument bore a 
resemblance to Schmitt’s concept of the political and critique of international law.  
Furthermore, a concept of a Muslim community unified in terms of belief rather than 
diversified by economic interests particular to each locality was more amenable to the 
principle of a unified Islamic law over Muslims rather than a universal law in which 
Muslims were included among other communities.  
Muslim Political Representation in th 1930s 
 
Muhammad Iqbal’s argument functioned within the context of colonial law 
and administration in the Punjab to undermine the ideological basis of Muslim 
agriculturalists’ land rights through customary law, which extended beyond the 
political boundaries that separated British India from princely states but were 
uncertain. British land settlements carried out in Kashmir, Alwar, and Bharatpur—
Hindu ruled princely states bordering the Punjab—described Muslim agriculturalists 
as having these ancient land rights through customary law, while also recognizing the 
‘quasi-sovereignty’ of princely states as their absolute land right within their 
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territories. Iqbal’s argument undermined a style of politics adopted by Punjabi 
Muslims, including the Ahmadiyya, who in the 1930s used their influence in the 
Punjab to lobby the British government to intervene in Kashmir and Alwar to 
negotiate constitutional rights for agriculturalists with princely rulers. 
 In the late nineteenth century, the Punjab administration intervened in the 
administrations of neighbouring princely states. They carried out land settlements that 
ostensibly raised the position of Muslim agriculturalists within these states to a level 
more on par with their fellow tribesmen in the Punjab. They did so by identifying 
them with village communities and vesting them with land rights according to custom. 
However, these interventions also recognized princely rulers as having absolute 
ownership over all lands within their states, which perpetuated laws and systems of 
administration that buttressed Hindu ruling classes against the rise of lower classes 
among whom Muslim agriculturalists were included. These laws also preserved 
inequalities among Muslims, buttressing Muslim groups in a higher social position 
against those in a lower position.  In the 1930s, the aim behind British interventions 
into the administrations of princely states was ambiguous, resulting in conflicting 
notions of the rights and duties of princely states and their Muslim subjects.  
British settlements of Alwar and Bharatpur seemed to be recognizing Jat and 
Meo Muslim agriculturalists as having rights similar to those of Muslim 
agriculturalists in British India by raising their status. The first British settlement of 
Alwar state, a princely state ruled by a Hindu Rajput dynasty, was carried out by P. W. 
Powlett in 1876.507 Powlett settlement classified Hindu Rajputs and a small number of 
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Muslim Rajputs as a ruling class of land proprietors and cultivators.508 It classified 
most of the state’s rural population as Chumar—depressed class cultivators—and 
understood higher caste agriculturalist groups as having proprietary rights to land 
through ancient custom. The largest group of such agriculturalists inhabited Mewat, 
the state’s most fertile region that extended into the Bharatpur State and Gurgaon 
province in the Punjab.  These agriculturalists, called the Meo, made up 90 per cent of 
Alwar’s Muslim population (Muslims comprising 27 per cent of the total).509  
As with Muslim agriculturalists in the Punjab, the vesting of ancient land 
rights with Meo agriculturalists came with their identification as a convert community. 
They were understood to have been converted to Islam in the fifteenth century but 
retained their Rajput caste identity by continuing to observe Hindu rituals and caste 
rules.510 The 1872 census described them as ignorant of Islam—few knew the khalima 
(profession of faith) and fewer still the Muslim prayers.511 It also described the 
distinction between the Meo and lower caste tenant cultivators as blurred: Meo men 
intermarried with women of other castes and Meo women tattooed their bodies like 
lower caste Hindu women.512     
The 1898 settlement of Alwar was carried out by future Punjab governor 
Michael O’Dwyer, who at the same time carried out the first British settlement for 
Bharatpur state, which had a Hindu Jat ruling dynasty. In Bharatpur, O’Dwyer’s 
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settlement was concerned with raising the status of the Meo and Jats to a level on par 
with their fellow tribesmen in surrounding areas.513 This involved making a clearer 
distinction between the rights of Meo and Jat agriculturalists and those of tenant 
cultivators, whose rights according to him had been rendered indistinguishable as the 
result of the state’s heavy revenue assessment.514 His description of the Meo in 
Bharatpur raised their caste pedigree from the previous settlement. He described them 
as a cross between the Aryan Rajputs and indigenous Minas, who had been described 
in Powlett’s settlement as the former rulers of Alwar state and of good social position: 
‘Rajputs eat and drink from their hand.’515 O’Dwyer’s diminished the value of 
privileged land tenures among an ‘aristocratic’ caste of Hindu Rajputs in Bharatpur, 
whose pedigree was traced to Jaipur’s ruling class. He described their lack or jagirs as 
making them better agriculturalists than their fellow tribesmen in Rajput States.516 By 
contrast, O’Dwyer described the gradual loss of power and privilege of Jat jagadirs in 
Bharatpur as making them ‘less energetic and successful as agriculturalists than Jats 
usually are’.517   
The British intervened in Kashmir state’s administration in 1889 in a manner 
that seemed to raise the position of Kashmiri Muslim agriculturalists to a level more 
on par with agriculturalists in the Punjab. Rather than the fluid religious identities that 
characterized Meo and Malkani (landowning) Rajputs, there was a salient distinction 
in Kashmir between a Hindu ruling class and administration and an overwhelmingly 
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Muslim agriculturalist or cultivating population.  Kashmir state, which bordered the 
Gurdaspur district in the Punjab, was ceded by the British to Gulab Singh (1792-1857) 
and his male heirs in 1846, creating a Hindu Dogra dynasty.518 The vast majority of 
Kashmir’s population was Muslim: it was 76 per cent Muslim and 22 per cent Hindu 
according to the 1921 census. The census classified Hindus as either high caste (16.1 
per cent) or Untouchable (3.6 per cent),519  and by most accounts high caste Hindus 
were entirely Brahmin.520  Kashmiri Muslim agriculturalists were not identified as 
higher caste, as were the Muslim Rajputs in Alwar and Bharatpur.  The 
proportionately smaller population of Hindus in Kashmir and lack of social 
stratification among them meant that Muslims assumed the roles of lower caste 
Hindus among Kashmiri Brahmins, who depended upon them to perform duties 
necessary to maintain ritual purity.521   
The manner in which Kashmir society was organized meant that the British 
intervention into Kashmir’s administration on behalf of its subjects was apparently an 
intervention on behalf of Muslims against a Hindu administration. Kashmir’s 
administration was blamed for the famine of 1877-1879, which affected Muslims to 
the exclusion of Hindu Pandits and was reported to have killed three-fifths of the 
population in the Kashmir valley while pushing other agriculturalists to flee into the 
Punjab. 522  Kashmiri land laws that encouraged Pandits and Dogras to settle 
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agricultural land were understood to have contributed to the misery of Muslim 
agriculturalists. These lands included village lands left fallow during the famine. In 
1889, the British administration installed a British resident and State Council to assist 
the maharaja in the administration of his state and Punjab civil servant Walter 
Lawrence carried out a settlement in the Kashmir valley. This settlement recognized 
Kashmiri cultivators as having hereditary land rights through membership within the 
village community.  
However, the vesting of absolute land rights in princely rulers maintained 
unequal social relations despite the language of customary rights in British 
settlements. As Mridu Rai has pointed out, the Kashmir settlement vested all 
landholders with hereditary land rights including Hindu Pandits and Muslim 
cultivators ‘without levelling the playing field.’523 Under Kashmir’s Pratap’s Code of 
1894, Dogras were given greater access to land and preferential revenue assessments, 
which included revenue exemption for five years after acquiring land and half the rate 
of other Kashmiris thereafter. Rather than alleviating the plight of Muslim cultivators, 
the British settlement contributed to peasant indebtedness by converting a portion of 
the state’s revenue demand from kind to cash. During the agricultural depression of 
the 1930s, indebted cultivators who were unable to meet the revenue demand 
relinquished their occupancy rights to the state. Privileged landowners who could 
afford to pay off arrears were permitted to assume ownership of the land from the 
state, which led to the consolidation of large estates and the conversion of small 
landholders into landless labourers. 
Similarly, O’Dwyer’s settlement in Bharatpur recognized the state as having 
‘the final right of ownership’ while recognizing landholders as holding subordinate 
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proprietary rights (Hakk Malikana), which they were entitled to possess as long as 
they paid the state demand.524  In 1932, Punjabi Muslim political leaders represented 
the granting of village lands as jagirs to Rajputs by Alwar state as infringing upon the 
rights of Meos as ‘Muslim landowners’ there, whose revenue assessment was 
burdened by the granting of these superior rights over their village lands.525 However, 
the British administration interpreted jagadirs in all Indian states to be virtual 
proprietors and there to be no other landowner in a jagir village. Proprietary rights in 
villages were not the result of land grants made by the princely ruler, but arose 
through uninterrupted possession of land.526   
While British administrative interventions did not elevate the position of 
Muslim agriculturalists in princely states to the level of Muslim agriculturalists in the 
Punjab, they contributed to the creation of a class of Muslims across the region who 
were government educated and expressed similar aspirations for social advancement 
and employment.527 British-imposed reforms on Kashmir’s administration in 1889 
brought an influx of Punjabis into the state’s civil service. The state introduced a 
modern, salaried bureaucracy, changed the language of its administration from 
Persian to Urdu, opened up government employment to competitive examination, and 
lifted immigration restrictions.528  The state’s education policy shifted from promoting 
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religious education among Muslims to mass education among all levels of Kashmir 
society, which allowed Kashmiri Muslims to advance to higher education in British 
India.529 Princely subjects and Punjabis sought out education and employment across 
porous boundaries between princely states and the Punjab. The Brayne-Meo High 
School in the Punjab, which was founded in 1923 by the Deputy Commissioner of 
Gurgaon and had an entirely non-religious curriculum, attracted a growing number of 
Meo villagers from the Alwar state, which lacked primary schools because of the 
state’s restrictions on the establishment of private schools and reticence to establish 
state-aided schools.530 
In Kashmir, Ahmadis were prominent among this emerging class.  In 1902, 43 
Ahmadis resided in Kashmir. The Kashmir census attributed their presence, as well as 
that of Arya Samajists, to the appointment of Punjabis in government service.531 By 
1931, the Ahmadiyya in Kashmir had grown into a small minority of 2,955.532 
Prominent Kashmiri Ahmadis shared similar educational backgrounds and expressed 
Muslim interests in a similar manner as their co-religionists in the Punjab.533 
Nooruddin Qari Kashmiri (1894-1948) and Muhammad Vakil (1865-1948) converted 
to the Ahmadiyya while pursuing higher education in the Punjab.  Qari translated 
Islamic legal texts into Kashmiri and was concerned with breaking the dependence of 
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Muslim Kashmiris on the ulama.534 He also wrote poetry that was widely recited in 
primary schools and aimed to facilitate mass education. Vakil trained as a lawyer in 
the Punjab and practiced law in Srinagar, where he also established an Ahmadi 
association and was a founding member of the Reading Room Party, which drew 
together western-educated Kashmiri Muslims—Ahmadi and non-Ahmadi—to discuss 
issues of social uplift among Muslims. S. M. Abdullah (1905-1982), who was not 
Ahmadi, was another prominent member of the Reading Room Party who was 
educated at Aligarh University in the United Provinces. He rose to political 
prominence in Kashmir in the 1930s and 1940s, becoming Kashmir’s first prime 
minister in 1947.  
From the late nineteenth century, the princely states surrounding the Punjab 
allowed Arya Samaj and the Ahmadiyya missionaries from the Punjab to operate 
according to a universal principle of religious liberty. In Kashmir, Arya Samaj 
missionaries carried out shuddhi campaigns in Jammu among ‘Untouchable’ Meghs 
and Doms against the interests of Kashmiri Dogra and Pandit ruling classes. These 
classes began to view their economic and religious interests as opposed to those of the 
Arya Samaj, who competed with them for government jobs and sought to reform the 
Hindu institutions that they as Sanatan Dharmi Hindus (Hindus of the ‘original’ or 
‘pure’ religion) upheld.  
In 1923, the Arya Samaj began a shuddhi campaign among Malkana Muslim 
Rajputs in Bharatpur and Agra, which the Ahmadiyya protested against as infringing 
upon the religious liberty of these Muslims. This campaign was based on the notion 
that Muslim agriculturalists had been forcibly converted from Hinduism into Islam 
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and must be allowed back into the fold. Within a few months, a considerable number 
of Malkanas from 30 Muslim villages had been ‘reclaimed’ by the Arya Samaj. The 
reclamation campaign garnered much attention in Muslim newspapers in the United 
Provinces and the Punjab, particularly from the Aligarh Gazette and through 
published letters from Ahmadi missionaries reporting it.535 Ahmadis attended Arya 
Samaj meetings and alleged that police and local state officials were active 
participants in the campaign. 536   They alleged that these officials had helped 
organized social boycotts against villagers who remained Muslim. They appealed to 
the British government to pressure the state administration to transfer one sub-
inspector of police in particular for his involvement.  
The Ahmadiyya sent missionaries from the Punjab to Bharatpur during the 
Arya Samaj’s reclamation campaign. They travelled to a village called Ikran in 
numbers, pitched a tent there, and invited the villagers to feast with them. This 
mission was centred on an elderly Muslim woman named Jumia, who according to the 
Ahmadiyya was a victim of a social boycott as a consequence of her refusal to convert 
to Hinduism. In addition to providing Jumia with material assistance, the missionaries 
stated that they were there to teach Jumia principles of Islam and see to it that she had 
a Muslim burial if she died.537 There was some evidence that Muslim agriculturalists 
might have felt pressure to renounce Islam. While Ahmadis were encamped in 
Jumia’s village, a document was submitted for registration in the court of the Nazim 
Bharatpur on behalf of Jumia’s son Sohbra.  Sohbra had apparently ‘reconverted’ to 
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Hinduism. However, he willed away his ancestral house to Jumia for her to live in and 
to allow meetings and prayer to be held there.538 
The mass conversion Malkana Muslim Rajputs to Hinduism had material 
implications for the vesting of land rights through customary law. The existence of 
such communities, whose identity as converts from Hinduism was emphasized in 
British settlement reports that described them as more Hindu than Muslim, validated 
the notion that village communities persisted from ancient times. Malkana Muslim 
Rajputs continued to be vested with land rights as members of the village community 
despite their conversion to Islam, and their Hindu tribesmen continued to be vested 
with the same land rights. Their conversion by Arya Samaj missionaries from the 
Punjab, who tended to come from commercial castes, may have had similar inferences 
for Muslims from the Punjab who represented agriculturalist interests.  
By 1928, on the eve of constitutional reforms towards increasingly responsible 
government in India, the relationship between the British government as a paramount 
power in India and princely states was ambiguously defined. A bloc of princely rulers 
interpreted their relationship with the British government as being governed by 
codified law. They held that their states’ internal sovereignty had been legally defined 
through treaty agreements entered into with the British from a position of equality. 
This view saw sovereign powers as resting in the first place with states, except for 
those that had been delegated towards the British by their consent. It assumed definite 
rights and obligations on the part of both the states and the British, and little 
discretionary powers in the hands of the British government as the paramount power 
in India. Colonial officials within the political and legal department in India 
interpreted paramountcy differently. According to their view, relations between the 
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states and the British government were governed by the necessity of keeping the 
paramount power paramount. Princely states had no absolute rights over their internal 
administration and laws, while the British government had unrestricted powers of 
interference under undefined conditions.  
The ideology upon which paramountcy was interpreted determined the course 
of economic development in princely states and India generally. Unlike Tupper’s 
interpretation of paramountcy, the political and legal department’s position towards 
paramountcy did not infer the evolution of unequally powerful polities (i.e. princely 
states and the British government) towards an equal balance of power between 
independent political communities under international law. Colonial officials 
explicitly dismissed any implication that the foreign relations of princely states would 
be regulated by international law after British paramountcy was replaced by a 
Dominion government in India.539 Nor did its view infer the evolution of unequal 
social relations between Indian communities towards greater social equality. Rather, 
maintaining the paramount power of the British government depended upon 
maintaining these inequalities. Sir John Malcolm 1823 argument held in 1928: 
paramountcy was guided solely by the concern for strengthening the links in Indian 
society (i.e. the ruling classes) necessary for maintaining order under British rule and 
conciliating the lower classes to that rule.  
In the early 1930s, Punjabi Muslim political leaders represented the interests 
of princely subjects in Alwar and Kashmir to British officials in a manner that 
asserted the duty of the British government as a paramount power in India to 
intervene in the administrations of these princely states on behalf of Muslim subjects 
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there. In doing so, they gave legitimacy to international legal principles that limited 
the autonomy of states’ over their internal administrations, while still recognizing 
non-democratic states as having sovereign rights.540 This form of representation 
assumed a political structure in British India in which political power continued to be 
decentralized to the provinces: Punjabi Muslim leaders used political influence that 
devolved to them through diarchy to represent the interests of Muslims in princely 
states who were outside of official channels of patronage, and they represented local 
and caste-based interests rather than the cultural interests of Muslims. The Ahmadiyya 
was prominent among other Muslims in representing Kashmiri Muslim interests in 
this fashion, but more prominently advocated the extension of religious liberty as a 
universal norm throughout India, including the right to convert.   
In 1930, Bashir-ud-din Ahmad interpreted the conditions experienced by 
Muslim agriculturalists in Hindu-ruled princely states as being analogous to the future 
conditions of Muslim agriculturalists in British India should power devolve to a 
central government elected by a Hindu majority population. According to him, the 
economic conditions that would result from this political development would lead to 
the dispossession of Muslim landowners by Hindu moneylenders, their indebtedness 
under exorbitant rates of interest, and social and economic discrimination against 
Muslims and other minorities.541 He claimed that Muslims would also suffer the loss 
of religious liberty, which was evident in Hindu princely states that prevented 
missionaries from preaching Islam and subjected Muslim converts to lengthy 
investigations. Alluding to Bharatpur in 1923, Bashir-ud-din Ahmad described 
Muslim villagers as having been forced to convert to Hinduism through shuddhi.  
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Ahmad advocated a political structure in India that would continue to maintain 
the autonomous interests of Muslims against the majority population in India, which 
included constitutional provisions for separate electorates, a federalist structure in 
which powers were delegated from provinces to a central government, and the 
creation of autonomous provinces in Baluchistan, N.W.F.P, and Sindh with Muslim 
majority populations.542  He advocated a legal order in India in which legislative 
powers over personal law would be transferred from the central legislature to the 
provincial legislature,543  maintaining local diversity and the discretionary powers of 
local government officials. This was the position represented by Muslim delegates to 
the RTCs, who included Muhammad Shafi, Zafrullah Khan, and the Aga Khan. It was 
also the position of the Unionist party leader Fazli-Hussain, who remained in close 
touch with them throughout the conferences.544 These Muslims operated through 
official channels and sought to secure their position through constitutional means. 
During this time, Husain was appointed to the executive council under Viceroy 
Willingdon (1931-1936), whose natural sympathies lay with constitutionalist Muslims 
like Husain rather than the Congress who during the conference advocated joint 
electorates and engaged in Civil Disobedience against the colonial government.545  
Kashmir Muslims made political demands that were interrelated to those made 
by Muslims at the RTCs. In 1931, S. M. Abdullah and other Kashmiri Muslims who 
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were members of the Reading Room Party began to petition Kashmir’s maharaja Hari 
Singh for constitutional rights, and Muslims within British India who were in a 
position of political influence lobbied the British government on their behalf.  The 
constitutional demands presented to the maharaja by Kashmiri Muslim leaders 
included that land revenue in Kashmir be assessed in line with the Punjab. They also 
demanded full religious freedom, freedom to assemble, and freedom of speech and 
press as existed in British India. Rather than full representative government, they 
demanded that 70 per cent of the legislature be elected, 30 per cent nominated, and 10 
per cent Dogra.546   
Muslims in British India formed the All-India Kashmir Committee (AIKC) to 
lobby the British government to assist in the settlement of these demands through 
constitutional means. AIKC member K. B. Rahim Bakhsh, a retired district judge 
from Lahore, petitioned the British government to establish an inquiry led by a British 
officer to look into the grievances of Kashmiri Muslims, which had led to mass 
protests in Kashmir’s capital city Srinagar, and recommend a settlement with the 
Kashmiri state. 547  With Bashir-ud-din Ahmad presiding over the AIKC, the 
Ahmadiyya played a prominent role on the committee. 
After continued pressure from Muslims in British India and Kashmir, 
maharaja Hari Singh established a commission to make constitutional 
recommendations under the supervision of British officer Bernard James Glancy.548  
                                                
546 Kashmir resident’s report, 20 October 1931, Foreign and Political Department files, IOR 
R/1/1/2155. 
547 K. B. Rahim Bakhsh, Retd. District and Sessions Judge from Lahore conversation with Sir Charles 
Watson 21 August 1931, ‘Report of the Riots Enquiry Committee appointed by Kashmir Darbar to 
enquire into the events which took place in Srinagar in July 1931’ Foreign and Political Department 
Records, IOR R/1/1/2154. 
548 Fortnightly report from the Kashmir resident, 26 November 1931, Foreign and Political Department 
Records, IOR R/1/1/2064. 
 183 
The Glancy commission was supported by Muslim political representatives in British 
India and Kashmir, including the Ahmadiyya. AIKC supported the Glancy 
Commission, and Bashir-ud-din Ahmad financed and organized lawyers to travel 
from the Punjab and assist Kashmiri Muslims in formulating their position before the 
commission.549 He did so by drawing upon resources within his own community, 
including recruiting Ahmadi lawyers to work pro-bono in Kashmir. The constitutional 
recommendations of the Glancy commission were supported by S. M. Abdullah and 
20,000 of his supporters,550 Muhammad Yakub of the All-India Muslim League,551 
and Muslim nationalist leader Shaukat Ali.552 
The Ahmadiyya also represented economic and religious grievances of 
Kashmiri Muslims to the British government through an AIKC member who had 
served as a missionary for the Ahmadiyya’s mosque in London. According to him, 
Kashmiri cultivators were aggrieved that the state did not give them the same rights to 
mining forests and erecting buildings as was given to their fellow tribesmen in the 
Punjab and United Provinces.553 He also stated that Kashmiris resented the state law 
that made conversion to Islam punishable through the confiscation of goods and 
complete separation from the family.  
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The Ahmadi representative was referring to anti-apostasy laws. Hindu and 
Muslim personal law in Kashmir enforced apostasy laws that had clear material 
implications for Muslims because of the manner in which Kashmir personal law 
ordered Kashmir society into a Hindu ruling class and Muslim subject population. 
According to an 1892 enactment, a person who forsook his religion could not inherit 
ancestral property in accordance with ‘ancient law and usage’. As late as 1931, a sub-
judge in Jammu ruled that the property of a Hindu man who converted to Islam was to 
be confiscated according to the ‘law of the Dharam Shastar.’554 The state supported 
this ruling as being in accordance with Hindu law based on the joint family system, in 
which a Hindu who renounced his religion went out of the joint family as if he had 
died. The Muslim law of apostasy had a similar effect of forfeiture of property. 
However, apostasy laws tended to act as a disability for high caste Hindu converts to 
Islam, since caste barriers in Hindu law prevented conversion to Hinduism except 
among Dalits who lacked land rights to begin with.555  
In 1932, Rahim Bakhsh presided over the All-India Alwar Conference, which 
sought to bring about constitutional reforms for Alwari Meo agriculturalists. The 
Ahmadiyya were not visibly involved in Alwar, but the conference presided over by 
Rahim Bakhsh represented similar grievances for the Meo as the AIKC presided over 
by Bashir ud-din Ahmad did for Kashmiris. Rahim Bakhsh described the conditions 
experienced by the Meo in Alwar as amounting to ‘religious persecution and 
economic depredation’.  Religious grievances represented by Punjabi Muslims were 
that the state was appropriating mosques, restricting Muslims from establishing 
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secular and religious private schools within the state, and allowing campaigns to 
forcibly convert them to Hinduism.556 Bakhsh described the religious grievances of 
the Meo as being directed against the state rather than its Hindu subjects, who were 
according to him sympathetic with Muslims. He described most of Muslim grievances 
as being economic and shared by the majority of Hindus against the Alwar state. 
These grievances resulted from heavy assessment of land revenue in the state, grazing 
taxes, and custom duties. They were caste-based: they resulted from the state granting 
village land ‘belonging to’ Muslim agriculturalists to Thakar Rajputs through 
jagadirs.557 
 As in Kashmir, Bakhsh evoked the paramount power of the British 
government to intervene on behalf of the Meo through constitutional means.  He 
described the British government as having a duty towards the subjects of princely 
states that was a ‘necessary corollary of its treaties with the states.’558 According to 
Bakhsh, the position of the paramount power towards the states was embodied in the 
words of Lord Mayo to an assembly of rulers of Rajputana States:  
If we support you in your power, we expect in return good government. We 
demand that everywhere through the length and breadth of Rajputana justice 
and order shall prevail that every man’s property shall be secure, that the 
traveller shall come and go in safety, that the cultivator shall enjoy the fruits of 
his labour and the trader the produce of his commerce, that you shall make 
roads and undertake the construction of those works of irrigation, which will 
improve the condition of the people and swell the revenue of your states, that 
you should encourage and provide for the relief of the sick.559  
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Bakhsh described his role and that of ‘influential Muslims’ in British India as one of 
arbitration, offering the administrations of Indian states help and advice to arrive at 
settlements with their Muslim subjects.560 According to him, members of the All-
India Kashmir Committee played a similar role in achieving a just settlement through 
the Glancy commission. He described the procedure of influential Muslims putting 
the grievances of Muslims within princely states before the British government and 
demanding an independent inquiry into them as their ‘acting through the Paramount 
Power.’561    
 
The Muslim Community in Punjab Politics 
 
Muhammad Iqbal put forward his argument that the Ahmadiyya were non-
Muslim during provincial and all-India legislative assembly elections. His argument 
conformed to a style of political representation adopted by urban Muslim politicians 
and ulama in this election. This style contrasted with that of the Punjab Unionist party, 
which had accommodated the Ahmadiyya and used official channels and 
constitutional means to protect the interests of Muslim agriculturalists. The Unionist 
style of representation did not necessarily represent the interests of all Muslims in 
British India. Urban Muslims, like the ulama, were marginalized within Punjab’s 
structure of representation and some understood their interests as being aligned with 
commercial castes.  
An alliance between Muslim politicians and the ulama seemed to coalesce 
around the Ahmadiyya’s involvement in Kashmir, which during the 1930s was a 
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place of contestation between the rights of Kashmiri Muslim subjects and those of the 
state. 562 This section looks at the political strategies of the Majlis i Ahrar (e. 1928), 
which comprised of urban Muslim politicians and ulama from the Punjab and United 
Provinces. During legislative assembly elections in the Punjab, Ahrar organized into a 
political party and campaigned against Ahmadi doctrines as a danger to Islam. These 
Muslims did not represent the same interests as Unionist politicians and they followed 
a different procedure, Civil Disobedience rather than constitutionalism, in pursuit of 
their interests. The campaign against the Ahmadiyya undermined the Unionist party’s 
position because it made belief, rather than shared economic interests, the basis for 
Muslim political solidarity. It was also rhetorically anti-British, undermining the 
procedure of acting through the paramount power of the British government, and 
appealed to ulama whose legal authority had been replaced by Muslim lawyers like 
Fazli Hussain.  
There were a couple of paradoxes within the politically dominant Muslim 
position during the RTCs, which Ahrar’s style of political representation avoided. 
Unionist party politicians in the Punjab demanded constitutional safeguards that 
would protect Muslims from caste discrimination. However, the influence that they 
used to lobby the British government was the result of a social and political order that 
discriminated against people on a tribal and caste basis. This paradox was 
demonstrated by B. R. Ambedkar’s criticism of the Punjab Land Alienation Act. Like 
the Muslim demand for separate electorates at the RTC, Ambedkar had also 
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demanded separate electorates from caste Hindus for dalits.563 In demanding separate 
electorates for their communities, Ambedkar and Muslim delegates opposed the 
Congress’s demand for joint electorates, represented by M. K. Gandhi at the RTCs.564 
However, Ambedkar and caste Hindus in the Punjab jointly appealed to the British 
administration to reform the Land Alienation Act in 1931. Ambedkar supported 
measures to restrict agricultural land to cultivators, but he opposed how the Act 
restricted land to designated agriculturalist tribes.565 He argued that the Act did not do 
what it purported to do of protecting those who actually cultivated the land against 
moneylenders who might also belong to agriculturalist tribes. He argued that the Act 
disadvantaged ‘agriculturalist’ cultivators by classifying him together with the 
‘agriculturalist’ doctor, moneylender, lawyer, etc. and excluded depressed class 
tenants from being able to acquire property. More fundamentally, by prohibiting a 
person from acquiring land by reason of birth, Ambedkar argued that the Act violated 
a ‘principle of civic justice which requires that no man shall be disqualified from 
holding office or property on the ground of race, caste, birth or religion.’566  
 The Muslim demand for separate electorates also undermined their 
representation of the economic and caste-based interests of Muslim agriculturalists 
because it could be inferred that Muslims represented interests particular to Muslims 
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only. While representing the Meo, Rahim Bakhsh alleged that the colonial 
administration misrepresented the real grievances of the Meo, which were against the 
state, as being due to ‘Hindu-Muslim trouble’ or ‘communal animosity’. He stated 
that the majority of Muslim grievances were shared to an equal degree by the Hindu 
majority in Alwar and described Hindus as being sympathetic to the complaints of 
Muslims regarding religious persecution by the Alwar state.567  
However, while stressing the shared interests of Hindus and Muslims in Alwar, 
Rahim Bakhsh also evoked a notion of an ‘Islamic brotherhood in India’ and a 
‘Muslim India’ to explain why influential Muslims in British India would lend their 
help and advice in the settlement of grievances between Muslim subjects and the 
administrations’ of Indian states. He placed princely states under the secular 
jurisdiction of the British government, which suggests that he did not wish to place 
Muslims under the jurisdiction of Islamic law. However, the prime minister of Alwar 
characterized Muslim representation as assuming the existence of Islamic law, which 
he said conformed to ‘the theory of extra-territorial Islamic jurisdiction in regard to 
the improvement of religious conditions of Muslims in Indian states.’568 The Alwar 
administration settled Meo grievances that were particular to Muslims. Of a list of 
grievances made to the state, the maharaja ignored non-religious grievances but 
restored four buildings to being used as mosques, introduced Urdu as an optional 
subject, and sanctioned the appointment of a mufti in the fatwa committee.569  
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 Furthermore, religiously trained ulama from the Deoband seminary in the 
United Provinces seemed to have been working at cross-purposes with Muslim who 
supported the Unionist position. The Deoband seminary had been founded in 1866 to 
reform Muslim education as an alternative to adopting English education and culture. 
Deoband advocated a return to the shari’a, Quran, and hadith to reform Islamic law 
and promoted its application to Muslim society.570 In 1917, a delegation of ulama 
representing Deoband had recommended that a Muslim theologian be appointed to 
each legislative council and reforms in education be made to encourage religious 
instruction.571 In 1927, the Deobandi missionary Mohammad Ilyas (1886-1944) began 
a tablighi (educational) campaign that contributed to the sharpening of Muslim 
identity among the Meo. The campaign sent lay missionaries to Alwar and established 
Islamic schools to religiously reform the Muslim peasantry.572 
Ahrar’s representation of Muslim interests did not run into the paradoxes 
inherent within the dominant Muslim position. Rather than advocating a legal and 
political order that preserved diversity at the local level, Ahrar’s founding objectives 
included complete independence from British rule for India and the establishment of 
an Islamic system for Muslims. Ahrar drew upon religious symbols that could appeal 
to an all-India Muslim community, rather than economic and social issues that could 
divide Muslims along class lines. Prominent members of Ahrar had participated in the 
first Non-cooperation movement and joined the All-India Khilafat Committee (e. 
1919), which espoused pan-Islamic ideologies that called for Muslim unity around the 
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Ottoman Sultan against Western hegemony. As Gail Minault has argued, this pan-
Islamism was proto-nationalist: it used a universal Islamic symbol to draw support 
from Muslims in India ‘divided by regional, linguistic, class, and sectarian 
differences.’ 573 Ahrar’s founding president was Ataullah Shah Bokhari, a Deobandi 
religious scholar. Bokhari was among the ulama who supported the Congress boycott 
of government schools, colleges, and jobs during the Non-cooperation movement. 
After Ahrar was founded, he suspended the organization in 1930 to join the Civil 
Disobedience movement.  
In 1931, Ahrar was involved in Kashmir and represented Kashmiri Muslim 
grievances differently than from how AIKC represented them. Mazhar Ali Azhar led 
Ahrar’s campaign in Kashmir and advocated full representative government for 
Kashmiris. They used civil disobedience as a means to achieve Ahrar’s objectives, 
organizing thousands of unarmed volunteers from the Punjab to enter Kashmir in 
order to pressure the maharaja to make concessions. Ahrar was not included in the 
Glancy Commission, and those Kashmiri Muslim representatives who participated in 
the enquiry did not press for full representative government.574 Ahrar called on 
Kashmiris to boycott the commission and continued to send volunteers into the state 
during the enquiry.575  
Ahrar organized as a political party and put up three candidates for the Punjab 
provincial by-elections in 1933: Afzal Haq, Mazhar Ali Azhar, and Abdur Rahman. 
They put up two candidates for the Indian assembly elections in 1937: K. L. Gauba 
from Lahore and Qazi Muhammad Ahmad Kazmi from Meerut in the United 
                                                
573 Minault, The Khilafat Movement, 2-3.  
574Fortnightly report, 19 October 1931. Foreign and Political Department Records, IOR R/1/1/2064. 
575Ibid. 
 192 
Provinces.576 Ahrar openly allied with the Congress, which was unpopular among 
Muslim voters in the province in part because of Congress’s opposition to the 1932 
Communal Award, which maintained separate electorates for Muslims.577   However, 
all of Ahrar’s candidates were successful and had a popular base among urban 
Muslims. In the Punjab, Ahrar had a significant following among the urban poor in 
Lahore, Amritsar, Ludhiana and Sialkot through campaigning against the Ahmadiyya 
as a danger to Islam.578  
Ahrar represented Muslims whose interests did not necessarily align with the 
constitutional position adopted by the Unionist party. This was exemplified by the 
political campaign of K. L. Gauba, who in 1934 campaigned against Rahim Bakhsh 
for a seat in the Indian legislature. Gauba came from a Hindu commercial caste and 
converted to Islam in 1933. His conversion upset the identification of Muslim 
interests as being opposed to Hindu commercial interests, according to which pro-
agrarian legislation received a communal inflection. Gauba was the son of Lala 
Harikshen Lal, who alongside Fazl-i Husain was appointed as a Punjab minister in 
1921 (but resigned in1923). Harikshen Lal was the founder of the Punjab National 
Bank and the People’s Banking and Commercial Association. He had commercial 
links with the Kashmir state, having been awarded in 1927 a contract to exploit the 
state’s Kishenganga forests for several years for railway and building construction.579 
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According to Gauba, this lucrative contract with Hari Singh brought twelve lakhs of 
rupees (1,200,000 rupees) into the state’s coffers annually. Lal was also a central 
figure in the Punjab Brahmo Samaj community. In the Punjab, members Brahmo 
Samaj were associated with ‘orthodox’ observance of caste norms as opposed to the 
Arya Samaj’s association with reforming caste norms. 580  Gauba described the 
‘progressive’ role of commerce, which pro-agrarian policies hampered, as dissolving 
religious difference. He cited Zafar Ali Khan, also a member of Ahrar, as having 
described the People’s Bank as ‘calculated to solve the tangle of Hindu-Muslim 
relations.’581 He described Lal’s belief that commerce was a force of progress that 
dissolved traditional structures and brought fluidity to Indian society ‘upsetting 
religion, social prejudice and setting in motion currents of civic life.’582 Gauba 
described all social struggle—against bureaucracy, among communities, between 
rural and urban interests--as economic struggles if accurately understood.583 
Gauba’s campaign against Rahim Bakhsh, however, appealed to religious 
‘orthodoxy’ rather than class issues.584 Electioneering on behalf of Gauba took place 
during what was ostensibly a religious conference organized by Ahrar. The 
conference was held during three days in late October on land immediately adjacent 
to the town of Qadian. Ahrar advertised the conference’s objectives as being to refute 
false doctrines and lay the foundations of an institution that would be called the 
‘Jamia Muhammadiyya.’ An estimated 10,000 people attended the conference, half of 
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whom were from the vicinity of Qadian, 300 of whom were ulama from Deoband and 
the North West Frontier Province, and a portion of whom were from princely states. 
Their presence was attributed by the government to the appeal of Ahrar’s campaign 
against the Ahmadiyya orthodox Muslims. Amid electioneering speeches on behalf of 
Gauba, Ahrar founder Bokhari made speeches concerning the claims to prophecy 
made by the current head and his predecessors and alleged that the Ahmadiyya were 
attempting to establish temporal and religious independence in Qadian. Ahrar 
speeches also strongly attacked the character of Bashir-ud-din Ahmad and Zafrullah 
Khan, who in 1934 was appointed to the Viceroy’s Executive Council. 585  
Ahrar has been taken to be a ‘clearly subaltern Muslim movement’ that 
emerged among other nineteenth century Muslim reform movements. 586  Their 
designation as such connotes that Ahrar was a social group that was politically outside 
the colonial power structure. Ahrar used anti-British rhetoric and appealed to poorer, 
urban classes in the Punjab who had been socially and politically marginalized by the 
British administration. However, Gauba’s involvement in Ahrar suggests a more 
variegated relationship between Ahrar and the colonial state, which drew upon all-
India political structures rather than local political structures for support. Gauba’s 
father Harikshen Lal was an outspoken critic of the Punjab administration. In 1918, he 
testified before the Indian Industrial Commission that the failure of his banks was due 
to a concerted conspiracy by the provincial government to destroy banking in the 
Punjab.587 Gauba continued to oppose the Punjab administration for its handling of his 
father’s business affairs. However, rather than being ‘anti-British,’ Gauba appealed to 
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the central government--the India Office--against the actions taken by the Punjab 
judicial administration against his father.588   
 Ahrar’s election campaign against the Ahmadiyya carried with it the increased 
potential for the violent targeting of Ahmadis, in part because the police and 
administration was unwilling to protect Ahmadis. Speeches made by Bokhari during 
the Gauba campaign so stirred one boy from Amritsar that he admitted to intending to 
assassinate Bashir-ud-din Ahmad when he was found to be in possession of a large 
knife and asking to interview the head.589 Ahrar organized a conference in Daska in 
Sialkot district in September of 1937, in which the British involvement in Palestine 
was condemned and the Ahmadiyya was attacked as a danger to Islam.590  Zafrullah 
Khan alleged that the police were hostile to the Ahmadiyya when intervening to 
maintain order during the conference and treated his brother Asadullah Khan as the 
aggressor in the situation. An investigation into the incident revealed that the sub-
inspector had falsified police diaries against the Ahmadiyya. 
Across the Punjab and the United Provinces, the growth of volunteer armies 
wielding weapons was further evidence of the breakdown of the previous colonial 
order. From late 1936, Lord Zetland noted the salience of bands of volunteers 
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attached to political organizations, with some dressed in uniform and drilling.591 By 
late 1938, volunteer organizations were increasing in strength and numbers, many 
drilling and carried lathis.  Ahrar organized well-disciplined volunteers corps in the 
United Provinces, North West Frontier Provinces, and Punjab. In the Punjab, there 
were an estimated 3,420 Ahrar volunteers by December of 1939.  Ahrar volunteers 
carried hatchets and swords during parades and processions. They organized a body 
of 350 ‘shock troops’ called Ghazi Corps whose express purpose was to counter 
Khaksar and Ahmadiyya propaganda. 592  Colonial officials interpreted these 
formations as presuming the powers to perform police duties, some volunteer corps 
even professed their intention to function as army and police in a parallel government.  
However, they hesitated to intervene to prohibit them for fear of a backlash.  
By contrast, the Ahmadiyya’s expressed obedience to the command of the 
British administration left them unarmed when thousands of hostile Ahrar supporters 
convened in Qadian: the local government found that the Ahmadiyya were recruiting 
volunteers and producing ‘sticks of a highly dangerous character shod with iron, and 
which were for all intents and purposes spears’ in anticipation of the event and 
commanded them to send back volunteers and stop producing sticks.593 Punjab 
governor Herbert Emerson explained to Bashir-ud-din Ahmad his reticence to 
intervene against Ahrar. He wrote in his governor’s report: ‘I took the opportunity of 
giving [Bashir-ud-din Ahmad] some advice about the future, and of explaining that a 
popular Government, dependent on the votes of orthodox Muslims, would find 
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themselves much embarrassed if they had to defend the Ahmadis against a general 
campaign of the faithful.’594   
 
Summary 
 
The early 1930s was a turning point for the Ahmadiyya in Punjab politics, 
when their political representation of Muslims lost legitimacy with the provincial 
administration. Urban Muslim politicians in the Punjab and Deobandi ulama joined 
together and campaigned against the Ahmadiyya during legislative assembly elections 
in the province. Muhammad Iqbal, who had previously allied with Ahmadis as a 
Unionist party member, demanded that the colonial state define them as non-Muslim 
as a matter of vital importance to the Muslim community.  
The logic by which Muhammad Iqbal excluded the Ahmadiyya from the 
Muslim community was based on a different conception of religion and society than 
that upon which the structure of political representation in the Punjab had been based. 
Iqbal did not interpret religion as existing within a social structure organized by caste, 
but rather interpreted social structures as emanated from religious beliefs. Not only 
did Iqbal’s interpretation of religion upset the conceptual foundations up which the 
Unionist party was organized, it also delegitimized a form of political activism 
adopted by Punjabi Muslim leaders. These Muslim leaders recognized the British 
administration as a paramount power over princely states, and used their political 
clout to lobby the administration to intervene in princely states to safeguard the 
economic and religious rights of Muslim subjects through constitutional means. The 
Ahmadiyya, which had highly visible missions in Kashmir and Bharatpur, engaged in 
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this form of political activism. They argued that Muslims’ freedom of conscience and 
belief was threatened under Hindu majority rule, particularly the freedom of Hindu 
converts to Islam, and advocated constitutional measures be put in place to safeguard 
these rights.  
The campaign against the Ahmadiyya asserted the authority of the ulama over 
that of the British government to determine correct belief in Islam and membership 
within the Muslim community.  It was based on Muslim political representation of 
religious issues particular to Muslims, rather than economic and social issues linked 
to caste. It was rhetorically anti-British, undermining the Punjabi Muslims who 
appealed to British paramountcy. This had implications for economic development in 
the region because their appeal to British paramountcy assumed that it was the 
paramount power’s duty to level out social inequalities among Muslims through 
facilitating progressive legal reforms. Because it was based on refuting Ahmadi 
doctrines as false and a threat to Islam, it undermined the universality of the value of 
freedom of conscience and belief, which the Ahmadiyya promoted.   
This chapter did not interpret Muslim political opposition to the Ahmadiyya as 
necessarily arising because colonial law and the principle of religious freedom were in 
conflict with Islamic law. It showed that the logic by which Muhammad Iqbal 
excluded the Ahmadiyya from the Muslim community mirrored theoretical strands of 
thought within the European legal tradition, which led to a nationalistic challenge to 
international law. The final chapter of this thesis focuses on the limitations that the 
colonial legal system placed on the principle of freedom of conscience and belief that 
it publically endorsed. It will examine how the punishment for apostasy from Islam 
was interpreted (as the death penalty) and operated (as the automatic dissolution of 
the apostate’s marriage) under colonial law. It will show how Muslim attempts to 
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reinterpret the punishment for apostasy were limited by the colonial court, which 
upheld ‘orthodox’ interpretations on principle, and non-Muslims.      
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Chapter 5: Apostasy and Conversion  
Introduction 
This thesis has so far examined two sets of countervailing legal and political 
principles. The first set of principles, derived from evolutionary legal theories, 
emphasized diversity and social inequalities among communities in India. These 
principles focused the attention of ‘lower caste’, politically influential Muslims in the 
Punjab on the law between communities and reform towards leveling social 
inequalities among them. They supported a decentralized political system that 
channeled political authority away from Indian groups who claimed to represent all-
India communities, and supported historically contingent interpretations of Islamic 
law. The second set of principles emphasized an all-India Muslim community, 
identified by colonial officials with ‘orthodoxy’. These principles focused the 
attention of urban Muslims in the Punjab and ulama on the law within the Muslim 
community: the internal sovereignty of these communities to define their own laws, 
and correct interpretations of religious doctrines as a basis for a unified community.  
In 1939, Zafrullah Khan argued that there was no punishment for apostasy in 
Islam and interpreted Islamic law as being in absolute accordance with the principle 
of freedom of conscience and belief. In doing so, he swept aside principles that 
emphasized diversity in interpretations of Islamic law and countervailing principles 
that emphasized the authority of an ‘orthodox’ interpretation of Islamic law, replacing 
them with one interpretation of Islamic law that was by definition ‘sectarian’ (an 
interpretation that dissented from ‘orthodox’ authority). This chapter places Zafrullah 
Khan’s theological argument within its historical and legal context by tracing the legal 
debate surrounding conversion and apostasy under colonial law in India. An 
interpretation of Islamic law that accorded with the right to conscience and belief had 
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obvious implications for the Ahmadiyya, in light of Muhammad Iqbal’s 1935 
argument that the Ahmadiyya must be excluded from the Muslim political community 
for their beliefs. This chapter examines the broader implications of freedom of 
conscience and belief that are revealed through these debates, which lay in its 
potential to alter how relations between Muslims and non-Muslims were conceived 
through the law. 
The first section of this chapter examines a series of reported cases from the 
Lahore High Court, all of which involved religious conversion. These cases are 
noteworthy because they record the legal arguments of Fazli Husain and Zafrullah 
Khan, who acted as lawyers in these cases. Their arguments recognized principles of 
private international law and freedom of conscience and belief, which would have 
allowed individuals to move between religious communities in India. However, 
colonial courts upheld ‘orthodox’ interpretations of Hindu and Muslim personal laws 
that were opposed to these principles and restricted such movement. The issue of 
conversion to Islam was linked with the issue of intermarriages between Muslims and 
Hindus, and non-Muslim opposition to intermarriage reinforced an interpretation of 
Islam as condoning conversion by force. Colonial courts translated the punishment for 
apostasy from Islam into the automatic dissolution of the marriage of the apostate, 
which was popularly interpreted by Hindus as a safeguard for Hindu women ‘forced’ 
to marry Muslim men.   
The remainder of the chapter examines all-India legislation to reform Muslim 
personal law, which was introduced in the 1930s by Muslim politicians according to 
‘orthodox’ legal principles. The Muslim Personal Law Application (MPLA) Bill, 
examined in the second section, sought to replace customary law with Muslim 
personal law in every instance that it was applied to Muslims. This legislation was 
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based on a conception of the historical conversion of Hindu agriculturalists to Islam 
as being a radical change in belief, but also had implication for altering the property 
rights of Muslim agriculturalists in the Punjab. The third section examines the 
legislative debates surrounding the Muslim Dissolution of Marriage (MDM) Bill, 
which sought to expand the grounds for divorce allowed to Muslim women and mend 
the loophole in divorce laws that was created through the automatic dissolution of 
marriage for apostasy from Islam.  Hindu politicians opposed measures to end the 
automatic dissolution of marriage for female apostasy from Islam and linked it with 
interreligious marriages, arguing that it infringed upon Hindu law and facilitated 
forced conversion to Islam through marriage.  
Recent historical studies on colonial law have connected the legal debates 
surrounding personal law reforms in the late 1930s to earlier legal debates originating 
in Bombay and continuing into post-partition India, relating principles of liberal 
individualism and individual rights to the discrete interests of Hindu and Muslim 
politicians.595 Connecting the legal debates surrounding these reforms to legal debates 
around conversion in the Punjab, with implications for the debates surrounding the 
Ahmadiyya’s religious status in Pakistan, necessarily alters how these reforms are 
interpreted. Previous analysis of these reforms has drawn attention to the concern of 
Muslim legislators for legal autonomy over a Muslim community.596 This chapter 
                                                
595 Particularly relevant to this chapter are: Newbigin, ‘Personal Law and Citizenship in India’; 
Sturman, The Government of Social Life; De, ‘The Two Husbands’. Rohit De’s study focuses on 
conversion to and away from Islam and shares a similar interpretative framework from Lauren Benton. 
However, the cases examined in this chapter do not fit with his conclusion that MDMA was a moment 
of crystallization of separate Hindu and Muslim personal law systems in India. He examines cases of 
conversion and apostasy from 1911 to 1938, while I examine cases from a decade earlier in the Punjab. 
This suggests regional differences in the manner in which personal law developed in the Punjab and 
Bombay. 
596 Newbigin, ‘Personal Law,’ 26; Sturman, The Government of Social Life, ch. 5. 
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draws attention to what might have been a tacit opposition among Muslims to 
principles that underpinned this legal autonomy.   
The legal cases examined in the first section of this chapter give insight into 
how litigants experienced personal law in their lives, and what ‘international law’ and 
the right to freedom of conscience and belief meant at the level of family relations. 
How person law was interpreted, including whether principles of international law or 
freedom of conscience and belief applied, was significant in determining which 
family bonds were maintained, and which ones might be dissolved.  These cases dealt 
with how personal law should be applied when a member of a family, or one person 
in a married couple, converted religions. ‘International law’ in these cases might be a 
means of resolving legal conflicts that arose within families as a result of conversion, 
providing a set of principles that could determine which laws to apply. On the other 
hand, the absence of such principles might restrict such conversions from occurring in 
the first case, as happened in Jamna Devi v. Mul Raj (1906). In this case, Jamna Devi 
attempted to divorce her husband Mul Raj after converting from Hinduism to Islam. 
Rejecting Jamna Devi’s lawyer Fazli Husain’s attempt to apply principles of 
international law to the case, which would have applied Muslim personal also to 
Devi’s defense, the court restricted Devi from converting to Islam according to its 
interpretation of Hindu personal law. It maintained a marital bond between Devi and 
her husband that she wished to dissolve.  
In Imam Din v. Hasan Bibi (1905) and Imam-ud-din v. Nur Din (1908), how 
Muslim personal law was interpreted to regulate apostasy was also relevant to 
determining whether a marital bond should be maintained or dissolved. The 
dissolution of marriage for apostasy appeared to be used as a strategy from Hasan 
Bibi (aka Nur Din) to divorce Imam Din and remarry. How personal law was 
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interpreted could dissolve or maintain legal bonds between blood relations as well. In 
Jamna Bai v. Gonda Ram (1923), Gonda Ram’s brother’s widow argued that Ram’s 
conversion to Islam separated him from the Hindu joint family—it dissolved a family 
bond that was interpreted as sacred under Hindu personal law. However, from Gonda 
Ram’s argument we can imagine an actual bond between brothers that was maintained 
despite his conversion to Islam.     
Punjab Legal Cases 
 
The Punjab administration upheld in rhetoric a principle of religious freedom. 
Upon annexation of the Punjab, its founding father Henry Lawrence issued the 
administrative order that: ‘My men are expected to extend equal rights to all native 
religions and to align with none.’ 597  The Lawrence administration publically 
proclaimed that all sects would be treated equally. Muslims, Sikhs, and Hindus would 
be allowed to practice their customs so long as they did not infringe on the rights of 
others, and communities were encouraged to appeal to the government to redress their 
grievances.598   Queen Victoria’s 1858 proclamation, which guaranteed her subjects 
security in the practice of their religion, seemed to extend this principle over all of 
British India. Mridtu Rai described the proclamation as a ‘veritable charter of 
religious freedom.’ 599  However, this principle was liable to be interpreted as 
protecting ‘orthodox’ interpretations of Hindu and Muslim personal law that restricted 
an individual’s freedom of conscience and belief (or right to convert between 
religious communities) against interpretations that embodied this principle.  
                                                
597 Quoted in Barrier, ‘The Punjab Government’, 525.   
598 Ibid., 526-527. 
599 Rai, Hindu Ruler, Muslim Subject, 82. 
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Punjab officials described processes of conversion to Islam in Indian society 
in a manner that did not blend with the principle of freedom of conscience and belief. 
Late nineteenth-century colonial ethnography described Punjabi Muslim 
agriculturalists, like the majority of Indian Muslims not of ashraf (foreign) descent, as 
descended from Hindu converts to Islam. Denzil Ibbetson described Muslim 
agriculturalists to have converted through coercion rather than choice. They converted 
during the reign of Aurengzeb (1618-1707) to escape religious persecution under 
Muslim rule and as a means to maintain their lands.600 Michael O’Dwyer interpreted 
conversion to Islam among depressed classes as voluntary but done without religious 
conviction. He wrote that: “Islam…[was] ready to admit even the lowest out-castes 
into its fold, provided they recite the kalima (confession of faith), avoid forbidden 
food (haram), and restrict themselves to what is lawful (halal).”601 He described 
movement between religions as fluctuating according to the seasons, with people 
converting to Islam during plentiful seasons and reverting back to their ‘debased 
cults’ at times of drought to avoid Islamic dietary restrictions.602  
The assumption that conversion to Islam did not occur through choice seemed 
to work within the law to criminalize intermarriage between Muslim men and Hindu 
women, punishing Muslim men. Allegations of ‘forced’ conversion to Islam often 
took the form of alleged abduction and marriage of Hindu women by Muslim men.603  
This seemed to have been implied by an Arya Samaj leader who, during the 
reclamation campaign among Malkana Muslim Rajputs in Bharatpur in 1923, spoke 
                                                
600 Ibbetson, Panjab Ethnography, 142. 
601 O’Dwyer, India as I Knew It, 61. 
602 Ibid. 
603 Mody, ‘Love and the Law’; Charu Gupta, Sexuality Obscenity, and Community: Women, Muslims, 
and the Hindu Public in Colonial India (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2001), 241. 
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against the ‘highhandedness’ of Muslims for molesting Hindu women.604 This type of 
allegation, which divided Hindu and Muslim public opinion, made the question of 
how ‘Hindus’ (i.e. native Indians) had been converted to Islam politically significant 
in the Punjab. Before his appointment to the Punjab legislative assembly, Fazli Husain 
attracted public attention as a lawyer in a criminal trial that involved the elopement of 
a Hindu woman to a Muslim man named Faujdar.605  The woman’s family alleged 
that Faujdar abducted the woman while Faujdar pleaded that she had married him 
voluntarily. The case divided prominent Hindus and Muslims in Sialkot. While 
prominent Hindus supported the woman’s family, prominent Muslims provided 
sureties for Faujdar and Husain defended him pro bono. The district magistrate in 
Sialkot ruled that Faujdar had abducted his wife and he was sentenced to three years 
imprisonment. However, Husain appealed the verdict and got Faujdar acquitted. 
Colonial law in India interpreted Islamic law as punishing apostasy from Islam 
through death. This interpretation not only conflicted with the principle of freedom of 
conscience and belief, but the manner in which it was applied by colonial courts fed 
into allegations of forced conversion to Islam through marriage. The ‘orthodox’ 
interpretation of apostasy laws in Islam was contained in Hamilton’s Hedaya, among 
other authoritative texts: death for the male apostate and imprisonment for the female 
apostate. The source for this law was a textualist interpretation of Quranic verse 
translated by Hamilton as ‘slay the man who changes his religion.’606 Colonial courts 
adapted the punishment for apostasy to Muslim personal law by recognizing apostasy 
                                                
604 Extract from the fortnightly memorandum of the internal situation in Ajmer-Merwana, 15 June 
1923, Foreign and Political Department Records, IOR R/1/1/1430. 
605 Husain, Fazl-i-Husain, 47-48.       
606 The Hedaya, or Guide; A Commentary on the Mussalman Laws, Vol. II, (tran.) Charles Hamilton 
(London: T. Bensley, 1791), 226.  
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by one or both of a married pair to invalidate their marriage immediately and without 
requiring a judicial decree.607 However, although the dissolution of marriage was 
intended as a punishment, it created an incentive for Muslim women to renounce 
Islam in order to bypass otherwise restrictive divorce laws.608 The ‘punishment’ for 
apostasy was mitigated for the wife apostate by the law recognizing her to be entitled 
to her full dower.609 The potential for this law to be used for divorce was made 
obvious to Muslims in the Punjab by Christian missionaries, who publicized the 
automatic dissolution of marriage for apostasy as a loophole in Muslim divorce 
laws.610 It fed into allegations of forced conversion to Islam through marriage because 
Hindu associations supported the law as protecting Hindu women from being 
abducted and forced into marriage by giving them an easy release from their marriage 
ties.611 
Ameer Ali interpreted the punishment for apostasy in Islam according to 
evolutionary legal theories, which meant it was amenable to progressive reform. 
According to his interpretation, the punishment for apostasy within Islamic law was 
analogous to the position taken by the Christian churches in Europe, which had 
condemned heretics to the stake. He understood the automatic dissolution of marriage 
as replacing the death penalty according to a natural progression that all religious 
                                                
607 Baillie, Moohummudan Law, 182. 
608 For an account of how apostasy from Islam was used as a means for obtaining a divorce, see: De, 
‘The Two Husbands’. 
609 Baillie, Moohummudan Law, 182.  
610 Husain, Fazl-i-Husain, 48. 
611 This view will be demonstrated in the last section of this chapter in relation to the Muslim 
Dissolution of Marriage Bill. 
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systems passed through.612 With the expansion of European people’s conscience, the 
death penalty was replaced by the forfeiture of civil rights and social ostracism. This 
interpretation seemed to imply that all societies would progress towards a norm that 
valued religious liberty, endorsed by the British administration but not recognized 
under colonial law as being contained in Islamic law. As has been discussed in 
chapter one, evolutionary legal theories made Islamic laws amenable to reform 
because they did not equate ‘orthodox’ with sacred law, but rather understood 
‘orthodox’ laws as the result of legal codification by Muslim lawyers and colonial 
scholars of a once fluid legal tradition.613    
However, colonial courts tended to uphold ‘orthodox’ interpretations against 
attempts at progressive reform.614 This was true in Imam Din v. Hasan Bibi (1905), a 
case in which Fazli Husain attempted to apply an alternative interpretation of the 
punishment for apostasy. The civil suit came about after Hasan Bibi converted from 
Islam to Christianity and understood her marriage to Imam Din as having been 
dissolved as a consequence.615  Husain argued on behalf of Imam Din for the 
restoration of his marital rights. Rather than using the standard textbooks on Islamic 
law--Hamilton’s Hedaya and Baillie’s Digest of Muhammadan Law based on the 
Fatwa-i-Alamgiri--Husain relied upon the opinions of eminent Islamic jurists from 
Samarkand and Balkh and the texts Durr-ul Mukhtar and Rudd-ul-Mukhtar. 616 
According to these sources, apostasy laws that made the life of a male apostate mobah 
                                                
612 Ali, Mahommedan Law, 429. 
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(free to be taken away) did not apply to women. Husain argued that the court should 
adopt this interpretation and not recognize the marriage of a female apostate as being 
automatically dissolved.  He asked the court to exercise ‘rational faculty to 
discriminate between the grounds urged in favour of the conflicting views’.617  
According to Husain’s argument, the Samarkand and Balkh opinions would repair the 
loophole that apostasy laws created in Muslim divorce laws. 
The court rejected Husain’s invitation to reason between conflicting views and 
upheld the ‘orthodox’ interpretation of the punishment for apostasy as a matter of 
principle. The presiding judge in the case Justice Chatterji upheld ‘divine law’ against 
amendment in his ruling: ‘Muhammadans do not admit the right of the Sovereign 
power to amend or alter that law.’618 In Chatterji’s judgment it was ‘beyond the 
province of British Courts to deduce that law by such methods from original texts and 
sources.’619 Moreover, his judgment equated ‘orthodoxy’ with correctness, and made 
it the court’s prerogative to apply ‘correct’ laws: ‘There is no allegation that [the 
Samarkand and Balkh] opinion is accepted by [Muslims] generally as the more 
orthodox and correct. On the contrary, the authority of Fatawa-i-Alamgiri the most 
important Digest of Muhammadan law of the Hanafite School prepared in India and 
promulgated under the authority of the most orthodox Muhammadan Ruler India ever 
had, is against it.’620 Chatterji’s judgment went against principles derived from 
evolutionary legal theories, which allowed for the reform of laws that had been 
interpreted as sacred. 
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In contrast to this interpretation of apostasy under Islamic law, the Lahore 
High Court did not recognize the automatic dissolution of marriage as a result of 
apostasy from Hinduism by a wife in a Hindu married pair. Jamna Devi v. Mul Raj 
(1906) was a suit brought by Mul Raj for the restoration of his conjugal rights to 
Jamna Devi, who he had married under Hindu personal law.621  Devi had separated 
from Raj after converting to Islam and Raj had applied for a decree from a lower court 
for custody of Devi as his wife. The lower court ruled against Raj and dissolved his 
marriage to Devi at its own discretion. It held that Devi was a sincere Muslim who 
would not willingly reconvert to Hinduism, while Raj was likely to coerce Devi into 
renouncing Islam and was even a threat to her life should they remain married. Upon 
appeal, however, the Lahore High Court overturned this ruling and instead ruled in 
favour of Raj. It held that the lower court’s ruling was in conflict with that of 
Government of Bombay v. Ganga (1879), which ruled in a similar suit to uphold a 
Hindu husband’s conjugal rights on the basis that Hindu marriage was indissoluble.622 
Fazli Husain was also a lawyer in this case and argued in Jamna Devi’s 
defence. He argued for the dissolution of Devi’s marriage using legal principles that 
considered Hindu and Muslim personal law as being component parts of a legal 
system. He assumed that freedom of conscience was a universal principle protected 
under colonial law, attempted to compare how Hindu and Muslim personal law 
operated in a like situation, and argued that principles from ‘conflict of laws’ (private 
international law) should be used to determine which law applied to a convert from 
Hinduism to Islam. However, the court’s ruling rejected these principles in favour of 
what it interpreted as an ‘orthodox’ interpretation of Hindu law. This interpretation 
                                                
621 Jamna Devi v. Mul Raj (1906) 9 PLR 83. 
622 Ibid., at 199, Husain is citing The Government of Bombay v. Ganga (1879) ILR, 4 Bombay 330. 
 211 
conceived of Hindu and Muslim personal law as being distinct legal systems that 
organized Hindus and Muslims into distinct societies.   
Husain argued that the dissolution of Devi’s marriage was necessary to protect 
her religious liberty. He argued that under Hindu law the effect of conversion to Islam 
was to cast Devi beyond the pale of Hinduism. According to the principles of Hindu 
law quoted by Husain, Devi’s husband lost his conjugal rights as a consequence of her 
conversion: ‘He cannot eat food cooked by her or let her touch his food or drink; he 
cannot let her join him in any religious ceremony or seat of worship, and so forth’.623 
Devi lost the rights granted to her in marriage but did not relinquish her ‘already 
existing liabilities’.624 Husain argued that Raj’s only recourse to restore his conjugal 
rights and make Devi fulfil her marital obligations was for him to force her to 
renounce Islam. This, concluded Husain, was ‘tantamount to laying it down that a 
Hindu woman has no right to freedom of conscience and can never renounce 
Hinduism, whatever her real sentiments might be’.625  
Husain attempted to apply the principles of ‘conflict of laws’ (private 
international law) to the operation of Hindu and Muslim personal laws in this case.626 
According to Raymond West and Johann Georg Buhler, litigation between a Hindu on 
the one side and a Muslim, Christian, or a Parsi on the other could result in different 
decisions according to the law governing one or the other party.627  British statute 
enabled the Supreme Court to determine suits involving Calcutta residents that related 
                                                
623 Ibid., at 200. Husain is quoting Ghose, Principles of Hindu Law, 664. 
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to inheritance and succession of lands, rent, and goods, and matters of contract 
according to Muslim law in cases involving Muslims, and Hindu law in cases 
involving Hindus. In cases where one party was Muslim and the other Hindu, the laws 
and usage of the defendant was to determine the decision.628  Husain argued that the 
conversion of Devi from Hinduism to Islam meant that she was now governed by 
Muslim law, while her husband continued to be governed by Hindu law. If decided 
according to Muslim law, Devi’s marriage to Raj would be invalidated because Islam 
prohibited the marriage of Muslim women to non-Muslim men. Husain did not 
approach Hindu and Muslim personal law as distinct systems of law. Rather, while 
arguing for the dissolution of Devi’s marriage he laid some stress on the ruling of the 
previous suit in which Hasan Bibi’s marriage was dissolved as a consequence of her 
apostasy from Islam.629  
The case was heard by Justice Johnstone and Henry Rattigan, who both ruled 
in favour of the restoration of Mul Raj’s conjugal rights. Their ruling rejected the 
principles that Husain had attempted to apply to the case. Johnstone’s ruling affirmed 
the distinctive nature of the institution of Hindu marriage: ‘the Hindu law being so 
entirely opposed to the Muhammadan in this matter.’630  According to Johnstone, 
Hindu marriage was defined by an entirely different set of rights and duties that 
formed the basis of a ‘social fabric.’ To grant a Hindu wife powers of divorce as a 
consequence of her conversion to Islam would be to fundamentally alter that fabric by 
rendering her ‘virtually independent of her husband’.631 Johnstone did not refute 
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Husain’s argument that Devi’s marriage deprived her of freedom of conscience. 
Rather, he stated that it was enough to assume that he would ‘simply keep her in some 
part of his house and try to persuade her to abjure her faith’.632 So long as he was not 
cruel, this was not ground for divorce. Johnstone acknowledged that Raj had 
expressed his intention of trying to reconvert her. Justice Rattigan’s non-dissenting 
judgment was also recorded in this matter. He noted that the degradation occasioned 
by Devi’s conversion to Islam ‘can be atoned for and the convert re-admitted to her 
status as a Hindu, if she hereafter renounces Islamism and performs the right of 
expiation of her caste.’633 Mul raj, he noted, ‘would be entitled, if he so wished, to 
desert his wife by reason of her apostasy and, under the personal law which must be 
taken to govern the case, he need do no more than allow her what is called a ‘starving 
maintenance.’634 Not only did these judges discount the principle of freedom of 
conscience and belief, but in both Hasan Bibi or Jamna Devi’s cases they did not 
consider as relevant whether their conversions were a matter of conscience or a means 
of obtaining a divorce. Chatterji’s ruling was not concerned with whether Bibi’s 
conversion from Islam to Christianity was sincere or a means of dissolving her 
marriage. Johnstone and Rattigan’s rulings were not concerned that Devi would be 
forced to renounce Islam.   
Husain attempted a second time reinterpret the punishment for apostasy in 
Islamic law in a manner that would stop its being used as a loophole for divorce.  This 
time he attempted to re-translate Arabic legal terminology, but without success. In 
Imam-ud-din v. Nur Din (1908) Husan Bibi’s former husband brought a suit against 
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her for the restoration of his conjugal rights. 635  Hasan Bibi (a.k.a. Nur Din) 
reconverted to Islam and as a consequence Imam Din appealed the previous court 
decision. In this case, Husain argued that the term ‘farruka’ used in standard texts of 
Muslim law and interpreted in colonial courts to mean ‘dissolution,’ as in the 
dissolution of marriage resulting from apostasy, should instead be interpreted as 
‘suspension.’636 He argued that in Muslim law, apostasy led to the suspension of 
marriage until reconversion. However, the court rejected this argument and upheld an 
interpretation of Islamic law in which apostasy in an Islamic state would be 
punishable by death for women as well as men. In Hasan Bibi’s case, apostasy laws 
allowed her to divorce her husband without ultimately having to renounce her faith. 
In 1921, Punjab legislative member Muhammad Amin enunciated principles 
of religious liberty in an attempt to close the loophole in Muslim divorce laws created 
through colonial courts’ interpretation of the punishment for apostasy. He moved the 
Punjab legislative council to legislate for ‘saving marriages under Muslim law from 
the effects of apostasy from Islam.’637 Amin expressed an objection to apostasy laws 
on the principle of religious liberty: ‘Every human soul has the birthright to profess 
any religion if it satisfies his enquiries and to shake off if it can be replaced with one 
better suited to his way of thinking. Freedom of thought and belief ought to be the 
first asset of every Indian and where social bondages interfere with such a change a 
suitable remedy ought to provided for lightening the severity of such bondages.’638 
However, he went only so far as to recommend the Samarkand and Balkh 
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interpretations to fix the loophole in divorce rules—rather than to legislate against 
dissolution of marriage for apostasy completely.   
Colonial law’s interpretation of punishment for apostasy in Islam was 
controversial among Muslims because it was misused, but it had particular 
significance for the Ahmadiyya because their status as Muslim was contested. 
Narantakath Avullah v. Parakkal Mammu (1921) was a revision of a North Malabar 
court’s acquittal of a Muslim Moplah woman, who had been accused of bigamy by 
her husband Narantakath.639 After Narantakath had become Ahmadi his wife sought 
the advice of a Muslim alim, who advised her that by becoming an Ahmadi her 
husband was no longer a Muslim and her marriage dissolved as a consequence. She 
remarried and Narantakath brought a criminal suit against her for bigamy. She was 
acquitted when the court determined that Ahmadis were non-Muslim based on the 
testimony of a Hanafi Sunni Muslim alim. The revision of this decision by a Bombay 
High Court, which was examined in chapter 2, was based on Justice Oldfield and 
Krishnan’s determination that Ahmadis were Muslim. However, their judgements left 
room for the possibility that the Ahmadiyya might be determined to be non-Muslim 
by the Muslim community through consensus, after sufficient time for such a 
determination had passed.640   
In some cases, the law’s failure to uphold the principle of religious liberty had 
material implications, especially in cases of conversion away from Hinduism. Certain 
provisions within statutory law were ostensibly measures to protect the principle of 
religious liberty. Under the Caste Disabilities Removal Act (XXI of 1850), any law 
that inflicted ‘personal forfeiture of rights or property or affects any right of 
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inheritance’ for religious apostasy was not to be enforced as law in colonial courts. 
The subsequent ruling Abraham v. Abraham (1863) accorded with this principle: the 
Privy Council determined that the profession of Christianity released the convert from 
‘the trammels of the Hindu Law,’ but did not necessarily involve any change of the 
rights and relations of the convert in matters that did not concern Christianity, 
including powers over property.641 The parties in the suit, Mathew Abraham and his 
brother, were native Christians whose ancestors had converted to Christianity 
generations ago but continued to form an undivided family. The Privy Council held 
that inheritance could be governed by Hindu law or any other law, while the 
coparcenary was a product of the rights and obligations attached to the Hindu 
undivided family and necessarily governed by Hindu law.642  
However, Abraham v. Abraham was not interpreted to mean that an individual 
convert from Hinduism to an ‘alien’ religion remained within the coparcenary. In 
Jamna Bai v. Gonda Ram (1923), a Lahore High Court overturned a lower court’s 
ruling that interpreted Abraham v. Abraham to mean that Gonda Ram, a Hindu 
convert to Islam, remained within the Hindu joint family.643  The court ruled that 
conversion from Hinduism ipso facto separated the convert from the Hindu joint 
family and the coparcenary property attached to it.644 In this case, Zafrullah Khan had 
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argued unsuccessfully that Gonda Ram (a.k.a. Muhammad Din) was treated as a 
member of the joint family after his conversion and assumed its rights and 
responsibilities, and was thus entitled to his share in the coparcenary. Khan’s 
argument that a Hindu convert to Islam was not ipso facto separated from the Hindu 
joint family cut against a notion that Hindu and Muslim laws and society were 
distinct.  One could be part of a family that was mixed.  
  
The Muslim Personal Law Application Act 
 
The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Bill (MPLA Bill/MPLA Act), 
introduced into the Indian legislative assembly in 1935, had implications for the kind 
of argument that Zafrullah Khan was attempting to make. The Bill sought to apply 
Muslim personal law in every instance that custom was recognized as law over 
Muslims in British India.645 This would have removed the urban and rural legal 
distinction among Muslims in the Punjab while creating a sharper distinction between 
Muslims and Hindus. The law would no longer recognize the existence of convert 
communities, whose identity as such legitimized customs among Muslims in common 
with Hindus. The change in their status from converts to fully converted would also 
undermine a sociological interpretation of conversion, as well as an interpretation of 
Islamic law underpinned by evolutionary legal theories. Supporters of measures to 
introduce the Bill described conversion to Islam not as arising through historical and 
material conditions in India, but as a conscious disavowal of Hinduism for Islam on 
the part of individual converts. A clear distinction between Hindus and Muslims in 
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personal law undermined Zafrullah Khan’s argument that an individual’s conversion 
to Islam did not separate him from the Hindu joint family, an argument intended to 
prevent the loss of property rights as a result of conversion from Hinduism to Islam. 
The MPLA Bill was introduced by H. M. Abdullah, a legislative member from 
the Punjab, and was the product of a campaign by ulama from the Punjab and the 
North West Frontier Provence who belonged to the Jamiat-i-Ulama.646   Within the 
domain of personal law, the Bill was expansive, explicitly covering ‘all questions 
regarding succession, special property of females, betrothal, marriage, divorce, 
maintenance, dower, adoption, guardianship, minority, bastardy, family relations, 
wills, legacies, gifts, partitions, any religious usages or institutions including Wakf 
(property and trust).’647 Its stated object was to improve the status a Muslim women 
under customary law, who had been deprived of rights guaranteed to them under 
Muslim personal law.648 However, the Bill had clear political implications: it was 
commonly perceived to have radical implications for altering the economic and social 
order in the Punjab, upon which the Punjab Unionist Party’s political dominance 
rested.  
When the Bill was circulated for comment, it was understood across India as 
having far-reaching implications for agriculturalists in the Punjab.649 In the Punjab, 
the provincial government opposed it as adversely affecting the economic status of 
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agriculturalist Muslims.650 In 1929, Mian Abdul Haye, an urban representative within 
the Punjab Unionist Party ranks, had proposed similar legislation in the Punjab 
legislative assembly, on similar grounds that it would improve the position of Muslim 
women.651 According to Justice Din Muhammad, this legislation had failed before 
because rural members of the Punjab legislative assembly were not prepared to 
endorse measures that would remove restrictions on alienations of land and ‘do away 
with the agnatic theory on which their whole superstructure is founded.’652 He 
commented that they feared that their estates would be divided and subdivided over 
the course of a few successions, which would weaken them economically and 
politically.  
The MPLA Bill was also circulated for comment to Muslim religious bodies 
and Muslims who represented urban interests. These comments gave expression to the 
urban and rural divide in the region, which highlighted how the dual systems of 
religious personal law and customary law translated into opposing sets of interests. 
Comments in favor of the MPLA Bill and removing the urban and rural distinction 
schematically expressed these opposing sets of interests as urban and ‘educated’ 
against rural and ‘backward.’ One member of the debt conciliation board in Jhang 
noted in his approval of the Bill: ‘Custom is backwards and the urban educated 
classes oppose it.’653 According to a deputy commissioner in Gujranwala: ‘The 
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educated Mussalmans, living in the cities, are mostly in favor of the restoration of 
Shariat.’  
The removal of this distinction through the universal application of Muslim 
personal law also gave religious sanction to Muslims who represented urban interests. 
Khan Bahadur Shaikh Fazl-i-Haq Piracha, a central legislative assembly member 
from North West Punjab, was in favor of the Bill, proclaiming that Islamic law was ‘a 
complete and competent law to lead and guide man in all aspects in life.’ According 
to Piracha, all religious heads and organizations were in favor of replacing customary 
law with Muslim personal law. Piracha was not concerned with the two main 
objections to the Bill, that it would lead to land fragmentation and the neutralization 
of the Land Alienation Act. Rather he commented that the ‘remedy [for 
agriculturalists’ problems] lies in industrializing the country and teaching the 
agriculturalists industries subsidiary to agriculture.’654  
The Ahmadi legislative member Pir Akbar Ali also commented on the MPLA 
Bill and reflected agriculturalists’ interests. Ali was concerned with the Bill’s impact 
on agricultural estates, particularly on how it would contribute to Muslim 
indebtedness and problems germane to the smaller holdings in central Punjab. 
According to Ali, the immediate consequence of the MPLA Bill was that the 
‘facilities and certain rights now allowed to agriculturalists will be taken away.’655 His 
comments in this regard were detailed. The Bill would mean the practical repeal of 
the Punjab Alienation of Land Act of 1900 and the Punjab Debtor’s Protection Act of 
1936. It would mean a radical alternation in the manner in which property was 
conceived under customary law: the removal of the distinction between moveable and 
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immovable property, between ancestral and self-acquired property. Without these 
property distinctions, agricultural lands would not be regulated any differently than 
other forms of property. For Muslims only, there would no longer be any right of 
representation, which allowed the grandson, or son of deceased son, to succeed to 
ancestral property. The concept of life estate would be replaced by absolute 
ownership, meaning that agricultural lands would be used to pay debt and funeral 
expenses, leaving only a residue to be distributed among heirs. It would also mean 
some fundamental changes in the collective nature of property laws in the Punjab, an 
end to the prevailing custom where the son lived with the father and contributed to his 
father’s estate. Muslim law instead recognized even a minor son as having separate 
property, over which his father acted as a guardian during his minority.  
  Like Fazli Husain, who attempted to apply private international law to regulate 
relations between Hindus and Muslims, Pir Akbar Ali was also concerned with how 
Muslim personal law operated in interaction with other laws in a plural legal system. 
Ali viewed Muslim personal law as a distinct system of law, but in interaction with 
other laws. He emphasized the manner in which Islamic institutions functioned in 
India rather than the religious compulsion of Muslims to be governed by Islamic 
institutions. According to Ali, shari’a was harmonious and socially beneficial when 
practiced in its entirety. When introduced in parts, as the MPLA Bill proposed to do 
by introducing Muslim personal law over a minority population, it acted as ‘an engine 
of oppression and inequality, a hybrid product partaking the good properties neither of 
secular law now obtained nor of the religious one anticipated.’ To illustrate this point, 
Ali used differing concepts of debt in British Indian law and Muslim law. In Muslim 
jurisprudence debt was conceived to be principal without interest, contrary to how it 
was applied in British Indian law. The just conclusion of applying shari’a, which 
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would undo legal interventions and debt protection, would have to be that Muslim 
debtors would only be liable to pay back principal. Ali’s opinion reflected the 
Mainian principles that justified the application of customary law against rapid legal 
modernization and social reform in the first place. From those principles, Muslim law 
was evolutionarily more progressive than custom. However, it could bring about 
greater backwardness than customary law when introduced into an unsuitable 
environment. Ali’s views on interest were similar to those of Zafrullah Khan—while 
Ali was concerned with how Islam’s prohibition on interest operated in the Punjab, 
Khan was concerned with how it operated within a global economy.656  
The MPLA Bill would have redrawn the legal boundaries between Hindus and 
Muslims by no longer recognizing ‘convert’ communities within the Muslim 
community.657 In addition to agriculturalist tribes in the Punjab, the application of 
Muslim personal law would have altered the customary law of Khojas and Cutchi 
Memons. These communities were all conceptualized within the law to be converted 
to Islam from Hinduism. One opinion gathered from Bombay described the Memons 
of Gujarat and the Khojas and Sunni Bohras of Bombay in these terms: 
In Hindu law, joint family system is recognized and a son as soon as he is born 
acquires rights equal to that of his father in the ancestral property of his father, 
but this rule does not apply to converts to Islam. Again the theory of joint 
family business is not applied to them, and the relations between members of 
Muslim family are governed by the Indian Contract Act and the Indian 
Partnership Act as in Mahomedan law itself there is no provision as such. 
Though the Hindu law of inheritance and succession is applied to them, the 
doctrine of survivorship is not applied to them.658 
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The recognition of customary law among Muslims gave these communities a fixed 
status as ‘converts to Islam’ as distinguishable from Muslims in personal law. This 
status positioned these communities between Hindus and Muslims within the 
imagined social order in India. Their removal projected a more distinct boundary 
between Hindus and Muslims, which conformed better to notions of Hindus and 
Muslims forming distinct societies. 
The MPLA Bill also had implications for how Islamic law was interpreted 
because the construction of minority Muslim community boundaries and their 
continued practice of ‘Hindu’ customs supported evolutionary legal theories. A 
Bombay district judge opinion on the Bill reflected this interpretation: 
Urf’ of custom is one of the principle sources on which Moslem lawyers have 
based the development of their law. The law so obtained would be likely to be 
best adapted to the varying classes of people who embrace Islam…Thus even 
in the Personal Law (Shariat) as prevailing today we do find a considerable 
element of custom.659 
The universal application of Muslim personal law in place of custom suggested that 
conversion from Hinduism to Islam was not a slow process, arising out of the material 
conditions from which conversion occurred. Rather, it suggested that conversion was 
a flip between Hinduism and Islam. Thus Zafar Ali Khan, in support of the 
legislation, described conversion from Hinduism to Islam within his family as a sharp 
break from Hinduism. He described his great-great-great grandfather as a ‘kafir’, an 
infidel: ‘when Islam came into our family we became the strictest of Muslims.’660  
The creation of a distinct boundary between Hindus and Muslims altered the 
potential for conversion without civil disabilities in India. Zafrullah Khan 
demonstrated this potential in Jamna Bai v. Gonda Ram (1923), in which he argued 
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that a Hindu convert to Islam who continued to live and be treated as a member of the 
Hindu joint family after his conversion should not be legally separated from it.661 His 
argument was based on a misreading of the term ‘convert’ in Abraham v. Abraham—
what was used to describe a family’s conversion generations ago was taken to mean 
an individual’s conversion within the present. Khan’s misreading of ‘convert’, as well 
as the lower court’s decision that this case was appealing, potentially allowed 
conversion to Islam to occur among Hindu individuals without the potential loss of 
property rights or legally altering the family relations of the convert.  
Farzand Ali, an Ahmadi missionary who had been stationed in London 
previously, commented on the MPLA Bill on behalf of the community.  The 
Ahmadiyya’s opinion on the application of the MPLA Bill seems to have been a 
pragmatic position for Ahmadi missionaries because it preserved recognition of the 
status of ‘convert’ within personal law while not opposing the application of Muslim 
law. Rather than the immediate application of Muslim personal law in place of 
customary law, Farzand Ali recommended that individual Muslims should be given 
the right to decide whether legacies left by them, including agricultural lands, be 
disposed of according to Muslim personal law. Should they opt for Muslim law, their 
minor children and descendants would have no choice but to follow Muslim law.662 
His position blurred the sharp distinction between Hindu and Muslim personal law 
that Zafar Ali Khan’s notion of conversion implied. 
The MPLA Act also had the potential to alter the position of privileged 
Muslim landowners not belonging to ‘convert’ communities and Shia landowners. 
The MPLA Act ultimately left vague what constituted shari’a law and ignored legal 
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differences that existed within the Sunni tradition between the schools of law, or the 
more substantial differences that existed between the Shia and Sunni legal 
traditions.663 Rather, it presented Muslim law as an uncomplicated, religious code of 
law and ‘project[ed] an image of communal solidarity’ onto Muslims in India.664 
Muhammad Yamin Khan, a Muslim representative from Agra whose constituency 
included wealthy landlords with taluqdari tenures, was concerned about the 
repercussions of a vaguely defined Muslim personal law leading to the loss of 
privileged land rights.665 Muhammad Yamin Khan’s interpretation of shari’a was that 
it did not allow any restrictions to the free transfer property, that it was entirely 
inimical to the spirit of pre-emption: ‘Muslim law presumes that every Muslim is a 
sensible man and he must have a free hand to transfer or to dispose of his property in 
any way he thinks proper.’666 He was concerned that the MPLA Act would affect the 
Agra Zamindari Act, an Act not particular to Muslims that was intended to protect a 
class of landowners in Agra by allowing them to keep their estates undivided. In a 
similar vein, he was concerned that the MPLA Act would do away with private waqks 
what allowed landowners to keep their estates undivided and restricted the alienation 
of land.  
The MPLA Bill ignored differences within Islamic law between Sunnis and 
Shias. Muhammad Yamin Khan drew attention to this difference in relation to the 
inheritance rights of a daughter without siblings: the daughter was entitled to inherit 
one-half of an estate under Sunni law and an entire estate under Shia law. Muhammad 
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Yamin Khan objected to the use of the term ‘shari’a’ in place of Muslim personal law 
in the Bill because he interpreted shari’a to imply one law, while he took Muslim 
personal law to imply different laws according to different schools within the Sunni 
and Shia traditions. Muhammad Kazmi (Ahrar, United Provinces) dismissed Khan’s 
concern and his response suggested that shari’a could indeed be interpreted to create 
one legal code: ‘Whatever he says has to be accepted…If by Shariat he means one 
law, he must remember that all Muslims who say they are following Shariat are the 
believers in one Koran and are the believers in one prophet and one God and therefore 
one Shariat for Muslims means one Shariat.’  
The MPLA Bill had the potential to fundamentally alter the legal structure 
upon which the Unionist party’s political dominance rested. However, it was passed 
through the legislature in a form that maintained the principle of a unified Muslim 
community without upsetting this structure that depended upon a distinction between 
rural and urban Muslims in personal law. Because the Government of India Act 
devolved any legislation that affected agricultural lands to provincial governments, 
the Bill was amended to exclude agricultural lands from its scope. The exclusion of 
agricultural lands in the Punjab from Muslim personal law avoided the potential for 
vast economic and political change in the province. The ideology behind the Bill was 
also appropriated by Muhammad Jinnah, who threw his support behind it after the 
1937 elections. Jinnah described shari’a not as a common law, but as various legal 
interpretations stemming from a common source. During the assembly debate over the 
MPLA Bill, he responded to Muhammad Yamin Khan’s concern that shari’a implied 
one law by emphasizing that ‘interpretation [was] the fountain head of Shariat’. This 
left a large gap between the interpretation of Muhammad Kazmi, who suggested that 
these sources led to one interpretation, and that of Jinnah. 
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The Muslim Dissolution of Marriage Act 
 
Shortly after the MPLA Bill was introduced, another Bill to reform divorce 
under Muslim personal law was introduced into the Indian legislative assembly by 
Muhammad Kazmi. The stated objective of this Bill, the Muslim Dissolution of 
Marriage (MDM) Bill, was to apply Hanafi and Malaki schools of law to divorce 
cases in such a way as to provide Muslim women with the widest grounds for divorce 
allowed under Muslim law. It also included a clause that apostasy from Islam was not 
in itself grounds for the automatic dissolution of marriage. 667 This clause was 
intended to remove the loophole in divorce laws created by means of apostasy, as its 
inclusion within the MDM Bill suggests. The MDM Bill passed without altering the 
ideologies that underpinned the automatic dissolution of marriage for apostasy, 
according to which Muslim and Hindu societies were fundamentally different and 
Islam condoned conversion by force. However, when commenting on the Bill as a 
government official, Zafrullah Khan appropriated its ideological intents by asserting 
that there was no punishment for apostasy. Rather, Islam valued freedom of 
conscience and belief.   
The movers of the MDM Bill did not necessarily share Zafrullah Khan’s 
interpretation of Islamic law.  Muhammad Kazmi was himself elected to the 
legislative assembly as a member of Ahrar, a party associated with campaigning 
against the ‘false doctrines’ of the Ahmadiyya. The Bill was presented as ‘orthodox’ 
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and endorsed by ulama through a fatwa.668 It also stipulated that all Muslim divorce 
cases be heard before Muslim judges, as non-Muslims more likely to misapply 
Islamic law. However, like the MPLA Bill, the Bill as introduced by Kazmi was 
significantly altered during its passage through the legislature. The government 
objected to the Bill’s apparently sectarian and communitarian nature—sectarian 
because it explicitly made reference to the Hanafi and Malaki schools of law and 
communitarian because it assumed that only Muslim jurists were competent to 
interpret Muslim law.669 These provisions were ultimately removed, leaving only the 
grounds for divorce listed within the Act without reference to the schools from which 
they derived or the necessity of their being applied by Muslim judges. 
The MDM Bill was passed so that apostasy was no longer grounds for the 
automatic dissolution of marriage, but with an important caveat added: in cases in 
which the female apostate was returning to her original faith, apostasy still operated to 
automatically dissolve her marriage. This caveat was the result of intense opposition 
to the clause relating to apostasy from Hindu members of the legislative assembly, 
who argued that it would adversely affect Hindus and allow forcible conversion to 
Islam to take place. Bhai Parma Nand, a Hindu member of the Select Committee for 
the Bill, objected to the Bill on account of the ‘fear prevailing in the minds of Hindus’ 
that it would adversely affect them.670 Nand quoted from the opinion of the Rajputana 
Provincial Hindu Sabha that the Bill opposed the principles of Hindu law. According 
to the Sabha, it also prevented Hindu women ‘who have been converted to another 
faith’ from returning to the Hindu fold: Hindu widows, wives, and virgins were 
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enticed away from Hinduism by Muslims and married to Muslims immediately after 
conversion. The Bill would prevent Hindu women from releasing themselves from 
‘the clutches of Muslims’.671  
Babu Baijnath Bajoria, a commerce member from the Marwari Association, 
stated as fact that rape, seduction, and abduction were ‘of common day occurrence’ in 
the Bengal and most of the culprits were Muslim and the victims Hindu.672 Bajoria 
cited recent court decisions in the Bengal to the affect that conversion to Islam of a 
Hindu wife automatically dissolved her marriage to a Hindu man—so, departing from 
the precedent laid down by The Government of India v. Ganga (1879). Bajoria took 
this to mean that a Hindu wife could be abducted, forced to convert to Islam and 
marry her abductor and the institution of Hindu marriage could do nothing to keep her 
within the fold. The Bill meant the breakdown of Hindu society according to him: 
Bajoria read a letter from the Secretary of the Sanatan Dharan Sabha of Philibhit that 
the Bill if passed would ‘interfere with the established laws of Hindu society and 
Hindu religion’ and would ‘inject the poison of communal animosities into the body 
politic of the Indian nation.’  
Hindu legislative members interpreted the MDM Bill as interacting with 
Hindu personal law, while describing Islam and Hinduism as being so fundamentally 
opposing as to make intermarriage impossible. Bhagavan Deshmukh opposed the Bill 
and described marriage between a Hindu and a Muslim as unworkable as the marriage 
in which ‘one is an idol breaker and one is an idol worshipper.’673 At the same time, 
he described his own Bill, the Hindu Women’s Right to Property (HWRP) Bill as 
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relevant to marriage between Hindu women and Muslim men. The Bill sought to 
abolish limited or lifetime estates for women and give them absolute ownership rights 
over property, including property through inheritance, partitions, settlements and 
gifts. This would have preserved the Hindu joint family, but reformed it to include 
women. When Bajoria commented that the MDM Bill would allow Muslim men to 
forcibly convert Hindu women, Deshmukh replied that it was for this reason 
necessary to support the HWRP Bill. 674 It may be that Deshmukh understood that by 
vesting ownership rights with Hindu women and joining them equally to men within 
the coparcenary, conversion to Islam would have operated as a civil disability for 
women as it did for Hindu men who converted to Islam. The potential loss of property 
rights as a consequence of being separated from the coparcenary would have been a 
disincentive to ‘forced’ conversions that occurred in the form of elopements and love-
marriages between Hindu women and Muslim men. 
This objection to intermarriage between Hindus and Muslims was also 
expressed by Muslim legislative assembly member M. Asif Ali (Congress, Delhi). 
Based on his interpretation of nas (the Quran and hadith), he held that Islamic law 
forbade intermarriage between Hindus and Muslims as it forbade marriage to 
‘idolatresses’ and ‘fire-worshippers.’675 He interpreted the law of apostasy in Islam as 
the consequence of the incompatibility of marriage between Hindus and Muslims, the 
outcome of ‘the structure of Hindu society and law [being] completely different.’  
Principles from private international law might also have worked to dissolve 
marriages between Hindu women and Muslim men without maintaining the 
justification for automatic dissolution of marriage as being the punishment for 
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apostasy. Ghulam Bhik Nairang, a Muslim member from the Punjab who helped draft 
the Bill, commented during its debate that forcible conversion to Islam was against 
the Quranic precept: ‘There shall be no compulsion in the matter of religion’. 
However, Nairang interpreted Islamic law commanding Muslim men to marry women 
of the book (revealed religions) as excluding marriage to Hindus—so under Islamic 
law, if a woman reconverted to Hinduism her marriage was invalid on account of this 
commandment anyway. 676  Ultimately, the MDM Act’s proviso that a female 
apostate’s conversion to her original faith automatically dissolved her marriage 
maintained the inference that the automatic dissolution of marriage was a safeguard 
for Hindu women against forced conversion.  
Opponents to the MDM Bill who argued that it allowed Muslim men to 
forcibly convert Hindu women did not espouse freedom of conscience and belief as a 
universal principle that should be protected under the law. They did not address the 
underlying principle behind the automatic dissolution of marriage for apostasy: that 
conversion away from Islam was tantamount to treason and merited the death penalty. 
Legislative member Muhammad Nauman’s comments within the debates were an 
exception.677 Nauman argued that Islam gave full liberty to women to change their 
religion if a woman thought that some other religion appealed to her mind and 
conscience. Naumann did not see the sense in compelling her to continue to follow 
her parents’ faith and contrary to her liberty. Thus he returned back to the justification 
for dissolution of marriage, punishment of apostasy, and questioned its legitimacy.     
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In a similar vein, Zafrullah Khan spoke in the legislative assembly on the 
punishment for apostasy in a manner that accorded with freedom of conscience and 
belief with Islamic law.678 Khan was the Muslim member of the Viceroy’s Council 
when the Muslim Dissolution of Marriage Act passed. In a speech that was 
commented upon by one legislative members for its religious fervour, Khan set about 
reinterpreting apostasy in Islamic law by first redefining Islam as a religion of inner 
conviction rather than social or political belonging: ‘faith is a matter of the heart.’ In 
that way he also dehistoricized Islamic law and removed it from the schema whereby 
‘orthodox’ law was defined by it being prior to later innovations—with implications 
for the law of apostasy as ‘orthodox’ law. Conversion from Islam [and thus to Islam 
from Hinduism) was not a matter of leaving one society to join another, but believing 
one faith to be true over another. According to Khan’s interpretation the Quran, any 
punishment for apostasy was a violation of the Islamic precept that there was no 
compulsion in Islam—using the same quote that Nairang had used in response to 
comments that Hindu women would be forcibly converted to Islam from Hinduism.679   
While British Indian law had not distinguished between sincere and insincere 
conversion from Islam for automatic dissolution of marriage, the sincerity of 
conversion was of primary importance in Khan’s argument that there was no 
punishment for apostasy in Islam. Khan quoted Quranic verse to argue that hypocrisy 
(munafikin) in Islam was morally worse than honest disbelief. According to the 
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Quran, ‘hypocrites shall be consigned to the nether most regions of fire.’680 To 
illustrate how the law of apostasy did not conform to the spirit of Islam in this regard, 
Khan described the conversion to Christianity of a Muslim woman married to a 
Muslim man. This conversion was based on the woman’s belief that Christianity was 
the truth. The husband wished to remain married despite the woman’s conversion, and 
in the spirit of Islam he would accept his wife’s conversion rather than compel her to 
live as a hypocrite. She also wished to remain married and to keep their family intact. 
However, the law would operate to either dissolve their marriage as a consequence of 
her conversion or compel her to live as a hypocrite. This was against their wishes and 
the spirit of Islam. Moreover, the form of divorce that automatic dissolution of 
marriage took was a hardship compared to Muslim divorce laws. The couple would be 
denied the option of a slow divorce allowed under shari’a, which required three 
declarations of divorce be made one month apart—complete and final divorce khula 
permitted in cases where continuing to live together would be intolerable.  
In the context of the legislative debates on the automatic dissolution of 
marriage, Khan’s interpretation of Islamic law as being in accord with freedom of 
conscience and religion cut two ways. It cut against the notion that Islam allowed the 
forcible conversion of Hindus, which criminalized intermarriage between Hindus and 
Muslims and stoked up Hindu fears against reforming the Muslim law of apostasy. It 
also cut against an interpretation of Islamic law in which apostasy from Islam was 
punishable by death. In British India, this punishment translated into the automatic 
dissolution of an apostate’s marriage. For Ahmadis, the sanctioning of this law within 
colonial courts meant the potential loss of civil rights for Ahmadis in British India 
should Ahmadis be defined as non-Muslim. As Zafrullah Khan had experienced when 
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an Ahmadi missionary was executed in Afghanistan, colonial courts that maintained 
this interpretation of Islamic law also placed Islamic states outside the domain of an 
emerging universal human rights scheme.681  
 
Summary 
 
Colonial courts interpreted the punishment for apostasy from Islam as the 
death penalty and translated it into the automatic dissolution of an apostate’s marriage 
under Muslim personal law, which provided a loophole for Muslim women to divorce 
their husbands within otherwise restrictive divorce laws. On the other hand, the 
Lahore high court interpreted a Hindu wife’s conversion to Islam as infringing upon 
her husband’s conjugal rights and upheld the sanctity of Hindu marriage against 
dissolution. In a series of cases involving conversion and apostasy, Fazli Husain 
attempted to interpret Hindu and Muslim personal law in a manner that would have 
allowed equal movement between religious communities.  He did so by using 
precedents from an alternative tradition within Islamic law that did not prescribe the 
death penalty for female apostates, thus preventing Muslim wives from using the 
‘punishment’ to dissolve their marriages. He then argued that the non-dissolution of 
marriage for a Hindu wife’s apostasy infringed upon her right to religious freedom. 
His arguments were concerned with ‘international law’, or the law between 
communities. The rulings in these cases, however, reasserted ‘orthodox’ 
interpretations of both Hindu and Islamic law, including the punishment for apostasy, 
and dismissed the right to religious freedom. These rulings were concerned with the 
law within communities.  
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Legislation, which was introduced by Muslim politicians in the central 
legislature during the 1930s, further undermined the principles that Husain derived 
from international law. The Muslim Personal Law Application Bill attempted to 
replace customary law with Muslim personal law in every instance it was practiced by 
Muslims. Underpinning this legislation was a conception of Hindus and Muslims as 
forming distinct societies with distinct systems of law. Muslim villagers would no 
longer be understood of as having ancestral land rights in common with Hindu 
villagers. Their identity as Hindu converts to Islam would not be recognized under 
personal law, in which customary law had implied gradual conversion of communities 
over generations rather than an individual’s conversion out of conviction. It also 
undermined economic and political policies in the Punjab that were based on the 
urban and rural distinction, a structure of political representation that decentralized 
political influence in the Punjab and encouraged political representation of socio-
economic interests. This legislation was thus was conducive to the style of politics 
adopted by urban Muslims and ulama in the Punjab.  
The Ahmadi lawyer Zafrullah Khan occupied the Muslim seat in the Viceroy’s 
Executive Council when the Muslim Dissolution of Marriage Bill was passing 
through the Indian legislature. The Bill attempted to mend the loophole in divorce 
laws created by the automatic dissolution of marriage for apostasy from Islam by 
using the same strategy that had been employed by Fazli Husain in court—asserting 
an alternative precedent from within the Islamic tradition. This legislation was firmly 
opposed by Hindu politicians because it was understood to infringe on Hindu law, and 
facilitate ‘forced’ conversion of Hindu women to Islam through marriage. The Act 
that passed was a compromise that allowed for automatic dissolution of marriage for 
female apostates who were converting back to their original religion. While the Bill 
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achieved its purpose, it preserved an interpretation of Islamic law that prescribed the 
death penalty for apostasy and reinforced a separation between Hindus and Muslims. 
Zafrullah Khan, speaking on behalf of the India government as an appointed official, 
supported the measure to reform apostasy laws. However, he argued that there was no 
punishment for apostasy from Islam, an interpretation derived from his own study of 
the Quran and the traditions of the Prophet rather than from the Islamic legal tradition.    
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Conclusion 
 
Whether or not the principle of freedom of conscience and belief, including 
the right to convert between religions, was legitimate to Punjabi Muslims seemed to 
have depended upon their position within the colonial legal order. It had legitimacy 
among a class of socially mobile, ‘lower-caste’ Muslims, for whom it maintained a 
legal order with porous social boundaries. It seemed to lack legitimacy among 
Muslims whose economic and social position benefited from a legal order that 
imposed a clear jurisdictional boundary between Muslims and non-Muslims, which 
necessarily restricted religious conversion. This was the position of urban Punjabi 
Muslims, who recognized the legitimacy of the ulama to distinguish Muslims from 
non-Muslims in terms of religious belief. As a missionizing movement and a Muslim 
sect, the Ahmadiyya depended for its existence on a legal order that did not make this 
distinction legitimate. Their promotion of the right to freedom of conscience and 
belief reflected their unique position as a Muslim sect within the colonial legal order, 
but also had broader appeal to the classes from whom the Ahmadiyya was itself 
drawn.  
Evolutionary legal theories shaped a legal order in the Punjab according to a 
common set of principles, which contributed to the rise of a class of Punjabi Muslims 
who recognized the legitimacy of colonial law. This legal order was based on a 
fundamental legal distinction between landowning ‘agriculturalist’ tribes and non-
agriculturalist Punjabis, which intersected religious categories within personal law 
and defined the land right of ‘agriculturalist’ Muslims according to codified 
customary law in common with Hindu and Sikh ‘agriculturalists’. This distinction was 
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the basis for land laws designed to stabilize the economic and social position of rural 
landowners, the majority of whom were Muslim, against indebtedness and land 
dispossession. While these legal interventions suggested that colonial land laws and 
an interaction between personal laws were detrimental to Muslim landowners, the 
colonial administration ascribed cultural reasons (e.g. reticence to pursue secular 
education) for the economic backwardness of Muslims compared to other groups. 
Colonial policies encouraged upward social mobility among rural Muslims through 
secular education, professional employment (including in law), military service, and 
land colonization, which also integrated rural Muslims into the colonial legal order. A 
structure of political representation in the Punjab allowed rural Muslim leaders to 
represent their grievances to the colonial administration through formal channels, and 
directed them towards representing caste-based, social and economic interests. 
Evolutionary theories made available to them an interpretation of Islamic law that was 
based on enlightenment principles, which gave legitimacy to their efforts to reform 
Islamic law as it had been codified by the British a century earlier. Their status as 
lower-caste Muslims encouraged them to focus legal reform towards redressing 
inequalities created through the interaction of legal systems in India.  
More than just recognizing the legitimacy of colonial law in India, Punjabi 
Muslim leaders acted to protect their class interests by evoking the duty of the British 
government to support their ‘just claims’: claims that were based on principles that 
legitimized colonial rule. According to principles of international law articulated by 
the Punjab administration, Indian communities retained rights over their internal laws 
and administrations (in the case of princely states) or customs (in the case of Punjab 
agriculturalist tribes), while transferring foreign relations and the right to wage war to 
the politically supreme British government. These principles inferred that India would 
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evolve to a position of political equality with Britain as inequalities between caste and 
religious communities within India levelled out through progressive legal reform 
facilitated by the British government. Punjabi Muslim politicians adopted the positive 
inferences that these principles inflected upon a political system that distributed 
political rights unequally among groups, advocating measures such as separate 
electorates for Muslims and other minorities as redressing institutionalized 
inequalities that favoured upper-caste Hindus. They understood themselves as ‘acting 
through’ the paramount powers of the British administration, lobbying British 
officials to intervene in the administrations of Kashmir and Alwar to raise the position 
of Muslim agriculturalists there to a level on par with that of agriculturalists in the 
Punjab through constitutional means.  
The Ahmadiyya emerged from within this legal order and appealed to the class 
interests of ‘agriculturalist’ Muslims and other upwardly mobile classes. Leaders 
within the Ahmadiyya, including Ahmadi founder Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, came from 
a class of Muslim landowners whose status and wealth deteriorated as a result of 
British laws and administration.  Along with ‘pro-agriculturalist’ Muslim leaders, they 
advocated secular education and competition among Muslims for positions within the 
civil service and professional fields. The Ahmadiyya was incorporated into the 
structure of political representation in the Punjab, and represented social and 
economic interests of rural Punjabis to the British government. After the expansion of 
representative government, Ahmadi legislative assembly members were included in 
the pro-agriculturalist, Unionist party. Pir Akbar Ali and Zafrullah Khan interpreted 
Islamic law in terms of economic rules and as existing in interaction with other laws 
in a plural legal system, arguing that Islam’s rules on debt and interest were socially 
healthy within the context of an Islamic legal system but worked to the detriment of 
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Muslims within a plural legal system. Like other Punjabi Muslim leaders, the 
Ahmadiyya advocated a decentralized, political structure in India and separate 
electorates for Muslims. They also acted through the paramount power of the British 
government, most prominently in Kashmir in the 1930s, by evoking the duty of the 
British government to intervene in princely states towards setting the just claims of 
Muslims for economic and social rights.  
The Ahmadiyya adhered to doctrines that were conducive to upward social 
mobility among ‘agriculturalist’ Punjabi Muslims and movement across jurisdictional 
boundaries. The Ahmadiyya’s identification as a Muslim sect under colonial law 
allowed their movement across jurisdictional boundaries within personal law. Muslim 
sects were defined in terms of the dissent from ‘orthodox’ Sunni belief rather than 
their divergence from Muslim personal law (i.e. Muslim rules of inheritance and 
marriage). This meant that, despite organizing as a community, the Ahmadiyya were 
not recognized as such under personal law in India. Muslims who joined the 
Ahmadiyya did so without altering their social relations according to the law, and the 
Ahmadiyya spread across caste boundaries that might have otherwise restricted such 
movement. While their treatment in the law as no different from Sunni Muslims gave 
the Ahmadiyya mobility, it also meant that the only means available for Sunni 
Muslims to legally separate from Ahmadi relations was through arguing that Ahmadis 
were not Muslim (which would lead to the loss of civil rights attached to their 
religious status). As early as 1905, a colonial lawyer argued in a civil suit that 
Ahmadis were apostates because they believed that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was a 
prophet, the same grounds upon which their identity as non-Muslim would be based 
in Pakistan.  
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Ahmadiyya doctrines facilitated their movement across international 
jurisdictional boundaries. These doctrines commanded obedience to temporal laws 
and replaced the rules for waging war against non-Muslims in Islamic law (jihad), 
with a duty to spread Islam through argument. Ahmadi missionaries resolved conflicts 
between Islamic law and the territorial laws under which they operated through 
principles of private international law. The Ahmadiyya’s adaptation of international 
law seemed to reflect the prominence of Punjabi lawyers within the movement, as 
well as their training in legal theories that prevailed in the Punjab. In 1921, a Lahore 
High Court ruled that Ahmadi doctrines derived from legitimate interpretations of 
Islamic law and the use of reason (ijtihad), which allowed for the adaptation of 
Islamic doctrines to the presence of Muslims in Europe. This interpretation of the 
Ahmadiyya may have reflected the argument of Zafrullah Khan, an Ahmadi lawyer 
arguing that Ahmadis were Muslim in the case. It may have reflected a common 
theoretical strand for interpreting Islamic doctrines shared by certain judicial 
administrators and Muslims. 
The Ahmadiyya interpreted international law as not only legitimate but in 
accordance with Islam. In the 1920s, the Ahmadiyya head interpreted the 
establishment the League of Nations as in accordance with Quranic guidance for the 
resolution of disputes between Muslim nations, and he argued that international law 
must be based on Islamic morality to function justly. In 1924, when the Afghan 
government condoned the killing of Ahmadis for apostasy under the decree of Muslim 
scholars (ulama), the Ahmadiyya appealed to the League of Nations and European 
governments to intervene on behalf of Afghan Ahmadis. The Ahmadiyya, as well as 
British advocates of human rights, included Muslim countries and colonial subjects 
within an emerging universal human rights scheme that included the right to freedom 
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of conscience and belief. The Ahmadiyya did not acknowledge any conflict between 
the cultural values embodied in universal human rights and Islamic cultural values.   
In contrast to an interpretation of Islamic law based on evolutionary legal 
theories and compatible with international law, Baillie’s digest of Islamic law 
imagined there to be an impermeable jurisdictional boundary between Muslims and 
non-Muslims: Muslims who moved across this boundary became apostates from 
Islam and ceased to be governed by Islamic law. The Lahore High Court judgments 
examined in this thesis interpreted Hindus and Muslims in India as distinct societies 
with separate legal systems, and their judgments emphasized the law within 
communities rather than the law between communities. These judgments had the 
effect of restricting movement between communities (i.e. restricting religious 
conversion and interreligious marriages) by not recognizing principles of private 
international law and not validating the principle of freedom of conscience and belief 
within Hindu and Muslim personal laws. Colonial law ‘punished’ apostasy from Islam 
with the automatic dissolution of an apostate’s marriage, which worked in a 
roundabout way to maintain a social separation between Hindus and Muslims. This 
was in part because it was a translation into Muslim personal law of the death penalty 
for apostasy from Islam under Islamic law, which preserved an ideology that Islam 
compelled adherence to the Islamic religion by force. In India, this ideology fed into 
popular notions that ‘indigenous’ Muslims (Muslims that were identified with lower-
caste Hindus, like ‘agriculturalist’ Muslims) had been converted by force to Islam 
under Muslim political powers, and that Hindu women were being forcibly converted 
to Islam through abduction and forced marriage to Muslim men. Moreover, despite 
colonial laws to the contrary, punishments for apostasy in both Hindu and Muslim 
personal law potentially led to the loss of property rights. In the Punjab and 
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neighboring princely states, the greatest potential for loss of property seemed to been 
a result of separation from the Hindu joint family as a result of conversion to Islam.    
This logic within colonial law, which asserted the internal law of religious 
communities over principles of international law and the ‘universal’ right to freedom 
of conscience and belief, had particular implications for the Ahmadiyya because their 
status as Muslim was contested. During the 1930s, this logic gave legitimacy to 
Muhammad Iqbal’s demand that the British government must define the Ahmadiyya 
as non-Muslim in accordance with the sentiments of Muslims. Muslims’ belief that 
Muhammad was the last prophet distinguished them from pre-Islamic religious 
communities, and clearly marked the Ahmadiyya as non-Muslim. The Ahmadiyya’s 
inclusion within the Muslim community weakened it from within. Underpinning 
Iqbal’s argument was a conception of Muslims as being culturally distinct from non-
Muslims and of dogmatic belief as being a cohesive agent among Muslims. These 
principles—of difference between religious communities and unity within them--were 
common to an all-India structure of political representation, in which Muslim 
politicians were compelled to represent the common interests of Muslims in India 
despite differences in their economic and social positions. What is more, Iqbal’s 
argument for the exclusion of the Ahmadiyya from the Muslim community mirrored 
theoretical strands of thought within the European legal tradition, which led to a 
nationalistic challenge to international law. 
The functioning of Iqbal’s argument as a legal construct also has social 
implications that were opposed to the interests represented by the Punjab Unionist 
party. Iqbal did not interpret religion as existing within a social structure organized by 
caste, but rather interpreted social structures as emanated from religious beliefs. Not 
only did Iqbal’s interpretation of religion upset the conceptual foundations up which 
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the Unionist party was organized, it also delegitimized the form of political activism 
adopted by Punjabi Muslim leaders in Kashmir and Alwar. Urban Muslim politicians 
in the Punjab and Deobandi ulama joined together and campaigned against the 
Ahmadiyya during legislative assembly elections in the province.  Their campaign 
against the Ahmadiyya asserted the authority of the ulama over that of the British 
government to determine correct belief in Islam and membership within the Muslim 
community.  It was based on Muslim political representation of religious issues 
particular to Muslims, rather than economic and social issues linked to caste. It was 
rhetorically anti-British, undermining the Punjabi Muslims who appealed to British 
paramountcy.  
Legislation, which was introduced by Muslim politicians in the central 
legislature during the 1930s, also conformed to this set of ‘nationalistic’ and 
‘orthodox’ principles. The Muslim Personal Law Application (MPLA) Bill attempted 
to replace customary law with Muslim personal law in every instance it was practiced 
by Muslims. Underpinning this legislation was a conception of Hindus and Muslims 
as forming distinct societies with distinct systems of law. Muslim villagers would no 
longer be understood of as having ancestral land rights in common with Hindu 
villagers. Their identity as Hindu converts to Islam would not be recognized under 
personal law. While customary law implied gradual conversion of communities over 
generations, Muslim politicians who supported the Bill described conversion as 
radical change by individuals based on religious conviction. It also undermined 
economic and political policies in the Punjab that were based on the urban and rural 
distinction, a structure of political representation that decentralized political influence 
in the Punjab and encouraged political representation of socio-economic interests. It 
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thus was conducive to the style of politics adopted by urban Muslims and ulama in the 
Punjab.  
The passage of the Muslim Dissolution of Marriage (MDM) Bill, whose 
movers expressed the same set of principles as those who moved the MPLA Bill, was 
a result of compromise or reconciliation of ‘Islamic law’ to ‘Hindu law’ through 
consensus. The Bill attempted to mend the loophole in divorce laws created by the 
automatic dissolution of marriage for apostasy from Islam by using the same strategy 
that had been employed by Fazli Husain in court—asserting an alternative precedent 
from within the Islamic tradition. This legislation was firmly opposed by Hindu 
politicians who argued that it infringed on Hindu law, and facilitated ‘forced’ 
conversion of Hindu women to Islam through marriage. The Act that passed was a 
compromise that allowed for automatic dissolution of marriage for female apostates 
who were converting back to their original religion. While the Bill achieved its 
purpose, it preserved an interpretation of Islamic law that prescribed the death penalty 
for apostasy and reinforced a separation between Hindus and Muslims.  
A decade before his appointment as the first foreign minister of Pakistan, 
Zafrullah Khan was the Muslim member of the Viceroy’s Executive Council. 
Zafrullah Khan, speaking on behalf of the India government, supported the passage of 
the MDM Bill as a measure to reform apostasy laws. However, he seems to have 
misrepresented the intents of its movers. He argued that there was no punishment for 
apostasy from Islam, an interpretation that he said derived from his own study of the 
Quran and the traditions of the Prophet, rather than from the Islamic legal tradition. 
This interpretation of Islamic law accorded with the principle of freedom of 
conscience and belief. While Khan’s interpretation could be said to reflect his 
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membership within a ‘heretical’ Muslim sect, it could also be said to reflect his social 
and economic background as an ‘agriculturalist’ Muslim lawyer from central Punjab.  
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